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7Preface
Martin Junge
For us Christians the interpretation of the Bible is crucial since the stories, 
prayers and theological reflections in the Bible profoundly nurture our faith 
and our life in this world. One key dimension of the Reformation movement 
was the renewed focus on the Bible and its life-giving message. Martin 
Luther was a Bible scholar by training, and he stressed the importance of 
translating the Bible into the vernacular. He underlined that God’s Word 
is a living word that aims at touching people’s hearts so that they experi-
ence God’s grace. Most renewal movements in the history of the church, 
be it pietism, popular Bible readings in base communities, or resistance 
movements in situations of oppression, find motivation and orientation in 
biblical texts.
Among Muslim scholars and within the Muslim community today, 
there is a vibrant conversation about the interpretation of the Qur’an. For 
Muslims, the Qur’an provides guidance for their relationship to God and 
to the world. Muslims recite Qur’anic verses when they pray and these 
support the Muslim community in daily life and at special moments. To 
learn verses of the Qur’an by heart is a key practice in Muslim spirituality, 
and Muslim ethics draw conclusions from the Qur’anic texts.
Christians and Muslims know full well that each text emerged in a 
specific context, and that each reading of the text takes place in a specific 
context. People of faith turn to their sacred scriptures in times of trouble 
and weakness as well as in times of joy and gratitude. People look at the 
texts when they seek guidance, and refer to them when they have to make 
major decisions.
The way in which we understand the texts is naturally informed by 
what is happening around us. As a Latin American, having grown up during 
times of oppression and massive violations of human rights, I remember 
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what it meant to read sacred texts against this specific sociopolitical 
context, and how that context informed the ways in which I approached, 
understood and read sacred texts.
The relationship between text and the diverse contexts is therefore one of 
the main topics in scriptural interpretation. In today’s world, communication 
breakdowns seem to be the order of the day and communities that used 
to live together peacefully no longer manage to do so. Polarization, hate 
speech and extremism haunt our communities; violence or the threat 
thereof is frightening.
In the midst of this reality, the articles in this book, written by Christian 
and Muslim scholars, attest to the fact that dialogue is possible—dialogue 
within and between our communities about meaningful and responsible 
scriptural interpretation today. How do religious communities deal with 
those passages in their own sacred scriptures that condone, or even justify 
violence? How do we deal with “texts of terror” in our own scriptures? It is 
vital that together we try to discern, explain and learn to be accountable 
in more explicit ways to those key principles that inform our reading of 
sacred texts and help us to live in a shared world.
Important topics that currently trigger vibrant debates in our religious 
communities with regard to scriptural interpretation are the empowerment 
of women and the ecological crisis. If justice is not at the very center of how 
men and women interact with one another the world will never find justice 
and peace. Equally, justice needs to be at the center in how we relate to all 
of creation and the planet as a whole. Important interfaith activities have 
taken place in climate advocacy and we need to join hands in dealing with 
the significant challenges facing the human family.
The essays in this book were first presented at an international Christian-
Muslim conference in 2016, which was organized by The Lutheran World 
Federation in collaboration with the Faculty of Theology at the University 
of Oslo, Norway and the Center for Islamic Theology, University of Münster, 
Germany. I would like to commend this publication to you; it is a clear sign 
that yes, dialogue is possible, yes, the world deserves strong contributions 
from religious communities and, yes, our focus is on transforming violence, 
oppression and injustice and live out the message of God’s love, grace and 
mercy.
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Simone Sinn
Historically, the emergence of a discrete body of texts as “sacred scripture” 
has been closely associated with the formation of a distinct religious com-
munity. These sacred scriptures are of vital importance to the respective 
religious communities. For instance, as the Christian community recognized 
the biblical canon as authoritative scripture, the church and the Bible took 
shape. Equally, in Islam the recognition of the Qur’an as the authoritative 
scripture was crucial for the formation of the umma. These interrelated 
processes fundamentally connect the community to the text and vice versa. 
These processes did not only occur when the communities came into 
being but continue to take place throughout the ages. Whenever Christians 
gather to listen to the gospel message, this constitutes the Christian com-
munity as church. Wherever Muslims gather to listen to the message of 
the Qur’an, there the Muslim community is alive. 
Beyond this close relationship between a community and its sacred 
scripture, there have always been well distinct connections to other texts 
and other readings of the same texts and traditions. There is clearly a his-
torical as well as theological interrelatedness between the Tanach, which 
Judaism refers to as sacred scripture, the Bible, which Christians regard 
as authoritative, and the Qur’an, which Muslims regard as the Word of God. 
These sacred scriptures did not emerge in isolation nor are they generally 
read in isolation. The reading of sacred texts can be used to distinguish 
and demarcate one’s own community or to build bridges and establish a 
connection to other communities. 
The interpretation of sacred scriptures is a contested field. Clearly the 
power of a sacred text can only unfold in its reading since the text needs 
a person and a community for whom the message becomes meaningful 
and relevant. Critical questions that many contemporary religious com-
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munities struggle with include the following: Who has the legitimate right 
authoritatively to interpret sacred scriptures? What are appropriate ap-
proaches? What are suitable methods of interpretation? How is the notion 
of “sacredness” to be understood in the process of interpretation? Neither 
Christianity, nor Islam has one central authority that decides on these 
questions. Globally and locally interpretation is a polycentric endeavor-
-polycentric in terms of geographical diversity, various positions of influ-
ence and different approaches. 
The essays in this volume contribute to debates on scriptural exegesis 
by proposing readings that take into account insights from the discourse 
on hermeneutics and interreligious dialogue processes. Christian and 
Muslim scholars from different contexts explore theoretical assumptions 
and interpret relevant texts from sacred scriptures, focusing specifically 
on “transformative readings.” This implies that reading and interpreting 
sacred texts is not simply a matter of intellectually reconstructing the 
content of a text nor an act of immersing oneself into a preexistent tradi-
tion, but a reading that effects change by opening up new possibilities of 
knowing God and oneself and of being in the world. 
This publication is divided into three sections. The first explores 
interpretative possibilities emerging when insights from other religious 
communities and other religious texts are taken into account. The various 
contributions look at the interaction and dialogue between texts, communi-
ties and scholars. 
With reference to concrete examples of how interpretations shift over 
time, Oddbjørn Leirvik outlines how the concept of hell was reinterpreted 
in Christian circles, and how contemporary Muslim scholars deal with 
Qur’anic verses that condone violence. He identifies the “humanization of 
theological ethics” as a hermeneutical strategy that can offer transforma-
tive perspectives in contemporary Christian and Muslim interpretations. 
Anne Hege Grung demonstrates that the humanization of theological 
ethics developed among scholars of Islam and Christianity can similarly 
be observed among the faithful in the communities. She analyses empiri-
cal data of a process where Muslim and Christian women together read 
difficult texts in the Qur’an and the Bible. The women in this interpreta-
tive community agreed that some texts from their respective traditions 
have the dangerous potential to be used in destructive ways. Hege Grung 
discusses the need for and possibilities of establishing forms of transfor-
mative hermeneutics through co-readings. 
Analyzing historical developments, Stefan Schreiner explores the in-
terwoven reception history between the Qur’an and the Bible. His starting 
point is the observation that many Qur’anic passages recollect texts and 
stories known from biblical and post-biblical Jewish and Christian sources 
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and he goes on to examine how scholars have interpreted the succession 
of revealed books and prophets. Schreiner’s analysis clearly demonstrates 
that there is not only a historical correlation but a mutuality that is also 
theologically relevant for today’s interpretation of the Qur’an and the Bible.
Nicholas Adams reflects on the unusual and remarkable practice of 
scriptural reasoning, which requires that scholars suspend their exper-
tise and reason together on the basis of the text alone. This is frequently 
experienced as a provocative requirement, perhaps because it puts into 
question the status of the scholar. Adams draws attention to this aspect 
of scriptural reasoning, argues that it sheds light on important features of 
the practice, and suggest that it accounts for certain successes and failures 
among particular groups of participants.
The report from a dialogical experiment with a multi-religious and 
interdisciplinary team of scholars in Hamburg concludes this section. 
Katja Drechsler and Thorsten Knauth outline the methodological approach 
and results of this empirical endeavor and suggest that at the heart of the 
dialogical hermeneutics is a balancing act of four fields of tension: one 
related to knowledge, another one to context, the third one emerging from 
the distinction between sacred and profane and the fourth to the opposing 
dynamics of trust and suspicion. 
The second section focuses on transformative readings of the Qur’an. 
Safet Bektovic summarizes recent developments in Islamic theology in 
Europe. He discusses the legitimacy of the concept of a European Islam 
and European Islamic theology and explores contemporary dimensions 
and perspectives of Islamic theological thinking in Europe. He concludes 
by describing their relevance in relation to the everyday lives of Muslims 
and the training of imams in Europe and clearly shows how structures 
and spaces for education and research need to be created that allow for 
transformative readings. 
Mouhanad Khorchide speaks out of such a space. Khorchide is con-
vinced that the Qur’an is not a monologue and, consequently, explores the 
Qur’an as an “act of communication.” He underlines that the Qur’an is at 
the same time thoroughly divine and thoroughly human. In order to deal 
with the hermeneutical challenges, Khorchide finds helpful insights in Paul 
Ricoeur’s reflections on hermeneutics. As a Muslim theologian, Khorchide 
highlights God’s mercy as the hermeneutical key to understanding the 
Qur’anic message. 
Since constructive interreligious relations are often restrained by ex-
clusivist religious truth claims, Sahiron Syamsuddin critically addresses 
such claims. He reinterprets Q 2:111—113, which is often used to legitimize 
an exclusivist perspective. Syamsuddin interprets the text by employing 
a classic twofold approach--first by establishing the original meaning of 
Simone Sinn • Introduction
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the text and second by articulating its significance for the contemporary 
situation. He shows how these verses can be interpreted in inclusive, even 
pluralist ways. 
In light of renewed reflection on gender relations, the creation stories in 
sacred scriptures are again the focus of attention. Dina El Omari describes 
insights of contemporary feminist exegesis of the Qur’an. Looking at key 
Qur’anic passages, she points out that God created men and women at the 
same time from the same substance and highlights that from this perspec-
tive men and women are equal partners. El Omari discusses theological 
debates related to the concept of the Fall and argues that this concept is 
not part of the original Qur’anic message. 
Asmaa El Maaroufi reinterprets Qur’anic passages referring to animals 
in order to develop fundamental guidelines for animal ethics from an 
Islamic perspective. She identifies similarities and differences between 
human beings and animals, and outlines the relationship that both have 
with the Creator. El Maaroufi explores the Qur’anic terminology used for 
the relationship between animals and human beings and critically ad-
dresses a reductionist anthropology. She pleads for repositioning humanity 
within the cosmos, and to develop more sensitivity to the close relationship 
between human beings and their fellow creatures. 
Naveed Baig’s contribution on Islamic spiritual care concludes this 
section. He explains how Qur’anic verses may help people in pain and 
suffering to find coping mechanisms and outlines how tradition and or-
thopraxy are present in the way religious Muslim patients cope during 
times of crisis. There are also signs that traditional Muslim coping ideals 
are expressed in ways peculiar to the individual’s personal situation dur-
ing times of suffering and need and a “talking with God” that defines new 
ways of perceiving God and the images of God. 
The essays in the third section focus on transformative readings of 
the Bible. Clare Amos takes the reader on a journey through the book of 
Genesis and demonstrates the shifting presentations of God. Traveling 
through the story of creation, the story of the flood, the stories of Abraham, 
of Jacob and of Joseph and his brothers, Amos argues that God’s voice in 
and through the biblical text is dialogical. Furthermore, she points out that 
the different names of God reflect various aspects of God’s relationship 
to humanity. Amos encourages an approach to the Bible that takes this 
sacred scripture as a dialogue partner.
Kenneth Mtata highlights that the power of sacred texts lies in their 
ability to offer a language for alternative reality. He underlines that in 
the biblical tradition God’s communication is an invitation of love. Mtata 
interprets 1 Samuel 1-7 and shows how in these chapters nation building 
transitions from a theocratic to a monarchical model. These passages pri-
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marily depict the catastrophic nature of divine silence but also point to its 
reversal. Mtata explores what led to the decline and how the nation was 
restored through God’s agency and God’s messengers. The new alternative 
reality is shalom, which is fully God’s, yet through God’s grace humans 
participate in the realization of shalom. 
Marianne Bjelland Kartzow observes that people relate to the Bible 
not only as sacred scripture, but also as a cultural, poetic, scholarly and 
political text. She argues that the theories of intersectionality and othering 
provide relevant insights for biblical interpretation today. She identifies 
hermeneutical and epistemological models in the New Testament which, 
due to their destabilizing potential, offer a space for transformation. 
According to Martin Kopp, climate change is one contemporary ethi-
cal challenge that leads the interpreter of the Bible to approach the texts 
with questions its authors ignored. Kopp poses the question how science, 
exegesis and theology can collaborate to generate meaning and discern 
God’s will. He advocates for a renewed interpretation of the scriptures in 
the face of the ecological crisis, and points out that a renewed theology will 
lead to a transformed understanding of what it means to be a Christian 
in today’s world. 
The contributions in this publication address the issue of transforma-
tive readings at the epistemological as well as the methodological level. 
While addressing different aspects of transformation--the structural, com-
munal and individual—all of them affirm the communicative and dialogi-
cal nature of sacred texts. Thereby the cliché that sacred texts are sacred 
because they stand “apart” from mundane reality is questioned. Rather, 
sacred texts are here presented as invitations to dialogue and engagement 
because they are a living, communicative source for human knowledge of 
God’s agency in this world. 
It is obvious that sacred texts unfold their transformative power when 
they speak to people’s hearts and minds. In order to prevent harmful read-
ings and foster live-giving interpretations ethical and theological discern-
ment is called for. Both, scholarly expertise and the communities of faithful 
are needed for such discernment. On many contemporary issues such as 
gender justice, animal ethics, climate justice, exclusion and violence joint 
Christian and Muslim scriptural interpretation provides an important space 
for transformative readings. These shared interpretative spaces open new 
possibilities of understanding and mutually reinforce engagement.
Simone Sinn • Introduction
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Reading Sacred Scriptures 
in Dialogue

17
Handling Problematic Texts: Ethical 
Critique and Moral Enrichment
Oddbjørn Leirvik
In the following, I will address the issue of “problematic texts” in the 
Bible and the Qur’an. I will try to identify some hermeneutical strategies 
aimed at tackling such texts—strategies applied by ordinary believers as 
well as by theologians. I will relate my discussion to the concept of hell 
in the Christian tradition and the way in which Sura 5:32 is dealt with in 
popular Muslim discourses about religion and violence. As for professional 
hermeneutical strategies, I will discuss the concepts of ethical critique and 
moral enrichment of sacred scriptures.
Which themes are put on the agenda in interfaith dialogue is a matter 
of discursive power in a given context. In her analysis of the work of a 
long-standing interfaith dialogue group in the Swedish city of Malmö, 
Anne Sofie Roald notes that some of the Muslim participants felt that 
the agenda was heavily influenced by liberal Christians—reflecting their 
social-ethical commitment to human rights, gender equality, social justice 
and ecological balance. Ethical issues outside the liberal agenda, such as 
alcohol consumption, were seemingly simply not taken into consideration for 
discussion. Furthermore, difficult theological issues—such as the question 
of heaven and hell—were completely ignored in a dialogue that was entirely 
“down to earth” in its orientation.1
1 Anne Sofie Roald, “Religionsdialogiska perspektiv: En fallstudie av en dialoggrupp 
i södra Sverige,” in Mikael Stenmark and David Westerlund (eds), Polemik eller 
dialog? Nutida religionsteologiska perspektiv bland kristna och muslimer (Nora: 
Nya Doxa, 2002), 83–97.
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The doctrine of hell as a hermeneutical challenge
In contemporary Christian theology, at least in the West, the images of 
heaven and hell have seemingly been abolished altogether, along with a 
rejection of the idea that non-believers and adherents of other faiths face 
eternal perdition. The Swedish theologian Kajsa Ahlstrand has suggested 
that interfaith dialogue has in fact contributed to this development, as part 
of a general “softening in inter-faith discourse.”2
Along with the ethical turn in modern theology, the doctrine of eternal 
damnation—with its traditional images of hellfire—tends to be seen as 
entirely incompatible with an ethically responsible theology. For many, it 
is seen as a real stumbling block for the humanization of theological ethics.
But how can those who strive for a humanization of Christian theology 
sidestep the image of a tyrannical deity who throws unbelievers into a hell 
of eternal torture? Are not these conceptions a pivotal part of the Lutheran 
confessions (The Augsburg Confession, Article 17)3 as well as of the New 
Testament message? And what hermeneutical strategy can be applied to 
defend the abolition of hell and related conceptions?
Back in 1953, the issue of hell was the topic of a heated public debate 
in Norway in connection with a radio broadcast in which the famous Inner 
Mission chief Ole Hallesby said:
I’m sure I speak to many this evening who know they have not turned to God. 
You know very well that if you fell dead on the floor at this moment, you would 
fall directly into hell … So how can you, who have not turned to God, confidently 
go to bed and sleep at night when you don’t know if you’ll wake up tomorrow in 
your bed or in hell?4
The speech was transmitted by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, 
which at that time had a monopoly. The speech was heavily attacked by 
the general public and also by some church leaders. Hallesby hit back by 
2 Kajsa Ahlstrand,“Softening in Inter-faith Discourse,” (2003), at http://www.
emmausnett.no/ressurser/ahlstrand_softening.shtml
3 “They also teach that at the consummation of the world Christ will appear for 
judgment and will bring to life all the dead. He will give eternal life and endless 
joy to the righteous and elect, but he will condemn the ungodly and the devils to 
endless torment.” “The Augsburg Confession—Latin Text—Article XVII: Concerning 
the Return of Christ for Judgment,” in Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (eds), The 
Book of Concord. The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2000), 51. 
4 Ole Hallesby, “Omvend deg – nå! (Helvetestalen),” Virksomme ord, n.d., at http://
virksommeord.uib.no/taler?id=3982, author’s own translation.
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stating that “in the Gospel of Matthew alone, Jesus spoke eighteen times 
about eternal perdition. And in nine of these instances, he vividly depicted 
the torment in various ways.” To quote but one of Hallesby’s examples from 
the parable of the weeds in Matthew 13:40–43:5
As the weeds are pulled up and burned in the fire, so it will be at the end of the 
age. The Son of Man will send out his angels, and they will weed out of his king-
dom everything that causes sin and all who do evil. They will throw them into 
the blazing furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then 
the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father. Whoever has 
ears, let them hear.
Or in Matthew 10:28: “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill 
the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.”
Hallesby’s chief opponent, the liberal Bishop Kristian Schjelderup, 
declared that for him, the doctrine of eternal punishment in hell was not 
compatible with what he called “the gospel of love”:
Undoubtedly, divine love and mercy are greater than what is expressed through the 
doctrine of eternal torment in hell. The Gospel of Christ is the gospel of love … For 
me, the doctrine of eternal punishment in hell does not belong to the religion of love.6
Of course, the Bishop did not deny that in the gospels Jesus does speak of 
salvation and perdition. But Schjelderup could not imagine that perdition 
would mean eternal torment—which in his understanding would be “in 
contradiction with the very spirit of the divine revelation we have received 
through Christ.”7
Oddly enough, the question was eventually dealt with by the Ministry 
of Church Affairs (this was in the state church era), which concluded that 
Bishop Schjelderup’s position was not contrary to Lutheran doctrine, thus 
abolishing hellfire by political decree.8
Bishop Schjelderup’s approach has been the main hermeneutical strategy 
of liberal theologians with a “humanizing” program: to take the sting out 
of problematic passages in the Bible by subordinating them to a superior 
message of love, which is postulated as the very core of the gospel. Reading 
the scriptures in light of a postulated center—the crucified Christ—is also 
5 Quoted from the New International Version.
6 Kristian Schjelderup, De evige helvetesstraffer og bekjennelsen (Oslo: Forlaget 
Land og Kirke, 1954), 15, author’s own translation.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 Ibid.
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a pivotal part of Lutheran hermeneutics. As demonstrated by Anne Hege 
Grung in her analysis of a group of Christian and Muslim women reading 
problematic texts together, the hermeneutical doctrine of Christ alone is 
often popularized to imply that anything in the New Testament that does 
not conform to the individual believer’s image of Jesus can readily be 
discarded.9
But exactly how, when scrutinizing the scriptures, do we come to the 
conclusion that Jesus and the gospels represent a “religion of love”? Must 
we not acknowledge that important parts of the New Testament (as well as 
dogmatic tradition) actually portray God as vengeful and a torturer? If so, 
there is no escape from submitting the gospels to a fundamental, ethical 
critique. For our own moral integrity, we simply cannot accept images of 
God that are associated with eternal torment in God’s name. The doctrine 
of hell is morally unacceptable.
In passing, it should be mentioned that the idea of eternal hellfire is also 
heavily represented in the Qur’an, often by the formula “the inhabitants of 
fire” (aṣḥāb al-nār): “Those who disbelieve and deny Our messages shall 
be the inhabitants of the Fire, and there they will remain” (Qur’an 2:39).10 
The Qur’anic imagery of hell is abundant and terrifying and the idea of 
divinely ordained hellfire constitutes a shared hermeneutical challenge 
for Islam and Christianity. How can the images of hell be reconciled with 
the belief in divine mercy? Must we not suspend them on ethical grounds?
Ethical critique of the scriptures
In the Christian context, the legacy of an ethical critique of the scriptures 
goes at least back to Kant who, in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
criticized the story of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac in light of the 
universal moral law.11 The stories of Abraham’s sacrifice constitute another 
shared hermeneutical challenge for Jews, Christians and Muslims and the 
idea of human sacrifice as a proof of obedience to God is of course deeply 
troubling from an ethical perspective.
9 Anne Hege Grung, Gender Justice in Muslim–Christian Readings. Christian and 
Muslim Women in Norway: Making Meaning of Texts from the Bible, the Koran, and 
the Hadith (Amsterdam: Brill Rodopi, 2015), 41–44.
10 For wider Islamic traditions, see Christian Lange, Paradise and Hell in Islamic 
Traditions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
11 Nils Gilje, “Filosofisk teologi og religiøs erfaring, et kantiansk perspektiv,” in 
Arve Brunvoll, Hans Bringeland, Nils Gilje and Gunnar Skirbekk (eds), Religion 
og kultur. Ein fleirfagleg samtale (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2009), 60–75.
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In the contemporary context, the Christian feminist theologian 
Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, in a 1987 presidential address to the Society 
of Biblical Literature, summoned biblical scholars not only to take public 
responsibility for their choice of interpretive methods but equally “for the 
ethical consequences of the biblical text and its meanings.”12 Developing 
her argument, she located the ethical problem not only in the act of 
interpretation but in the authorial construction of the texts themselves:
If scriptural texts have served not only noble causes but also to legitimate war, 
to nurture anti-Judaism and misogynism, to justify the exploitation of slavery 
and to promote colonial dehumanization, then biblical scholarship must take the 
responsibility not only to interpret biblical texts in their historical contexts but 
also to evaluate the construction of their historical worlds and symbolic universes 
in terms of a religious scale of values.13
Modern Christian theologians increasingly recognize ethical critique of the 
sacred scriptures as an unavoidable exercise in theological hermeneutics.14 
But how can we handle the unease we feel when faced with morally troubling 
texts? Should we suspend them in the name of a higher interpretative 
principle, or challenge the sacred texts on moral grounds?
To me, moral or ethical critique is a more convincing hermeneutical 
strategy than just declaring that anything problematic in the scriptures 
can be obliterated by a postulated “religion of love” or “gospel of Christ.” 
But we need to be clear about which ethical principles we apply in our 
critique and explain why we think that exactly these principles (or values) 
are trumping anything else in the sacred traditions.
Islam and violence
Whereas Christians (at least in the West) have a long history of being 
challenged in their beliefs in hell, Muslims face other types of challenges 
in public debates. There is little doubt that many Muslims share traditional 
12 Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation,” in Journal 
of Biblical Literature (107), 15.
13 Ibid.
14 See Michael Prior, The Bible and Colonialism. A Moral Critique (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997); Heikki Räisänen, ”På väg mot en etisk bibelkritik,” in 
Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok 65 (2000), 227–42; and Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Interreligious 
Hermeneutics and the Ethical Critique of the Scriptures,” in Oddbjørn Leirvik, 
Interreligious Studies. A Relational Approach to Religious Activism and the Study 
of Religion (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 105ff.
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Christian views of heaven and hell, as numerous Islamic webpages with 
graphic descriptions of hellfire abundantly demonstrate. But it is not the 
symbolic violence implied in these images that captures critical attention 
from the general public. It is rather the question of real, and religiously 
legitimized, violence that dominates the discussion.
In current debates about religion and violence, Muslims are constantly 
confronted by isolated verses from the Qur’an such as the notorious “sword 
verse” in Q 9:5 (“kill the polytheists wherever you find them”) or Q 8:60 
which is also the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Prepare whatever 
forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off 
God’s enemies and yours …”15
Believers can contextualize these verses without too much difficulty 
by referring to the particular circumstances that may have prompted 
them, namely violent animosity against the first Muslims and their still-
precarious situation after the emigration to Medina. To balance the same 
verses, Muslims may also mobilize much more peaceful passages such 
as the ubiquitously quoted “no compulsion in religion” (Q 2:256) and, not 
least, the following passage from Q 5:32: “If anyone kills a person … it is 
as if he kills all mankind, while if anyone saves a life it is as if he saves 
the lives of all mankind.”
If we look at the preceding literary context of the latter verse, we will 
find the Qur’anic version of the story of Cain and Abel, which is retold 
in a way that corroborates the apparent non-violent ethos of verse 32: “If 
you raise your hand to kill me, I will not raise mine to kill you. I fear God, 
Lord of all worlds” (5:28).
The problem with the subsequent verse 32 is the mid-verse reservation 
which reads, “If anyone kills a person – unless in retribution for murder 
or spreading corruption in the land—it is as if he kills all mankind.” In 
my experience, this reservation is normally ignored (or concealed) when 
Muslims quote this verse in current discussions about religion and violence.
Judging by the following verse 33, the ignored reservation in verse 
32 (which legalizes the taking of lives in certain circumstances) seems 
actually to be the point here:
Those who wage war against God and His Messenger, and strive to spread corrup-
tion in the land should be punished by death, crucifixion, the amputation of an 
alternate hand and foot, or banishment from the land: a disgrace for them in this 
world, and then a terrible punishment in the Hereafter ... . 
15 The Qur’anic quotations are taken from The Qur’an, A New Translation by M.A.S. 
Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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Another verse in the immediate literary context (verse 38) legalizes the 
cutting off of hands for theft.
So what is going on here, when the mid-verse in Q 5:32 is simply cut away 
and the problematic parts of the literary context are completely ignored? 
It seems that the Qur’an is being censored by well-meaning believers who 
are inclined to reinterpret the entire Book of God as a divine message of 
mercy. Much like the “Gospel of Christ” and “religion of love” invoked by 
Bishop Schjelderup, a postulated principle of mercy trumps anything in 
the sacred scriptures that is morally problematic for the modern mind 
(or for a Muslim human rights proponent). In his book, Islam is Mercy: 
Essential Features of a Modern Religion,16 Mouhanad Khorchide, eloquently 
demonstrates the hermeneutical key of divine mercy.
But how should the complex relationship between non-violent 
admonitions and divinely sanctioned violence—be it the symbolic violence 
of hellfire or the terrifying reality of hudud-punishments—be addressed 
hermeneutically? Must one resort to a cut-and-paste strategy, so to speak, 
in the name of love?
The cut-and-paste strategy is not, of course, an acceptable hermeneutical 
strategy in learned circles. Some Muslim academics have responded to 
the need for a moral discussion of the scriptures by developing their own, 
congenial approaches to scriptural hermeneutics. A triggering factor has 
been that of gender-based violence.
Saying “no” to the text?
Amina Wadud’s hermeneutical development in her struggle with Qur’anic 
texts that are felt to be problematic in relation to gender-based violence 
(especially the notorious verse 4:34, which seems to allow the husband to 
hit a disobedient wife), is interesting. Whereas in her 1992 book, Qur’an and 
Women, she tended to “save” the text by indicating alternative translations 
of ḍaraba,17 in her later 2006 book (Inside the Gender Jihad), she emphatically 
says “no” to the text (or at least, its literal meaning):
There is no way of getting round this one, even though I have tried through dif-
ferent methods for two decades. I simply do not and cannot condone permission 
for a man to “scourge” or apply any kind of blow to a woman … . This leads me to 
16 Kindle edition (Freiburg: Herder, 2014).
17 Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman. Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective (Oxford: Oneworld, 1999), 76.
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clarify how I have finally come to say “no” outright to the literal implementation 
of this passage.18
This also has implications for Wadud’s reasoning regarding the hudud 
(penal code) ordinances:
This verse [4:34] and the literal implementation of hudud both imply an ethical 
standard of human actions that are archaic and barbarian at this time in history. 
They are unjust in the ways that human beings have come to experience and un-
derstand justice, and hence unacceptable to universal notions of human dignity.19
An ethical critique of sacred texts could hardly be spelled out more clearly, 
and that by a believer. Wadud also notes that the felt necessity to say “no” 
to Q 4:34 implies that “we finally arrive at a place where we acknowledge 
that we intervene with the text.” Defending her hermeneutical strategy, 
Wadud claims that “the collective community has always manipulated the 
text in concert with civilizational or, better still, human development … . 
We are the makers of textual meaning.”20
Moral enrichment of the text: part 
of the process of revelation?
In her argument, Wadud leans partly on the reasoning of the Egyptian-
American thinker Khaled Abou El Fadl. When criticizing violence and other 
problematic issues such as authoritarian structures, gender inequality 
and intolerance of other faiths, Abou El Fadl (like Wadud) does not stop at 
criticizing the interpretive tradition but also opens a critical, dialogical 
hermeneutics of the Qur’an. Abou El Fadl does not, however (like some 
Christian theologians), speak of an ethical critique of the sacred text, but 
instead introduces the notion of moral enrichment. Noting that the Qur’an 
repeatedly appeals to the moral sense of its reader by its reference to 
general terms such as “justice” (ʽadl) and “right” (al-ma‘rūf ), he suggests,
…the Qur’anic text assumes that readers will bring a preexisting, innate moral sense 
to the text. Hence the text will morally enrich the reader, but only if the reader 
18 Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad. Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2006), 200. Cf. Aysha A. Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 138–41.
19 Wadud, op. cit. (note 17), 200.
20 Ibid., 204.
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will morally enrich the text. The meaning of the religious text is not fixed simply 
by the literal meaning of its words, but depends, too, on the moral construction 
given to it by the reader.21
A similar approach is taken by Ebrahim Moosa in a chapter about “The debts 
and burdens of critical Islam,” published in the 2003 anthology Progressive 
Muslims. Moosa notes that a number of practices seemingly sanctioned by 
the normative sources have in fact been abandoned by modern Muslim 
sensibilities: “For a whole set of reasons, we no longer consider marriage 
to what our modern culture deems minors, corporal punishment and the 
death penalty to be acceptable practices.”22 Like Abou El Fadl, Moosa 
takes a step further—from historical contextualization towards a critical 
conversation with the sacred text itself, by suggesting that all kinds of “text 
fundamentalism” must be avoided and the critical response of the reader 
must be taken seriously—as part of “the process of revelation.” Referring 
to indisputable patriarchal features of the Qur’an, he writes:
It may be preferable to hear the Qur’an in its patriarchal voice but to understand 
it with the sensibility of an actor/reader/listener/reciter immersed in the process 
of revelation. It is that listener/reciter who discovers through her or his history, 
experience and transformed inner sensibility that gender justice, equality and 
fairness are a norm for our time and not patriarchy.23
What shines through in Moosa’s reasoning, is an ethical hermeneutics 
focused on a reader’s response. Involving the contemporary reader in the 
very process of revelation, he even formulates a theological hermeneutics 
characterized by interactivity. Criticizing those who exclusively seek 
authority in some founding text for failing “to engage the text in an 
interactive manner,” he claims that:
It is precisely such interactivity that transforms the human being who is ultimately 
the subject of revelation and who has to embody the qualities that combat patri-
archy and endorse justice and equality … The truth is that we ‘make’ the norms 
in conversation with the revelatory text.24
21 Khaled Abou El Fadl et al., The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press. 
2002), 15.
22 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam,” in Omid Safi (ed.) 
Progressive Muslims. On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 122.
23 Ibid., 125
24 Ibid.
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In the Islamic context, the approaches of Wadud, Abou El Fadl and Moosa 
break new ground in theological hermeneutics. Their way of reasoning 
can readily be applied by Christian theologians as well. Actually, their 
ideas of moral enrichment of the text and of readers being included in 
the process of revelation may be considered as more dialogical than the 
perhaps more monological concept of ethical critique. However, from a 
feminist theological viewpoint (cf. Wadud), it is crucial that the right to 
say “no” to the text is retained.
The humanization of theological ethics 
However we name these hermeneutical strategies, their common horizon 
seems to be the humanization of theological ethics.25 But we cannot, as 
Christian and Muslim interpreters, avoid explaining our normative positions. 
Where do we find those ethical principles with which we morally criticize 
or enrich the sacred scriptures? If basing our reading on a non-violent, 
humanistic premise, how did we reach this critical point of no return from 
divinely sanctioned injustice and violence?
In conclusion, I will suggest how Tariq Ramadan’s 2005 moratorium 
could be read in this respect.26 In his much-debated communication, 
Ramadan called for an immediate moratorium on the death penalty and 
hudud punishments in the Muslim world. Similarly, in 2001, Abou El Fadl 
had called for a “conscientious pause” regarding the applications of hudud 
ordinances, realizing that such a pause “might result in a faith-based 
objection to the textual evidence.”27 Returning to Ramadan, he explains 
that the intention behind his conscientious moratorium was to address
… the conscience of each individual, to mobilize ordinary Muslims to call on their 
governments to place an immediate moratorium on the application of these punish-
ments and to call for Muslim scholars for the opening of a vast intra-community 
debate on the matter.28
25 Leirvik, op. cit. (note 14), 134–37.
26 Tariq Ramadan, “An International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, 
Stoning and the Death Penalty in the Islamic World,” 5 April 2005, at http://www.
tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article264.
27 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name. Islamic Law, Authority, and Women 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 93; cf. Wadud, op. cit (note 17), 200.
28 Tariq Ramadan, “A Call for a Moratorium on Corporeal Punishment—The Debate 
in Review,” in Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe (eds), New Directions 
in Islamic Thought. Exploring Reform and Muslim Tradition (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2009), 165.
27
When reading Ramadan’s call, it struck me that the guiding principle 
behind his moratorium was actually a theologically motivated concern for 
the vulnerable human being. Ramadan realizes that, in an imperfect world 
with asymmetrical power relations, severe punishments will regularly 
affect women more than men and the poorer and weaker members of 
society much harder than the wealthy and powerful ones. If we recognize 
this somber reality, says Ramadan, “it is impossible for us as Muslims to 
remain silent as irreversible injustice is done to the poorest and weakest 
members of society in the name of our religion.”29
Muslim as well as secular Western reactions against the proposed 
moratorium proved its controversial character. Several critics said that 
Ramadan should have called for a full abolition of hudud punishments 
and not merely a “moratorium.” The way Ramadan argues his proposed 
moratorium, however, gives the clear impression that his call is really meant 
for an indefinite period of time, probably for ever. For, from Ramadan’s 
perspective, how can such punishments ever be justified when we know 
how the world works?
In my view, ethical concern for the vulnerable human being is clearly 
the implied premise for Ramadan’s moratorium. I therefore take his call as 
an example of humanizing theological reasoning in Islam. In Ramadan’s 
case, his application of the humane criterion in theological reasoning leads 
him to sidestep important aspects of classical Sharia—for the sake of the 
vulnerable ones. In tune with Emmanuel Levinas’s face-to-face philosophical 
ethics, I would suggest that concern for the vulnerable human being is 
the common ground for any call for ethical critique or moral enrichment 
of the sacred scriptures.
A topic that remains for further dialogue is whether we see God as a 
vulnerable deity or whether we—on moral grounds—simply have to resist 
God’s all-too-powerful authority.
29 Ibid., 163.
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Transformative Hermeneutics in 
the Making through the Co-Reading 
of Biblical and Qur’anic texts by 
Muslim and Christian Women
Anne Hege Grung
Introduction
What happens when Muslim and Christian women come together in order to 
co-read the Bible and the Qur’an? Can establishing such forms of interpreta-
tive communities provide new resources for understanding and negotiating 
with our canonical scriptures? In this contribution, I will explore the complex 
hermeneutical situation that may arise when Muslim and Christian women 
read and discuss biblical and Qur’anic texts together. Drawing on empirical 
material established in a Norwegian context from an interpretative community 
of this kind, I will look further into how the participants’ reading strategies 
and interpretation are situated between interpretative authority, ethical cri-
tique and moral enrichment of the texts and how the interpretative encounter 
between the readers from the two traditions shapes their understanding. 
This understanding moves between understanding and investigating the 
texts and interpreting and exploring the contexts represented in the group. 
The women in the interpretative community I studied agree that some texts 
from their respective traditions have the dangerous potential to be used in 
destructive ways. The need for and the possibilities of establishing forms of 
transformative hermeneutics through co-readings emerged from the group’s 
work. But what does this transformation consist of and who and what will 
possibly be transformed? Is it the readers, the texts, the interpretative tools 
or communities in a wider sense that are object(s) of transformation?
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The texts and the group of readers
The texts we worked with in the group were the Hagar narratives from both 
traditions as they occur in Genesis and the Hadith and two prescriptive 
texts from the New Testament and the Qur’an: 1 Timothy 2:8–16 and Sura 
4:34. I will not reflect further on the interpretative work on the Hagar 
texts here, but concentrate on the prescriptive texts and how the readers 
dealt with them together. Let me cite both of the texts before I continue:
1 Timothy 2:8–15:1
I desire, then, that in every place the men should pray, lifting up holy hands with-
out anger or argument; also that the women should dress themselves modestly 
and decently in suitable clothing, not with their hair braided, or with gold, pearls, 
or expensive clothes, but with good works, as is proper for women who profess 
reverence for God. Let a woman learn in silence with full submission. I permit no 
woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent. For Adam was 
formed first, then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived 
and became a transgressor. Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided 
they continue in faith and love and holiness, with modesty.
Sura 4:34:2
Men are in charge of women,3 because Allah hath made one of them to excel the 
other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women). So 
good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah hath guarded. 
As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds 
apart, and scourge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! 
Allah is ever High, Exalted, Great.
1 The text read and distributed in the group was from the Norwegian Bibelen, 1978 
edition in bokmål, The Norwegian Bible Society.
2 The text is from Muhammad M. Pickthall,and Marmaduke William Pickthall 
(eds), The Glorious Qur’an: Text and Explanatory Translation (New York: Tahrike 
Tarsile Qur’an, 1996, first edition 1984). The text read and distributed in the 
group was from the Norwegian version of the Qur’an, Qur’anen, transl. by Einar 
Berg (Oslo: Universitets forlaget, 1980). In the Norwegian version Sura 4:34 is 
numbered Sura 4:38.
3 In the Norwegian version of the Qur’an that was read in the group, “in charge of” 
is translated into the Norwegian word bestyrelses autoritet. This could be translated 
as “executive authority” and has different connotations in Norwegian than the 
word “supporter” has in English. In the later discussion the Arabic word qiwama 
from the Arabic Qur’an is brought up and discussed.
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Thorough exegetical work on both of these texts, including historical context, 
linguistic and semiotic analyses and all the other work biblical and Qur’anic 
exegesis includes when interpreting these texts, have been conducted by 
several exegetes. Some have also worked comparatively with the texts on 
a textual or theoretical level. But studies of how readers affiliated with the 
Christian or Islamic faith and religious practice interpret and make use 
of the texts in their religious practice is less studied, and this includes 
processes of co-reading Christian and Muslim canonical texts. Projects 
connected to the practice of scriptural reasoning and Lissi Rasmussen’s study, 
“Diapraxis and Dialogue between Christians and Muslims,” are significant 
exceptions.4 To study how insiders and believers interpret and read their 
canonical scriptures as part of their religious praxis may provide valuable 
insights both from a lived religion perspective and from a more traditional 
theological perspective. To study the dynamics of co-reading of canonical 
scripture with people from two or more religious traditions present may 
generate knowledge about interreligious co-existence and negotiation on 
a shared interpretation of the texts’ context, which the readers may share.
I study the texts cited earlier through the comments of the readers of 
the texts and through the interaction between readers coming from the 
different religious and cultural traditions. The participants in this co-
reading came from different cultural backgrounds, including Christian 
women readers whose backgrounds were partly East African and Middle 
Eastern to avoid a complete overlap between Christian and Norwegian 
backgrounds. Among the Muslims, a majority had a Pakistani–Norwegian 
background, but one woman had an Iranian–Norwegian background. The 
readers’ religious affiliations included Sunni and Shia Muslims as well 
as Lutheran and Roman Catholic Christians. The highly diverse religious 
and cultural backgrounds of the readers contributed varied significant 
interpretative or hermeneutical insights on how the texts are used and 
read in different contexts and how they can be interpreted in light of 
cultural and geopolitical settings when readers tease out the meanings 
of the texts through conversations. The differences also contributed to 
how the readers interpreted their encounters, in particular in regard to 
establishing and articulating challenges from various perspectives. I pursue 
two questions. (1) What are the challenges of the texts for the readers in 
this study? (2) What are the challenges of the Muslim–Christian mixed 
cultural encounter when reading the texts and discussing them with regard 
4 David Ford and C. C. Pecknold, The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), and Lissi Rasmussen, Diapraksis og dialog mellem kristne og muslimer: i lyset 
af den afrikanske erfaring (Diapraxis and dialogue between Christians and Muslims: 
In light of the African experience) (Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 1997).
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to their respective contexts? Before I explore these questions, I will look 
into how the readers positioned themselves as readers and what kind of 
interpretative authority they claimed to possess as individuals and as a 
group. After I have discussed these questions further, my presentation will 
move on to address questions on establishing a transforming hermeneutics: 
Why, how, and where, connected to what and to whom?5
The group originally consisted of ten people, but mostly between five and 
eight people participated in our six meetings lasting for three—four hours 
each. In the group, the work on the texts started with someone reading the 
texts aloud. Usually, a Christian read the biblical text and a Muslim read 
the text from the Qur’an or the Hadith. From the beginning, the readers 
established themselves as having a right to read and interpret the texts. 
The challenge was the extent to which they viewed their interpretations 
as being seen as authoritative for fellow-believers and communities. The 
women in the group did not consider themselves as religious leaders as 
such and none of them held formal positions as leaders in their respective 
religious communities. What they had was knowledge about and experience 
of struggling with their respective texts and engagement with the meaning 
of the texts. Some had received formal education in their religious tradition; 
all had been playing responsible roles in their faith communities or in 
interreligious or intercultural dialogues.
Ethical critique and moral enrichment of the texts
The Christian women felt that they were granted authority in their tradition 
itself. This was particularly the case with the Lutheran women—whose 
conviction could be expected on the basis of Lutheran biblical hermeneutics. 
They interpreted this authority as being, according to the concept proposed 
by Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, the obligation to read and interpret 
Christian canonical scripture with an ethical perspective and to practice 
an “ethical critique of the texts.”6 Schüssler Fiorenza laid this obligation 
on biblical scholars rather than on “ordinary” readers of the Bible. She 
reasoned that scholars have a responsibility for what they legitimize and 
5 For a more thorough and substantial presentation of the methodology of the study, 
including a presentation of the readers, the working methods of the group and 
the conversations, you can consult Anne Hege Grung, Gender Justice in Muslim-
Christian Readings. Christian and Muslim Women in Norway Making Meaning of 
Texts from the Bible, the Qur’an, and the Hadith (Amsterdam: Brill Rodopi, 2015).
6 Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation,” in Journal 
of Biblical Literature 107 (1988), 3–17.
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convey to new generations and to believers and that texts having messages 
that are evaluated as unethical should be openly criticized. When the group 
critiqued the text from 1 Timothy, the Christian readers dismissed the text 
as “unchristian.” They were deeply worried about the text’s (and its related 
Pauline authority’s) potential to convey a message of oppression of women 
and they claimed that all Christians, including women, were saved through 
divine grace, not through childbirth. They called on what they perceived 
as the original message of Jesus to support their evaluation of 1 Timothy 
and declared it to be contradictory to Jesus’ teachings.
The Muslim women were more concerned about the need to increase 
common knowledge of the text and its context among their fellow Muslims 
and, in particular, Muslim leaders and the ulama rather than to state their 
own interpretive authority. On several occasions, they mentioned that women 
and women’s experiences should be included in interpretative work with the 
texts at all organizational and scholarly levels. But if they did not articulate 
their authority, they actively participated in the group. Regarding their 
interpretation of Sura 4:34, they showed how alternative interpretations of 
the concept qiwama were possible. Instead of connecting it to male authority, 
they cited Islamic feminist scholars such as the late Fatima Mernissi to show 
that this concept could well be understood as the principle of the strong 
helping the weak—regardless of gender. They also discussed the part of the 
Sura concerning abandonment and physical punishment of a disobedient 
wife. They were not ready to compromise on the authority of the Qur’an as 
God’s revelation and had no alternative exegesis to provide to the immediate 
content of this part. Instead, they added their own moral judgments on the 
contextual understanding of this verse and broadened the perspective. First, 
they agreed that mental pressure and physical punishment were equally 
harmful and constituted a transgression of a person’s boundaries that should 
be protected. Secondly, they argued that the Sura could be understood as 
a limitation of the violence permitted in a marriage: harmful violence and 
killing were clearly not legitimized, in fact forbidden, in the text. And lastly, 
they stated that they would recommend divorce rather than performing or 
accepting an act of violence whether major or minor. Unlike the Christian 
women, they criticized not the text itself but its interpretations and offered 
new perspectives and contextual knowledge. Abou El Fadl’s concept of “moral 
enrichment of the text” seems very suitable here: the idea—as a principle 
grounded in the Qur’an itself—that the reader of the Qur’an not only has the 
possibility but also the responsibility to enrich the Qur’anic text with her 
own moral universe.7
7 Khaled Abou El Fadl et al. (eds), The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2002).
Anne Hege Grung • Transformative Hermeneutics in the Making
34
Transformative Readings of Sacred Scriptures
After presenting the main interpretative work in the group on these 
two texts very briefly and having connected it to the two hermeneutical 
concepts of “ethical critique” and “moral enrichment” of the texts, which 
Oddbjørn Leirvik explores in a greater depth in his contribution in this 
volume, I will now turn to other hermeneutical concepts that could be used 
to analyze the group’s work on the two texts and which may be examples 
of hermeneutical transformative tools.
Caution: “The texts may be 
dangerous—handle with care”
After the two texts were read aloud for the first time, the readers immediately 
shared their first general reactions to them. One of the Muslim participants 
referred to the texts as “dangerous” if they were used to legitimize the 
oppression of women. One of the Christian participants said they were 
dangerous if they were not interpreted in a skilled manner. Other aspects of 
the texts’ potential to produce destructiveness were also indirectly mentioned: 
they were seen as potentially misrepresenting the religions if they were 
“misused,” that is, if they conveyed an image of women or of the relationship 
between women and men that was in conflict with what the readers understood 
as the core or original message of the Christian and Islamic traditions. They 
were all confident that their traditions’ original message was one of gender 
justice. In many ways, this was the key hermeneutical platform that they 
all shared in principle in what could be described as a practical diversity.
Establishing inter-subjective time between the 
readers and between readers and texts
Some reactions to the texts may be characterized as an attempt to place 
them in a different period and thus to establish a distance to them. The 
view that the texts reflected a different time with another cultural and 
social view of women was particularly present among the Christian readers 
with a Norwegian background. Others in the group pointed out that the 
distance between different realities for women was not only a matter of 
different periods of time but also of different spaces/places, as in differing 
cultural and geopolitical contexts. Experience of and knowledge about 
contemporary places outside the Norwegian context were included in the 
conversation and thus broadened what was seen as the significant context 
in which to consider the texts in hermeneutical work.
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To use the concept of time—more precisely historical evolutionism—to 
establish distance to other humans has been explored and criticized by 
the social anthropologist Johannes Fabian.8 Originally criticizing his own 
discipline for how research objects tended to be defined by anthropology’s 
colonial past, his reflections are also useful in this context. Fabian posited 
a need to establish what he called an “inter-subjective time”—in his case 
between the researcher and the object of research—in order to establish 
“coevalness.” Fabian claims that created and acknowledged “coevalness” 
is a necessity because such shared time is necessary to create a space 
of “inter-subjective time” in which communication is possible.9 Without 
acknowledged “coevalness,” communication will not happen because one 
of the subjects (or both) has distanced themselves from the other through 
temporal categorization. Inter-subjective time, which makes communication 
possible and counteracts the establishing of hierarchies between cultures, 
groups of people—and, I would add, religious groups—needs to be established 
and appears automatically as a result of a decisive act in which a shared 
present is acknowledged. We may speak of inter-subjective time between 
people, but can we also speak about inter-subjective time between a text 
and a reader? If we aim to transform texts or their meaning, there is no 
access to the text other than from the readers’ presence. To enter into an 
act of transformation requires engagement, not distance. This would be 
valid for human encounters with both texts and other humans.
What about the actual time gap between biblical and Qur’anic texts and 
their readers? Can we impose our time on the texts? The cultural theorist 
Mieke Bal introduces the concept of “bold anachronisms” in which she 
argues that our only access to history (including historical texts) is from 
the present.10 She warns that we should not assume that we have a full 
overview over other cultures, other religions or other historical times. This 
means that our reading will always be anachronistic. Rather than trying 
to avoid this (which she anyway thinks is impossible), we should read 
in a skilled manner, knowing which interpretative elements we use and 
where we situate ourselves. For Bal, to engage with “bold anachronisms” 
is the only way to take the past seriously. This means that when our group 
readers criticize, dismiss, reinterpret or add perspectives to the texts from 
1 Timothy and Sura 4:34, they are taking the texts seriously.
8 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
9 Ibid., 30f. 
10 Mieke Bal, Loving Yusuf: Conceptual Travels from Present to Past (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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The discussions on the prescriptive texts in this Muslim–Christian 
co-reading opens up space for discussion on present challenges, thanks 
to the inter-subjective time established between the readers and between 
them and the texts. The readers also engage with what post-colonial 
feminist theologian Kwok Pui-Lan calls “diasporic consciousness” through 
negotiating meaning between different contexts, cultures and religious 
traditions and between the past and the present.11 Kwok also states that 
it is necessary to emphasize the interpretative work done by “ordinary 
readers” of the Bible in order to create a broader interpretative community 
and knowledge basis for interpretation.
Seeds of transformative hermeneutics
In the group’s work on 1 Timothy and Sura 4:34, the hermeneutical 
strategies I have described are used to formulate at least two direct aims 
for transformation: (1) to make these two texts less dangerous for women; 
and (2) to establish an interpretative relation, including the exchange of 
knowledge between the readers across their religious and cultural affiliations 
(and possibly to communicate this knowledge outside the group) in order 
to establish a shared present. The latter aim was most evident when the 
Muslim readers introduced their alternative interpretation of qiwama. 
When the word was explained as referring to the concept of the duty of the 
strong to support the weak rather than to legitimize the husband’s authority 
over his wife, the surprise and relief of the Christian readers was written 
all over their faces. This not only transformed their view of this piece of 
the Qur’an, but it also reinforced their view of their Muslim co-readers as 
necessary and valuable human resources of knowledge about the Qur’an.
What is the object of transformation and who does it involve? One aspect 
of transformative hermeneutics is to question the authority to interpret. 
Questions of interpretative authority over canonical texts are actually 
negotiations of interpretative power concerning who can decide on a text’s 
meaning and under what circumstances. In the Christian and Islamic 
traditions in which the canonical texts traditionally hold a significant 
position, this authority is salient for how religion is lived. The Qur’an has 
a different status in Islam than the Bible in the Christian tradition. This is 
reflected in the teachings and the authoritative religious practices in the 
two traditions. Another question may be how much this is reflected among 
“ordinary,” non-scholarly, readers. The group of readers in my study and 
11 Kwok Pui-Lan, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology (London: SCM 
Press, 2005).
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in particular the Muslims were very clear in their call for transformation 
of interpretative authority. At the same time, they concentrated their 
criticisms on other readers rather than on the Qur’anic texts themselves. 
They claimed that “women must be included” in the ongoing interpretations 
of texts and practice at all levels. 
In Muslim–Christian co-readings, your own text is being read by 
someone from a different religious tradition and you read the other person’s 
text. The exchange of questions and knowledge that this generates may 
transform the personal relationship between the participants and point 
to mutual challenges. The main challenge for the Christian readers in the 
group was to understand the contexts of other Christians living in different 
religious and cultural circumstances than their own, and to learn about 
their Muslim co-readers and about the Qur’an as a living text. In this 
way, the texts also transformed the human encounter into hard, engaged 
hermeneutical work. Opening up for mutual critique, self-criticism and self-
reflection in the process of reading and discussing the texts contributed to 
establishing inter-subjective time, making communication possible. This 
was perhaps the most significant promise of transformation.
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The Interrelatedness of the 
Holy Scriptures: the Qur’an as 
an Interpretation of the Bible
Stefan Schreiner
Whoever studies the Qur’an encounters passages that refer to or even 
resemble biblical and/or post-biblical, Jewish and/or Christian traditions 
on almost every page.
When, almost two centuries ago, Abraham Geiger (1810–1874) raised 
the question, Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judentume aufgenommen? in his 
dissertation,1 he inaugurated a new discipline in the study of the Qur’an 
and Islam, whose main objectives were, and still are, to identify all possible 
Jewish and Christian “sources” of the Qur’an. Since then, an entire library 
has been written, reaching its peak with Heinrich Speyer’s (1897–1935) book, 
1 Abraham Geiger, Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judentume aufgenommen? (Bonn, 
1833; Leipzig: Kaufmann, ²1902; last reprints: Berlin: Parerga Verlag, 2004; 
Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2010 [= Gorgias Theological Library, vol. 40]); 
English, Judaism and Islam: A Prize Essay, transl. F. M. Young (Bangalore, 1896; 
Madras: M.D.C.S.P.C.K. Press, ²1898; last reprint: London: Forgotten Books, 2012). Cf. 
Johann Fück, Die arabischen Studien in Europa (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), 
174f., and the articles published in Dirk Hartwig, Walter Homolka, Michael J. Marx 
and Angelika Neuwirth (eds), “Im vollen Licht der Geschichte.” Die Wissenschaft 
des Judentums und die Anfänge der kritischen Koranforschung, Ex Oriente Lux—
Rezeptionen und Exegesen als Traditionskritik, vol. 8 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 
2008), esp. Aaron W. Hughes, “Contextualizing Contexts—Orientalism and Geiger’s 
Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judentume aufgenommen Reconsidered,” ibid. 87–98.
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Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qoran.2 Without going into further detail,3 
it is worthwhile noting that, whereas Jewish scholars were eager to prove 
that Judaism and its biblical and post-biblical writings were the first and 
foremost “sources” of Muhammad’s inspiration, Christian scholars tended 
to prove exactly the opposite, namely, that Muhammad was deeply rooted 
in, and indebted to, the legacy of oriental Christians; accordingly, they did 
not spare any effort to identify the Christian “sources” of the Qur’an. Over 
the almost two centuries since Geiger’s book, Jewish and Christian scholars 
alike were, and sometimes still are, convinced that they can trace almost 
every verse of the Qur’an back either to a Jewish or a Christian “source.”4
Until today, the relationship between the Qur’an and the Bible has 
remained subject to debate in Islamic studies, but the agenda and objectives 
have changed.5 Today, it is not so much the quest for the so-called actual 
or alleged “sources” of the Qur’an that scholars are dealing with, but the 
search for an answer to the question about the character and meaning of the 
relationship between the Qur’an and the Bible; that there is a relationship 
between them is obvious and cannot be overlooked. The Qur’an and the 
Bible are connected, and this connection is not a one-way street; on the 
contrary, the connection between the two scriptures appears to be a mutual 
2 Heinrich Speyer, Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qoran (Gräfenhainichen: C. Schulze 
und Co., 1931; reprint Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1961; ³1988; 
on this book, see Franz Rosenthal (1914–2003), “The History of Heinrich Speyer’s 
Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qoran,” in Hartwig et al., op. cit. (note 1), 113–16.
3 Cf. the literature cited in Stefan Schreiner, “Der Koran als Auslegung der Bibel 
– die Bibel als Verstehenshilfe des Korans,” in Hansjörg Schmid, Andreas Renz, 
Bülent Ucar (eds), “Nahe ist dir das Wort...” . Schriftauslegung in Christentum und 
Islam, Theologisches Forum Christentum—Islam (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 
2010), 167–83 = in Stefan Schreiner, Die jüdische Bibel in islamischer Auslegung, 
ed. Friedmann Eißler and Matthias Morgenstern, Texts and Studies in Medieval 
and Early Modern Judaism, vol. 27 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 1–18, note 1.
4 Johann Fück’s critical résumé “Die Originalität des arabischen Propheten,” in Zeitschrift 
der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 90 (1936), 509–25 = in Johann Fück, Arabische 
Kultur und Islam im Mittelalter. Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Manfred Fleischhammer 
(Weimar: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1981), 142–52, reflecting hundred years of scholarship 
after Geiger’s dissertation, is more than worthwhile reading still today.
5 Cf., e.g., Schreiner, op. cit. (note 3); furthermore, Gabriel Said Reynolds, The 
Qur’an and its Biblical Subtext, Routledge Studies in the Qur’an (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Gabriel Said Reynolds (ed.), The Qur’an in Its Historical Context 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2008); Gabriel Said Reynolds, New Perspectives on 
the Qur’an = The Qur’an in Its Historical Context, vol. 2, Routledge Studies in the 
Qur’an, vol.12 (London/New York: Routledge, 2011); Corrie Jonn Block, The Qur’an 
in Christian–Muslim Dialogue. Historical and Modern Interpretations, Culture and 
Civilization in the Middle East, vol. 38 (London/New York: Routledge, 2013; ²2016).
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relationship that can be described as an interrelatedness. Indeed, the Qur’an 
and the Bible are intertwined in a very specific way.
Repeatedly, the Arabian prophet is instructed wa-ḏkur fī l-kitābi, “to 
remember or to mention the book,”6 that is, to bring to mind the memory 
of people, individuals as well as nations, who received the revelation 
beforehand and to recollect and retell their (hi)stories. The prophet is even 
instructed “to remind” (ḏakkara) his audience of the fate and destiny of those 
who went before and “to admonish” (ḏakkara) his audience to be aware of 
what those people experienced fa-ḏakkir innamā anta muḏakkir: “So admonish 
[them], because you are an admonisher” (Sura 88:21). Similarly, the Qur’an 
is described as a “book of remembrance” (Sura 38:1: ḏū ḏ-ḏikr), as a book 
“endowed with all that one ought to remember,” according to Muhammad 
Asad’s (1900–1992) interpretation,7 and nouns which denote precisely that8 
are repeatedly applied to the revealed message that the Qur’an conveys: ḏikr 
(Sura 7:63.69; 12:104; 38:87; 68:52; 81:27), ḏikrā (Sura 6:69.90; 11:114.120; 
74:31), taḏkira (Sura 69:48; 73:19; 76:29), as W. Montgomery Watt (1909–2006) 
has already rightly observed.9 Time and again, the Qur’an refers to and 
draws upon already existent traditions, and (hi)stories.
While the study of the Qur’an already uncovers the presence of biblical 
and/or post-biblical traditions, it should be noted, however, that the Qur’an 
hardly quotes any biblical or post-biblical text literally.10 In most instances, it 
presents the texts and stories that have parallels in biblical and/or post-biblical 
Jewish and/or Christian traditions in versions that are clearly different from 
their biblical or post-biblical counterparts. Nowhere is the Qur’anic rereading 
of a biblical and/or post-biblical text based on a written document, a written 
Arabic translation of the Bible or the like. And it cannot be otherwise, because 
at the time of the writing of the Qur’an, no written Arabic Bible translation 
existed. Whenever the Qur’an “remembers” biblical or post-biblical texts 
and stories, it draws on what could be called “free-floating oral traditions” 
that circulated among Jews and Christians living on the Arabian Peninsula, 
as Sidney H. Griffith has rightly pointed out.11
6 See, e.g., Surah 19,16.41.51.54.56; 38,41.45.48; 46,21.
7 Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’ān (Gibraltar/Dublin: Dar al-Andalus, 
1980; ²1992), 694.
8 Mu‘ǧam alfāẓ al-Qur’an al-Karīm, 2 vols (Cairo: Maǧma‘ al-luġa al-‘arabīya, 1409/1989), 
I, 433 s.v. ḏ-k-r.
9 W. Montgomery Watt, Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’ān, Islamic Surveys, vol. 8 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 144f.
10 See, e.g., Angelika Neuwirth, “Psalmen—im Koran neu gelesen (Ps 104 und 136),” 
in Hartwig et al., op. cit. (note 1), 157–89.
11 Sidney H. Griffith, The Bible in Arabic. The Scriptures of the “People of the Book” in 
the Language of Islam (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), esp. 7–96.
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Compared to their biblical and post-biblical counterparts, the Qur’anic 
rereadings differ in the sense that the Qur’an usually presents them in 
rather brief, abridged versions. The only exception to the rule, i.e., the only 
biblical story that is retold in the Qur’an at greater length, is the story of 
Yūsuf/Joseph in Sura 12 that bears his name in the title.
Mostly, however, the Qur’an simply alludes to biblical and post-biblical 
stories as is the case in the story of Ayyūb/Job, who is “remembered” twice, 
but both times only very briefly: in Sura al-Anbiyā’ (21:83-84) and in Sura 
Ṣād (38:40-44).
Moreover, in their Qur’anic form, these biblical and post-biblical stories 
are often presented not only once but several times, and not only in one 
version but in versions differing from each other in their literary character 
as well as in their outlook according to their respective contexts. To give 
but two examples:
Again, as an exception to the rule, the story of the ʽAqeda, the binding 
of Abraham’s/Ibrāhīm’s son (1 Moses 22) is retold in the Qur’an only once 
(Sura 37:99–113).12 On the other hand, Jonah/Yūnus, sometimes called Ḏū 
n-Nūn, “the one of the great fish” (Sura 21:87) and sometimes Ṣāḥib al-ḥūt, 
“the companion of the great fish” (Sura 68:48), appears no less than ten 
times in the Qur’an, and his story appears not only in four different Suras, 
but at the same time also in four different versions, varying in content, 
form and outlook depending on their respective contexts (Sura 10:96–98; 
21:87–88; 37:139–148; 68:48–50).13
By and large, however, the Qur’an gives the impression that it can be 
taken for granted that the prophet’s audience had an overall knowledge of 
the content of the earlier revealed books, so that there is no need to retell 
all the stories at length; it suffices to “remind” his listeners of them and 
to confine the remainder to what is new or how they should be interpreted 
and understood.
The mere fact that biblical and post-biblical stories are told in the 
Qur’an cannot be a surprise. The Qur’an itself confirms on several occasions 
that the Bible is an integral part and thus part and parcel of the Islamic 
tradition, part of the prehistory of the Qur’an as well as of the Qur’an itself.
12 Stefan Schreiner, “Die ‘Bindung Isaaks’. Die ‘Aqeda in jüdischer und islamischer 
Überlieferung,” in Stefan Meißner and Georg Wenz (eds), Über den Umgang mit 
den Heiligen Schriften. Juden, Christen und Muslime zwischen Tuchfühlung und 
Kluft, Interreligiöse Begegnungen—Studien und Projekte, vol. 4 (Münster/Berlin: 
LIT-Verlag, 2007), 140-157 = in Schreiner, op. cit. (note 3b), 46–74.
13 Stefan Schreiner, “Muhammads Rezeption der biblischen Jonaerzählung,” in 
Judaica 34 (1978), 148–70 = in Schreiner, op. cit. (note 3b), 173–95.
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A prophetic Ḥadīṯ narrated by Abū Huraira (c. 600–678) has the prophet 
answer the question, what is īmān (belief)? by saying: “the Messenger of 
God (peace be upon him) […] replied: [īmān (belief) is] that you believe in 
God, His angels, His [Holy] Books (bi-kutubihī), His Messengers, in meeting 
Him [on the Day of Judgment], and that you believe in the Resurrection 
hereafter.”14
Saying this, Muhammad remembered and confirmed what he himself 
was taught earlier and what he was instructed to convey to his faithful 
followers and believers:
The Messenger [of God] believes in what has been sent down upon him by his Lord, 
and the believers with him, they all believe in God, His angels, His [Holy] Books 
(bi-kutubihī), His Messengers, making no distinction between any of his Messen-
gers. And they say: “We have heard, and we pay heed. Grant us Your forgiveness, 
our Lord, for with You is all journey’s end” (Sura 2:285).
Likewise, we read in the same Sura:
Say, we believe in God, and in what has been bestowed upon us, and in what has 
been bestowed upon Ibrā hīm/Abraham, Ismā’īl/Ismael, Isḥāq/Isaac, Yaʽqūb/Jacob 
and the Tribes [of Israel], and [in] what was given to Mūsā/Moses and ‘Īsā/Jesus 
and what was given to the Prophets by their Lord, and we make no distinction 
between any of them. And it is unto Him that we surrender ourselves (Sura 2:136).
However, neither the abovementioned Ḥadīṯ nor the verses quoted from 
the Qur’an provide any further detail regarding the books mentioned, nor 
do they specify their character. Neither do we hear anything about their 
content. Nevertheless, it should be noted that according to the text of the 
Qur’an as well as of this Ḥadīṯ, it is not one book only in which believers 
(Muslims) are called to believe, but books (in the plural: bi-kutubihī). Thus, 
it is certainly not only the Qur’an that is meant here, but other books are 
alluded to as well, something that deserves to be emphasized and all the 
more as today, this Ḥadīṯ is quite often quoted as if it reads in the singular: 
“they all believe in God, His angels, His [Holy] Book (bi-kitābihī, i.e., the 
Qur’an) etc.”
More information about these books can be obtained from the Qur’anic 
context. According to it, they include scriptures that contain a revealed 
message and are regarded as books of divine origin transmitted by God’s 
14 Transmitted by Muslim b. al-Ḥağğāğ (817/21–875), al-ğāmi‘ aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ, book I: k. 
al-īmān, no. 4 and 6; and Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. Ibrāhīm al-Buḫārī (810–870), 
al-ğāmi‘ aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ, book II: k. al-īmān, no. 47 and book LX: k. tafsīr al-Qur’ān, no. 300.
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Messengers, prophets.15 Altogether, the Qur’an mentions six such books 
by name:
1. The “Leaves (ṣuḥuf ) of Ibrāhīm/Abraham and Mūsā/Moses” (Sura 
87:18-19)
2. The “Torah (taurāt) of Moses” (Sura 3:3.48.50.65.93; 7:157; 9:111; 61:6; 62:5), 
i.e., the “Scripture revealed unto Moses” (kitāb Mūsā) and transmitted 
by him (Sura 2:53; 11:110 = 41:45; 11:17; 17:2; 23:49; 25:35; 46:12 etc.)
3. The “Psalms” (zabūr) bestowed upon David (Sura 4:163; 17:55; 21:105)
4. The “Scripture” (al-kitāb) bestowed upon John the Baptist (Sura 19:12);
5. The “gospel” (inğīl), i.e., the Scripture vouchsafed to Jesus (Sura 5:46 
etc.)16
6. The “Arabic Qur’ān” sent down upon Muhammad (Sura 12:2 etc.).
In other words, to the books mentioned in the Qur’an, which Muslims are 
admonished to believe in, belong books which, according to Muḥammad 
‘Abduh (1849–1905) and others, represent one tradition of revelation, one 
chain of revealed and prophetically transmitted books, otherwise called the 
Holy Scriptures or books of the Bible. However, the abovementioned list of 
books indicates at the same time that when speaking about biblical books, 
the Qur’an apparently means something other than the Bible as we know it 
today from the Jewish and Christian traditions. And this cannot be otherwise 
because, as indicated above, the formation of the Qur’anic text took place at 
a time and in an environment where there was no Arabic Bible yet.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that as far as the “Torah (taurāt) of 
Moses” and the “Psalms of David” (zabūr) are concerned, at least two parts 
of the tripartite canon of the Hebrew Bible are mentioned explicitly,17 and 
the “Gospel of ʽ Īsā/Jesus” (inğīl) may be regarded as a pars pro toto title for 
the entire New Testament or even the Christian Bible. But neither Jewish 
nor Christian traditions know anything about “Leaves (ṣuḥuf ) of Ibrāhīm/
Abraham and Mūsā/Moses,” let alone a “scripture” (al-kitāb) sent down 
unto John the Baptist. Despite all that, it seems to be appropriate to assume 
that when the Qur’an mentions these books, it refers to the Bible, making 
it part of its own prehistory and, at the same time, including itself into 
the Auslegungs- und Wirkungsgeschichte, the reception history of the Bible.
15 Prophets according to the Qur’an, of course.
16 Mu‘ǧam alfāẓ al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Cairo: Maǧma‘ al-luġa al-‘arabīya, 1409/1989), I, 
93-94 s.v. i-n-ǧ-ī-l.
17 Likewise, in Luke 24:44 the “Psalms” are mentioned to designate the third part 
of the canon of the Hebrew Bible (cf. Sirach, Prologue, and 1 Maccabees 12:9).
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The reason for connecting Qur’an and Bible in this way is explained 
in the Qur’an itself: first, with reference to its concept of the unity of 
revelation and the succession of revelations and revealed books emerging 
from it and, secondly, with reference to the—likewise—Qur’anic concept 
of the succession of prophets.
The unity of revelation and succession 
of revealed books and prophets
If God is but One (cf. Sura 112), then God’s revelation, God’s prophetically 
transmitted message must also be one. Thus, the Qur’an says:
He has sent down from on high upon you (nazzala) the Book that is the Truth (al-
kitāb bil-ḥaqq), confirming (muṣaddiqan) whatever there still remains [of earlier 
revelations]: for it is He who has sent down from on high the Torah (at-taurāt) and 
the Gospel (al-inǧīl) before, as a guidance18 unto all people. And He has sent down 
from on high the standard or measure (al-furqān) by which to discern [the true 
from the false] (Sura 3:3-4).19
Likewise,
Verily, We revealed unto you just as We revealed unto Nūḥ/Noah and the prophets 
after him (innā auḥainā ilaika kamā auḥainā ilā Nūḥ wan-nabīyīna min ba’dihī)—just as We 
revealed unto Ibrāhīm/Abraham, Ismā‘īl/Ismael, Isḥāq/Isaac, Ya‘qūb/Jacob and the 
Tribes [of Israel], ‘Īsā / Jesus, Ayyūb/Job, Yūnus/Jonah, Hārūn/Aaron and Sulaimān/
Solomon, and We vouchsafed unto Dāwūd/David the Book of Psalms (zabūr) (Sura 4:163).
Therefore, all those who follow these prophets, listen to their message 
and accept it, believe eo ipso in one and the same God as the source and 
origin of all revelation and prophetically transmitted messages, as the 
Qur’an affirms:
We believe in what has been sent down from on high upon us as well as what has 
been sent from on high down upon you: for our God and your God is one and the 
same, and it is unto Him that we surrender ourselves (Sura 29:46).
Affirming this, the Qur’an forbids Muslims, Christians and Jews to see 
each other as non-believers, “because they all observe and follow one and 
18 This is precisely what the Hebrew word torah literally means (cf. Sura 5:44–49).
19 Cf. the interpretation offered by Asad, op. cit. (note 7), 65f.
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the same God’s word and commandment,” as Ğalāl ad-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 
1459) explained in his commentary on the verse cited.20
If God is One and the only One and God’s message is likewise one 
message only, then all the prophets (provided they all are messengers of 
this One God) who received and proclaimed God’s divine message constitute 
a silsilat al-isnād, a single chain of transmitters and their respective 
messages likewise constitute one chain of transmission, in other words: 
a “prophetic succession” or “succession of prophets,” as could be inferred 
from the Sura 4:163 verse quoted above.
Though every nation has its own messenger or prophet (Sura 10:47), 
they all are part of one and the same sequence of messengers, between 
whom “no distinction is being made” (Sura 2:136 and 285). Therefore, with 
reference to Muhammad we read in the Qur’an: “[And as for you,] nothing 
is being said to you but what was said to all messengers before you” (Surah 
41:43). Therefore, Muhammad “is not an innovation among the messengers” 
(ma kuntu bidʽan mina-r-rusul), but is proclaiming “what the earlier revealed 
books contain” (Sura 26:196).
This concept of a “succession of prophets”—according to the Qur’anic 
idea of prophets and prophetology—includes the stipulation that every 
prophet announces the coming of his successor explicitly as, in turn, every 
successor explicitly refers to his predecessor: Thus, Muhammad is “the 
Messenger, the unlettered Prophet (an-nabīy al-ummī)21 whom they shall 
find described in the Torah that is with them and in the Gospel” (Sura 
7:157),22 provided that they understand the Torah and the gospel correctly 
20 Tafsir al-Ğalālain, ed. Ḫālid al-Ğūğā (Damaskus: n.d.), 531–32.
21 For theological reasons, every prophet must be “unlettered, illiterate” to make sure 
that he is not the author of his message or scripture, but its transmitter only, as Philon 
of Alexandria (c. 15/10 BCE—c. 40 CE) already discussed with reference to Moses; see, 
Yehoschua Amir (1911–2002), “Mose als Verfasser der Tora bei Philon,” in Yehoschua 
Amir, Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandrien, Forschungen 
zum jüdisch-christlichen Dialog, vol. 5 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983), 
77–106. Therefore, Jeremiah dictated his message to his secretary Baruch (cf. Jeremiah 
36,4sq.). Similarly, Muḥammad had his personal scribe in the person of Zaid b. Ṯābit 
al-Anṣārī (d. between the years 662 and 676) who, according to Islamic tradition, wrote 
down the message which Muḥammad was proclaiming. The only exception to this 
rule seems to be the Persian prophet Mani (216–276) who, so we are informed, himself 
authored his books accepted by the Manicheans as their Holy Scriptures.
22 At this point, Muslim Qur’an commentators usually refer to biblical passages 
such as Deuteronomy 18:18–20; Isaiah 5:26–30; Matthew 21:33–46 etc. For further 
details, see Hava Lazarus-Yafeh (1930–1998), Intertwined Worlds. Medieval Islam 
and Bible Criticism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 75–110.
47
(Sura 2:121).23 An illuminating early example of this type of Muslim Bible 
interpretation that reveals dozens of announcements of and allusions to 
(the coming of) Muhammad in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament 
alike, can be found in the Kitāb ad-dīn wad-daula by Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Sahl 
Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī (c.  830/8–c.  870)24 (who, by the way, was a Christian 
physician from Persia who at an advanced age converted to Islam).25
From Sura 2:129, we learn that Ibrāhīm/Abraham already prayed 
(alluding to Deut 18:18): “Our Lord, raise up for them a messenger from 
among themselves who shall convey unto them Your Verses and teach them 
the Scripture and the Wisdom and purify them.” And in Sura 61:6 it is ‘Īsā/
Jesus himself who announces the coming of his successor:
And ‘Īsā/Jesus, the Son of Maryam/Mary said: “O children of Israel, behold, I am 
the Messenger of God unto you, confirming [the truth of] whatever there still 
remains of the Torah and announcing a messenger who shall come after me, and 
his name shall be Aḥmad.”
Since an entire library has been written on this much debated verse,26 it 
would go well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it anew. Muslim 
commentators see in it a clear reference to Jesus announcing the coming 
of a paráklētos (Jn 14:16f.; 15:26; 16:4b–15 etc.) and Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī 
already suggested that the word paráklētos in the Gospel of John should 
23 Cf. Muḥammad ‘Izzat Ismā’īl at-Tahtārī, Muḥammad—nabīy al-islām fī t-Taurāt wal-
Inğīl wal-Qur’ān (Cairo, n.d.); David Benjamin, Muhammad in der Bibel (München: SKD 
Bavaria Verlag, 1992); Martin Accad, “Muhammad’s Advent as the Final Criterion for 
the Authenticity of the Judeo-Christian Tradition: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Hidāyat 
al-ḥayārā fī ağwibat al-yahūd wa-‘l-naṣārā,” in Barbara Roogema, Marcel Porthuis, Pim 
Valkenberg (eds), The Three Rings—Textual Studies in the Historical Trialogue of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2005), 216–36.
24 Arabic text ed. Alphonse Mingana (1878/81–1937) (Manchester/London: Univ. 
Press, Longmans, Green, and Co/Bernard Quaritch Ltd, 1923); English, The Book 
of Religion and Empire, transl. Alphonse Mingana (Manchester [etc.]: University 
Press, 1922, last reprint LaVergne, TN: Kessinger Publishing LLC, 2010).
25 See Max Meyerhof (1874–1945), “Alī ibn Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī, ein persischer Arzt des 
9. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.,” in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 
85 (1931), 38–68.
26 For a summary, see Asad, op. cit. (note 7), 861 n. 6; and Yūsuf Qazmā Khūrī et al. 
(eds),’Īsā wa- Maryam fī l-Qur’ān wat-tafāsīr (Amman: Dār āš-Šurūq lin-našr wat-tauzī’, 
1996), 525a-532b. In the same way, and long before the rise of Islam, the Manicheans 
too regarded Jesus announcing the coming of the paráklētos as Jesus’ announcement 
of the coming of their prophet Mani (216–276/7); cf. Alexander Böhlig (1912–1996), 
Die Gnosis—der Manichäismus (Düsseldorf/Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1997), 23–24 etc.
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be understood as a misspelling of an alleged “original” períklytos which 
in Arabic means aḥmad (“praised”), just as ‘Īsā/Jesus said in Sura 61:6.27
According to this concept of the “succession of prophets,” the “differences” 
between the prophets are rather “formal.” They differ from each other only 
with regard to: (1) their audience; (2) the time and (3) place of proclaiming 
their message; and (4) their language. Thus, every prophet conveys his 
message (1) to his people; (2) in his time; (3) in his place; and (4) in his 
language—Moses to the Jews of his time in Hebrew (the language of the 
Torah), Jesus to the Christians in Greek (the language of the gospel) and 
Muhammad to the Arabs of his time in Makkah and Madinah in “clear, 
pure Arabic” (Sura 12:2; 43:2 etc.).
No distinction between the prophets 
and their messages
The concept of successive revelation and succession of prophets also proves that 
no distinction can be made between them, because all revelation, i.e., all revealed 
and prophetically transmitted divine messages, originate from the same source: 
they all go back to the one “Book of God” (Sura 35:29), which is the “Mother 
of the Book” (Sura 13:39; 43:4; 47:20) that is inscribed upon the “well-guarded, 
well-preserved tablet” (lauḥ maḥfūẓ) in heaven (Sura 85:22). Nevertheless, in the 
same way that prophets differ from each other in each conveying his message to 
his people in his time at his place and in his language—their (orally) proclaimed 
messages and eventually also the books containing their messages in writing 
differ from each other above all with regard to their audiences and language. 
But all of them (re)present the same revelation that, put into writing, became—
literally—a writ (kitāb > k-t-b “to write”), i.e., scripture or book.
It should be added in parentheses that there is a remarkable difference 
in the understanding of what revelation means. In Christianity revelation 
means incarnation: “The (divine) Logos became flesh” (Jn 1:14: ho logos 
sarx egeneto), while in Islam, the (Divine) Logos became (proclaimed) 
word and, eventually, book. In view of that, Jacques Berque (1910–1995),28 
27 Among the European Orientalists it was Ludovico Marraci (1612–1700), who was 
the first to come up with the same idea without knowing anything about Rabban 
aṭ-Ṭabarī; see E. Denison Ross, Ludovico Maracci, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
Studies, University of London 2 (1921), 117–23.
28 Jacques Berque, Relire le Coran (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993); German, Der Koran 
neu gelesen, transl, Monika Gronke, with an introduction by Tilman Nagel and 
preface by Mohamed Bennouna (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck Verlag, 1996), 118.
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Stefan Wild29 and others therefore once suggested describing the Islamic 
concept of revelation as inverbation (“Logos becoming word”) or inlibration 
(“Logos becoming book”).
Even though these books contain God’s revelation—the prophetically 
transmitted revealed message has been put into writing, each in its own 
way, i.e., in one language only. Therefore, no book can claim to contain 
the “preserved tablet” in full, let alone be regarded as its perfect copy. 
Every book presents and represents only part of it. It is only the sequence 
of books, their succession, which may be regarded as a presentation and 
representation of the entire “preserved tablet.”
Despite the idea that no distinction is being made between the revealed 
messages and their transmitters (messengers or prophets), it cannot be 
overlooked that the Qur’an and the Bible, as we know them, are very 
distinct from each other.
According to the concept of prophetic succession and the succession of 
revealed messages and books, they should have been identical. But they 
are not, as can easily be affirmed by comparing the two books. Already 
Muhammad’s Jewish and Christian contemporaries were unable to recognize 
their Holy Scriptures in their reading of the Qur’an and therefore rejected it 
and refused to follow the Arabian prophet (Sura 2:145). Instead, they insisted 
on believing only in what has been sent down to them (Sura 4:150). But
those who deny God and His messengers and make a distinction between [belief in] 
God and God’s messengers and say; “We believe in the one, but we deny the other,” 
and want to pursue a path in between, they certainly are denying the truth, and 
for the deniers [of the truth] We have readied shameful suffering (Sura 4:150-151).
In order to explain the apparent distinctions between the Qur’an and the Bible, 
the Qur’an itself already suggested the idea (that was further developed by later 
Muslim scholars) that became known as intentional “alteration or falsification 
of scriptures” (taḥrīf or tabdīl) by Jews and Christians (Sura 2:75-79).30
29 Stefan Wild, Mensch, Prophet und Gott im Koran. Muslimische Exegeten des 20. 
Jahrhunderts und das Menschenbild der Moderne (Münster: Rhema-Verlag, 2001), 6.
30 Cf. e.g., Surah 5,13: ḥarrafa l-kalima ‘an mawāḍi‘ihī; Surah 2,58-59 = 7,161—162: 
baddala qaulan; Surah 3,78: lawā alsinatahū bil-kitāb; Surah 2,42; 3,71: labisa l-ḥaqq 
bil-bāṭil; Surah 6,92: aḫfā kaṯīran, and Surah 2,79: kataba l-kitāba bi-aidaihī. For an 
analysis of these various Qur‘anic expressions used to describe what “falsification 
of scriptures” means, see W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters: 
Perceptions and Misperceptions (London/New York: Routledge, 1991). On the concept 
of “alteration or falsification of scriptures” and its later development, see Thomas F. 
Michel SJ in his introduction to A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity: Ibn 
Taymiyya’s Al-Jawab al-ṣaḥīḥ li-man baddala dīn al-Masīḥ (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 
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Had the Bible, the Torah and the gospel not been “falsified,” but preserved 
in their original form as transmitted by Moses and Jesus respectively, they 
would be identical, congruent with the Qur’an. The mere fact, however, that 
this is not the case sufficiently proves that they must have been altered 
and falsified for whatever purpose.
The apparent distinctness of the Qur’an from the Bible and the inability 
of Jews and Christians to recognize their Holy Scriptures in the Qur’an 
in turn caused them to start to translate their Holy Scriptures “into the 
language of Islam,” as Sidney Griffiths put it.31 Indeed, Christian and Jewish 
versions of the Bible in Arabic began to emerge precisely as a reaction to 
Muhammad’s message as an answer put forward to reproach and, at the 
same time, to correct the distorted version of the(ir) Bible contained in the 
Qur’an, thus, making a distinction. However, making such a distinction 
between the prophets and their messages is—according to the Qur’an—a 
sign and proof of disbelief (Sura 4:150-151).
Succession of prophets and books as subsequent 
confirmations of the truth contained in them
The “succession of scriptures” as based on the idea of the unity of revelation 
and of revealed books does not mean, according to Qur’anic prophetology, 
that all revealed books are of equal rank, value, importance and validity. 
On the contrary, the idea of succession implies also that there is a sequence 
of prophets and books in terms of time, which is to be understood as a 
climax ascendens reaching its peak with the last prophet and culminating 
in the proclamation of the Qur’an:
Thus, the “Leaves of Abraham” precede the “Torah of Moses,” the “Torah 
of Moses” precedes the “Gospel of Jesus,” and the “Gospel of Jesus” precedes 
the Qur’an (Sura 3:65). Likewise, in his time, each successive prophet 
was regarded as the “seal of the prophets” sent to “seal” the sequences of 
messengers before him. Thus, in the same way as Moses and Jesus—and 
1984); Martin Accad, “Corruption and/or Misinterpretation of the Bible—The Story 
of Islamic Usage of Taḥrîf,” in Theological Review 24/2 (Beirut, 2003), 67–97; Hava 
Lazarus-Yafeh, Intertwined Worlds. Medieval Islam and Bible Criticism (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 19–74; Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers on 
Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: From Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm, Islamic Philosophy, 
Theology, and Science, vol. 22 (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J. Brill Publ., 1996), 
223–48. Schreiner, op. cit. (note 3), esp. 175–77.
31 Griffith, op. cit. (note 11).
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according to Manichean tradition also Mani—were “seals of the prophets,”32 
each in his time, in the same way Muhammad is the “seal of the prophets,” 
but not only in his time, but of all the prophets of all times (Sura 33:40). 
With him, the succession of prophets ends.
The same idea is applied to the revealed books: The “Torah of Moses” 
(taurāt) and the “Gospel of Jesus” (inğīl) were once “guidance and light” 
(hudā wa-nūr) in their times, but now it is the revelation transmitted by 
Muhammad that is not only the last in terms of time, but also the final and 
ultimate revelation in terms of significance and validity (Sura 3:3). The 
sequence in time of prophets and books reflects their ranking and order 
of priority. Thus, every successive prophet is superior to his predecessor.
Here we have the same type of concept of prophets as in the Jewish 
tradition, with one significant difference: instead of the Qur’anic climax 
ascendens (see above), the Jewish tradition assumes a climax descendens.
According to the Jewish tradition, it is not the last but the first prophet, 
Moses, who is superior to all others after him (see Talmud Bavli Yevamot 
49b; Wayyiqra Rabba I,14).33 Therefore, rabbinic sources describe and call 
Moses “the father of all prophets” (av kol ha-nevi’im):34 All prophets who 
came after him are deemed inferior to him, and not only that, because the 
chain, the succession of prophets ends with the death of the last biblical 
prophet, the last prophet explicitly mentioned by name in the Hebrew 
Bible, that is Malachi, for “with the death of Malachi the spirit of prophecy 
withdrew from the world” (Tosefta Sota II,30). Consequently, any prophets 
coming after the death of Malachi were certainly not prophets, but regarded 
as false prophets.
Nevertheless, to prevent us from drawing premature conclusions, a 
little detail in the biblical obituary on Moses (Deut 34:10–12)35 should not 
32 Ibn Kaṯīr (1301–1372), e.g., calls Jesus “the seal of the prophets of the children of 
Israel”; see Abū l-Fidā’ Ismā῾ īl Ibn Kaṯīr, Muḫtaṣar tafsīr al-Qur’ān, ed. Muḥammad A. 
aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 3 vols (Beirut/Mekka, ³1984), III, 493; furthermore, Carsten Colpe, Das 
Siegel der Propheten. Historische Beziehungen zwischen Judentum, Judenchristentum, 
Heidentum und frühem Islam, Abhandlungen zur neutestamentlichen Theologie 
und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 3 (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990), 15–37 
and 227–43.
33 See Stefan Schreiner, “‘Der Vater aller Propheten’. Mose als Prophet und die 
Prophetie des Mose in jüdischer, christlicher und islamischer Tradition,” in Klaus 
von Stosch and Tuba Isik (eds), Prophetie in Islam und Christentum, Beiträge 
zur komparativen Theologie, vol. 8 (Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich: Verlag 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 13–34.
34 See, e.g., the Midrashim Wayyiqra Rabba I,3; Ester Rabba I; Shemot Rabba XXI,4; 
Bereshit Rabba LXXVI,1.
35 Cf. Sirach 44,23-45,5, and Philon of Alexandria, Vita Mosis II,189-191.
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be overlooked. This obituary begins with the words: “Never since has there 
arisen a prophet in Israel like Moses,” which means that Moses was/is the 
greatest prophet in Israel. Outside Israel, among the nations of the world, 
however, it is not impossible that a prophet like Moses might rise (Sifre 
Devarim § 357 end; Yalqut Shim’oni II § 966).36 And the Yemenite Jewish 
philosopher Netan’el ibn al-Fayyūmī (12th c.) identified the Arabian prophet 
as a prophet like Moses from among the nations of the world.37
But the abovementioned Qur’anic climax ascendens should likewise 
not to be misunderstood. It does not imply that each succeeding prophet 
and their books render their predecessors irrelevant and unimportant. On 
the contrary, as can be learned from the Qur’anic concept of succession as 
summarized in Sura al-Ma’ida 5:44-49:
(44) Verily, it is We who sent down from on high the Torah (taurāt), wherein there 
was guidance and light (hudā wa-nūr), and on its strength did the prophets, who 
had surrendered themselves unto God, deliver judgment unto those who followed 
the Jewish faith etc. […]. (46) And We caused ‘Īsā/Jesus, the son of Maryam/
Mary, to follow in the footsteps of those [earlier prophets] confirming the truth 
(muṣaddiqan) of what was before him of the Torah. And We sent down from on 
high upon him the Gospel (inǧīl) wherein there was guidance and light (hudā 
wa-nūr), confirming the truth (muṣaddiqan) of what was before him of the Torah, a 
guidance and admonition unto the God-fearing. […] (48) And upon you, We have 
sent down from on high the book that is the truth (al-kitāb bil-ḥaqq) confirming the 
truth (muṣaddiqan) of what was before him of the Book and corroborating [literally: 
saying Amen to] it (muhaiminan ʽalaihi) […]
Consequently, the succession of prophets and books is to be understood as 
the “confirmation” (taṣdīq) and “corroboration” (haimana) of a preceding 
prophet and his book by his/its respective successor. Thus, the Qur’an does 
not only repeat the message contained in the Torah and the gospel in pure 
and clearly understandable Arabic (Sura 41:43; 46:9), but it confirms their 
truth and significance as guidance and light (hudā wa-nūr). As the gospel 
36 Cf. Bemidbar Rabba XIV, 20, and Talmud Bavli Bava Batra 15b.
37 Netan’el al-Fayyūmī, Bustan al-‛uqūl, ed. Yosef D. Qafiḥ (Jerusalem/Qiryat Ono: 
Agudat halakhot ‘Am Yisrael, 1984), 103–110; English, The Bustan al-Ukul by 
Nathanael ibn al-Fayyumi, transl. David Levine, Columbia University Oriental 
Studies, vol. 6 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908; reprint New York, 
N.Y.: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), 103–108. A similar view was held by Zekharyah b. 
Shlomoh ha-Rofe’, Midrash ha-ḥefeṣ, ed. Meir Havatzelet, 2 vols. (Jerusalem: Mosad 
ha-Rav Kook, 1990–1992), II, 482.
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confirmed and corroborated the Torah and the truth in it, the Qur’an confirms 
and corroborates the gospel and the truth therein (Sura 5:48; cf. 2:91).
With reference to the relationship between the Bible and the Qur’an 
and their interrelatedness, the ideas of taṣdīq (“confirmation”) and haimana 
(“corroboration”) have a fourfold meaning:
First of all, taṣdīq refers to the fact that the Qur’an has predecessors 
whose existence rather than being denied is recognized and positively 
evaluated.
Regardless of the so-called falsification of scriptures, i.e., of the Torah 
and the gospel, the Qur’an remains related to them. To understand the 
Qur’an, therefore, requires a certain knowledge of the Bible. As said at the 
beginning, many biblical and post-biblical stories are retold in the Qur’an 
in such an abridged version that it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, 
to understand them and explain their message without knowing their 
biblical and/or post-biblical counterparts or parallels.38 In that regard, 
knowledge of the biblical and post-biblical Jewish and Christian traditions 
provides a necessary, if not indispensable, means to understand the Qur’an. 
According to Sura Yūnus 10:94, Muḥammad is instructed: “If you are in 
doubt concerning that which We have revealed unto you, then ask those 
who are [were] reading the Book [taurāt and inǧīl] before you. Verily, the 
truth has come to you from your Lord. So be not of those who doubt (it).” 
Similarly, in Sura 16:43 = 21:7:39 “And We never sent but men upon whom 
We have sent down a revelation. Ask the People of Tradition (ahl aḏ-ḏikr. 
i.e., Jews and Christians) if you do not know something.”
Secondly, the concepts of taṣdīq and haimana are to be understood 
as “confirmation” and “corroboration” of (a) the Divine origin of all the 
scriptures, including those preceding the Qur’an; (b) the truth contained 
in them; and, subsequently, (c) their claim to truth as well. The preceding 
scriptures are no less “guidance and light” than the Qur’an. With respect 
to the Qur’an, they serve as references and fulfill a legitimizing role (“Le-
gitimationsinstanz”).
38 Gabriel Said Reynolds speaks of the “biblical subtext” of the Qur’an. See his 
The Qur’an and its Biblical Subtext, Routledge Studies in the Qur’an (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2010).
39 On that term, see Surah 21.7; 12,109; 17,101; 26,197. ahl aḏ-ḏikr is a parallel to 
the otherwise usually applied ahl al-kitāb (people of the book) and refers to those 
following earlier revelations, as Ibn Kaṯīr wrote (Muḫtaṣar tafsīr, ed. by aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 
II, 333). Ğalāl ad-Dīn as-Suyūṭī, however, sees in it a hint at the “scholars of the 
Torah and the Gospel” (῾ulamā’ at-taurāt wal-inğīl) (Tafsīr al-Ğalālain, ed. al-Ğūğā 
[Damascus, n.d.], 357).
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Accordingly, Muslim Qur’an commentators and historians used biblical 
and post-biblical texts40 throughout the centuries as dicta probantia as well 
as praefigurationes for the Qur’an, as Gustav E. von Grunebaum already 
rightly observed41 years ago (cf. in this context also the so-called Isrā’īlīyāt 
that are serving a similar purpose).42
In the fifteenth century, Burhān ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Umar al-Biqā‘ī 
(1406–1480) felt the need to write a book in defense of the use of the Bible in 
Muslim exegesis of the Qur’an: al-Aqwāl al-qawīma fī ḥukm an-naql min al-kutub 
al-qadīma (“The right words to rebuke the verdict to quote from the Old Books”).43 
In addition, he compiled a comprehensive commentary on the Qur’an in which 
he repeatedly resorted to the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament alike, using 
them as an indispensable “Verstehenshilfe [help to understand].”
Thirdly, taṣdīq (“confirmation”) and haimana (“corroboration”) of the 
preceding scriptures imply their critical study and examination.
Indeed, the Qur’an claims to correct the falsification of the scriptures 
committed by the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb). Thus, the Qur’an offers to 
bring what the People of the Book omitted and to put right what they distorted:
O People of the Book, now there has come Our messenger, to make clear unto you 
much of what you have been concealing of the book [Bible], and to pardon much. 
Now there has come unto you from God a light and a clear book, through which 
God shows unto all that seek His goodly acceptance the path leading to salvation 
and, by His grace, bring them out of the depths of darkness into the light and 
guides them onto a straight path (Sura al-Ma’ida 5:15-16). 
In that sense, taṣdīq and haimana mean interpretation and commentary on 
the Bible. The Qur’an becomes—and serves as—a rereading of the Bible, as 
40 See David R. Thomas, “The Bible in Early Muslim Anti-Christian Polemics,” in 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 7 (1996), 29–38; Jane D. McAuliffe, “The 
Qur’anic Context of Muslim Biblical Scholarship,” in Islam and Christian–Muslim 
Relations 7 (1996), 141–58; Accad, op. cit. (note 30), 72ff.
41 Gustav E. von Grunebaum (1909–1972), Studien zum Kulturbild und Selbstverständnis 
des Islam (Zürich/Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag, 1969), 310.
42 Georges Vajda (1908–1981), “Isrā’īlīyāt,” in Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill Publ., 1978), IV, 211f.; Meir Jacob Kister (1914–2010), “‘ḥaddiṯū ‘an Banī Isrā’īla 
wa-lā ḫaraja’—A Study of an Early Tradition,” in Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972), 
215–39; Gordon Newby, “Tafsīr Isrā’īlīyāt—The Development of Qur’an–Commentary 
in Early Islam and its Relationship to Judaeo-Christian Traditions of Scriptural 
Commentaries,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47 (1979), 685–97.
43 Walid A. Saleh (ed.), In Defense of the Bible. A Critical Edition and an Introduction 
to al-Biqā῾ ī ‘s Bible Treatise, Islamic History and Civilization, vol. 73 (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 2008).
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can be illustrated by many examples44 where, as Wilhelm Bacher (1850–1913) 
wrote over 140 years ago, the Qur’an in connection with post-Qur’anic 
traditions provides interpretations that contribute to a better and deeper 
understanding of biblical texts.45
And finally, every successive revelation surpasses and “outbids” the 
preceding one, placing it on an inferior level, as can be inferred from Sura 
al-Baqara 2:91:
For when they are told: Believe in what God has sent down, they reply: We believe 
[only] in what hast been sent upon us (unzila ‘alainā), and they deny everything 
else, although it is the truth confirming the one already in their possession (wa-
huwa l-ḥaqq muṣaddiqan li-mā ma‘ahum).
And likewise in Sura al-Ma’ida 5:68:
Say, People of the Book, you have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you observe 
the Torah and the Gospel and what now has been sent down upon you by your Lord.
The scriptures once given to Moses and Jesus were the divine writ in their 
time, but now they are superseded and replaced by the Qur’an. After the 
revelation of the Qur’an, the earlier scriptures (taurāt, zabūr, inǧīl) have not 
lost their validity, but are placed at an inferior level. And a prophetic Ḥadīṯ 
relates that if Moses had had the chance to listen to the message proclaimed 
by the Arabian prophet, he himself would have followed this prophet.46
In other words, the same question raised with regard to the relationship 
between Christianity and Judaism, that is, the relationship between the 
44 Cf. the studies in Schreiner, op. cit. (note 3b); John Kaltner, Ishmael Instructs Isaac: 
An Introduction to the Qur’an for Bible Readers (Collegeville, Mn: Liturgical Press, 
1999); John C. Reeves (ed.), Bible and Qur’an. Essays in Scriptural Intertextuality, 
Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series, vol. 24 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2003 (Leiden/Boston: E.J. Brill Publ., 2004); Jane D. McAuliffe (ed.), 
With Reverence for the Word. Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; ²2010).
45 Wilhelm Bacher, “Bibel und biblische Geschichte in der muhammedanischen 
Literatur,” in Jeschurun—Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums 8 (1871), 
1-29; cf. also Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921),“Ueber Bibelcitate in muhammedanischen 
Schriften,” in Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 13 (1893), 315–21 
= in Ignaz Goldziher, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. J. de Somogyi, 6 vols (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlag, 1967–1973), III, 309–15); Ignaz Goldziher, “Neutestamentliche 
Elemente in der Traditionsliteratur des Islams,” in Oriens Christianus 2 (1902), 390–97.
46 Transmitted by ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. al-Faḍl b. Bahrām b. aṣ-Ṣamad 
Muḥammad ad-Dārimī as-Samarqandī (797–869), Sunan al-Musnad, Nr. 436.
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Gospel of Jesus and the Torah of Moses and the validity of the Torah post 
Christum natum, is also raised with regard to the relationship between the 
Qur’an and the Bible, Islam, Christianity and Judaism.
On the one hand, Paul writes in his Letter to the Romans that the 
coming of the Messiah (Christ) implies the end of the Torah (Rom 10:4: 
télos gar nómou Christós); on the other, we read in the Gospel of Matthew 
(Mt 5:17) that not a single dot will be taken away from the Torah, it remains 
as it is and does not lose its validity. Thus, the Qur’an on the one hand 
supersedes the Torah and the gospel but, on the other, needs them for the 
purpose of legitimization and understanding and remains indebted to them. 
Therefore, in line with that, the Andalusian lawyer Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. 
Mūsā aš-Šāṭibī (1320–1388) suggested explaining the relationship between 
the three scriptures as a relationship of mutuality and interrelatedness: 
they are intertwined and, thus, serve each other mutually as co-references.
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The Suspension of Expertise 
in Scriptural Reasoning
Nicholas Adams
In this short paper I draw attention to two features of the practice of 
scriptural reasoning. First, it is hospitable to religious actors who are 
radically uninformed about religious traditions other than their own. 
Second, it strips academic participants of their knowledge, and thus, to a 
certain extent, their status, and requires them to engage in discussion as 
equal partners with non-experts. 
These two features have in common a certain privileging of ignorance, 
whether natural (in the case of the uninformed) or learned (in the case of 
experts). The categories “uninformed” and “expert” in fact overlap in the 
case of any particular participant in scriptural reasoning: it is typically 
the case that scriptural reasoners with a deep knowledge of their own 
traditions are not competent in other traditions; and even those who are 
expert in one aspect of their own tradition, e.g., its early formation, its 
texts in the original languages, its later development, its modern trans-
formations, will be more or less ignorant of other aspects. No one knows 
everything. My argument, however, is that even an ideal polymath, with 
a deep knowledge of all traditions, must learn a certain kind of ignorance 
in order to participate in scriptural reasoning. In brief: to do scriptural 
reasoning competently is to suspend one’s expertise.
Scriptural reasoning is not one thing. It is certainly the practice of 
interpreting texts from multiple traditions in small groups, and it is guided 
by certain rules. But as Peter Ochs has indicated, these rules tend to be 
negative: they inhibit certain practices. All kinds of variants with their 
own distinctive positive qualities now abound, and it is hard to define what 
scriptural reasoning is. It is much more straightforward to say what it is 
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not.1 In this investigation I do not wish to define the practice of scriptural 
reasoning or provide an exhaustive description of its features. Instead, I 
want to look at one aspect of it and explore its implications.
There is what might look like a paradox at the heart of the practice of 
scriptural reasoning. It is both simple and intimidating. And, curiously, it 
is more intimidating the more expertise one has in a religious tradition. 
It is simple in its format: participants have texts from different traditions, 
typically three, but there are many variations, and they interpret them 
together. “Together” is a key adverbial qualification here. It is not the case 
that Jews interpret Jewish texts, Christians interpret Christian texts, and 
Muslims interpret Islamic texts. And this is not only because texts that are 
Tanakh for Jews are simultaneously Old Testament for Christians. More 
importantly, all participants interpret all texts. More fundamentally, all 
participants interpret together. The business of interpretation is a shared 
enterprise where agency is located in the group rather than in each separate 
individual. It is intimidating in the discipline it imposes on participants. One 
must interpret the text, and not expatiate upon topics of one’s own choice: 
no mini-lectures. One must pay attention to its details, and not subordinate 
its meaning to matters external to it, such as historical context or doctrinal 
settlement. One must speak, and not just listen, and listen, and not just speak. 
One must treat all scriptural texts as sacred objects. There are many musts.
This all takes some getting used to. One of the readily observable 
features of scriptural reasoning, when viewed long term over many years of 
its practice, is the horror or contempt expressed by some first-time academic 
participants. This reaction is quite common and may in part explain the 
uncertain reputation that scriptural reasoning has in academic circles. It 
is worth exploring this horror/contempt a little—not out of a concern for 
how some participants might feel about scriptural reasoning, but because 
it may shed light on core features of the practice that might otherwise 
remain on the margins of one’s field of vision.
Academic experts are often invited to speak. Indeed, this is a common 
locution in English for the business of arranging a lecture or a colloquium. 
“Professor X has been invited to speak.” Even the word professor adverts 
to this power of speech, of professing. In a certain sense it is redundant to 
invite a professor to speak: to invite a professor is just to invite one who 
speaks. The status attached to this speaking office is more uncertain than 
it once was, and there are doubtlessly many explanations for this change. 
Higher education is more widely available; universities are frequently 
viewed as businesses; the internet has rendered information more accessible; 
1 Peter Ochs, “Re-Socializing Scholars of Religious, Theological, and Theo-
Philosophical Inquiry,” in Modern Theology, vol. 29, Issue 4 (2013), 201–19.
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the fruits of research are often not readily intelligible to a general reader; 
feudal habits are attenuated with each passing generation; and so forth. 
Academic experts are thus in an uncertain position: their status is tied 
to their capacity for speech but that status, and therefore their speech, is 
diminishing. Scriptural reasoning certainly invites academic participants, 
but typically not to speak, and not to share their expertise, but to engage 
in a practice of interpreting texts where there is a good deal of listening.
This is often a disorientating and perhaps even offensive matter. The 
fundamental texts of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are not merely objects of 
research. They are the most researched objects in the history of the university. 
Indeed such research predates universities themselves, and by hundreds of years. 
To be expert in commentary on the Torah, or to have command of interpretation 
of the New Testament, or to be knowledgeable about the details of Tafsir, is to 
join a great chain of scholarship extending back into the indefinite past. It is 
to engage an unimaginably large bibliography in multiple languages, many 
of whose books mark high points of civilization, and some of which have very 
likely changed the ways entire communities understand themselves and the 
world. It is to practice scholarship whose potential readership and influence 
extends to the billions. It is thus an extraordinary shock for biblical scholars 
to discover that their scholarship and knowledge are not contested but, much 
worse, irrelevant to the practice of scriptural reasoning.
Likewise theologians with a grasp of the nuances of scriptural 
interpretation and a subtle sensibility for the shifting resonances that certain 
passages have for religious communities across the centuries might well 
be taken aback by the sheer vulgarity of a practice that presents grown 
adults with unmarked passages of scripture, typically in translation, and 
encourages free discussion of its meanings while discouraging interventions 
that draw other texts and voices into the discussion. Scriptural reasoning 
is surely a kind of joke, a travesty, or at best a parody of the worst kind 
of fundamentalist Bible study, where readers do not “study” at all, but 
serially offer their pious reflections, unchecked by such niceties as knowing 
anything about the text and its history of interpretation.
This exaggerated picture perhaps gives an idea of the experience of 
academic experts who participate in scriptural reasoning for the first time. 
It seems so amateur, so unschooled, and so ill-disciplined.
What this experience reveals, however, is the extent to which scriptural 
reasoning is not like academic study in the late-modern university. In a session 
of scriptural reasoning the texts are alive and have an agency that contains, 
and frequently overwhelms, the subjectivity of any particular interpreter; and 
the interpretations that circulate are more or less dominant, not because of 
the information they convey but because they generate conversation: certain 
interventions spark off an array of further explorations; others interrupt the 
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flow. The flow of conversation, within and across traditions, is one of the 
remarkable features of scriptural reasoning. A competent scriptural reasoner 
offers interpretations as gifts for others to receive, as seeds for others to 
plant, as bricks for others to build. And as with gifts, seeds and bricks, 
those who receive them may put them to uses quite unforeseen by the one 
who gives them. When multiple bricks are in circulation, their interactions—
and the corresponding temporary architecture of interpretations—is quite 
unpredictable. A good session will typically display some surprises, as the 
texts stimulate unfamiliar interpretations, and frequently a good deal of 
humor—including the grim humor that accompanies acknowledgement of 
the capacity for these texts to be weapons in the hands of those with axes 
to grind and enemies to use them on.
Scriptural reasoning requires participants to suspend their expertise 
for the sake of generative interpretation. It invites participants to dispossess 
themselves of their own interpretative interests for the sake of a shared 
enterprise of interpretation. This can be seen quite clearly in four features 
of scriptural reasoning, which each interrupt the expectations of academic 
discourse but can also nourish it in unexpected ways. These are its tendency 
to produce (1) understanding more than agreement; (2) collegiality more 
than consensus; (3) generativity more than critique; and (4) temporary 
more than enduring interpretations. After considering each in turn, I shall 
suggest some ways in which scriptural reasoning aids certain kinds of 
academic study and may even make some of them possible.
Understanding
First, scriptural reasoning produces understanding more than agreement. 
Put differently, the orientations of scriptural reasoners are typically more 
towards illumination than persuasion, although there are plenty of exceptions 
to this. This is partly because when three or more traditions encounter each 
other in relation to their texts there is a good deal of history behind that 
encounter, and the more of that history one knows, the better one grasps 
that these traditions are constituted by their difference from one another. 
Their histories of textual interpretation, and especially of legal development, 
are often expressions of refusals of each other’s ways of thinking and acting. 
Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism grew up together, often in physical 
proximity, and consciously crafted shibboleths to distinguish themselves. It 
is not merely the case that religious traditions happen to be different from 
one another. Our religious traditions have frequently defined themselves 
against each other: difference is core to their identities. This also has the 
strange result that in some deep sense the traditions require each other 
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in order to manifest this difference. Obviously if two things are different, 
each needs the other for that difference to exist. The point is that in these 
cases difference is core to identity, and so for the identity to show itself, 
the different other must be visible. Islam, for example, does not make as 
much sense if it is not contrasted with the traditions whose practices and 
beliefs it has refused. For better or worse, there is a good deal of negativity 
in the traditions’ sense of identity.
Scriptural reasoning embraces that difference and, in ways that are 
perhaps obscure and difficult to grasp, it has the capacity to embrace 
that negativity. Participants who are emphatic about their own tradition’s 
rightness, and emphatic about other traditions’ wrongness, are quite welcome 
in scriptural reasoning. It is a practice of interreligious encounter that 
welcomes awkward customers. But scriptural reasoning also disciplines 
those tendencies by requiring conversation to be generated by the 
interpretation of texts. As any scriptural reasoner can testify, it is in fact 
rather a challenge to produce broad claims about each other’s traditions 
when interpreting texts, because the specificity of those texts acts as a 
brake on ambitious generalizations about traditions as such. Those who 
have the tendency to speak negatively about other traditions are welcome, 
but scriptural reasoning affords severely limited opportunities for such 
claims to be articulated. It thus has the potential to attenuate certain 
habits. Scriptural reasoning does not merely privilege understanding 
above agreement. In various ways it actually sustains disagreements, in 
all their full negativity, but it does so in ways that mitigate the familiar 
aggressive rhetorical modality of that negativity.
For a reasoner trained in the academic study of religions, and especially 
of texts, this can appear odd. If the purpose of reading texts is to determine 
their meanings, then while there will doubtless be disagreements, even strong 
ones, the purpose of study is surely to end them, or at least reduce them 
as far as possible. Scholarly study of texts is in principle overwhelmingly 
oriented towards agreement, even if in practice scholarly habits of engagement 
often tend rather theatrically to generate disagreements in ritual displays 
of intellectual plumage. The practice of scriptural reason seems not to 
determine the meanings of texts in quite the same way that the scholarly 
study of those texts does. I shall remark a little later on certain features 
of this “not quite the same way.”
Collegiality
Second, most forms of scholarly study deal in consensus. Conferences and 
their currency, academic papers, aim to establish or challenge established 
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consensuses. It is hard to imagine a view on a topic that does not position 
itself with respect to a consensus of some kind. Scholarly interventions 
are typically addressed to a community, which to a greater or lesser 
extent knows what it thinks about a subject. To have one’s authority to 
speak to the community recognized is, at least in part, for one’s grasp of 
the community’s mind to be acknowledged. As in the case of agreement, 
while the principle of scholarly study is towards consensus, one often 
sees in practice the theatrical production of its absence: there are few 
things more satisfying for a scholar than to throw a consensus into doubt. 
Scriptural reasoning, by contrast, is a practice that neither seeks nor 
undermines consensus. It is just the wrong category to grasp what is being 
sought. A group of scriptural reasoners tends to aim at a shared practice 
of interpretation more than a practice of shared interpretation. It is the 
convergence of interpretive energies on a text rather than the convergence 
of interpretations of a text that is of value. There is nothing wrong with this, 
from a scholarly perspective, and indeed a discussion with an elegant flow 
of conversation is a beautiful thing. But such a flow is not exactly the goal 
of scholarly discussion: the goal is typically to generate knowledge, and 
to do so in such a way that a new consensus about it can be established. 
Scriptural reasoning is oriented towards a flow of interpretations, and the 
mark of a successful session is indicated by the quality of its flow just as 
much as the quality of the interpretations in play. Indeed, these two are 
closely linked: high quality interpretations often accompany high quality 
flow of discussion. The suspension of expertise is perhaps a core condition 
for this kind of conversation to flow elegantly. I suggest that this should at 
least be taken seriously as a possibility.
Generativity
Third, scriptural reasoning privileges the production of high energy 
interpretive activity: if my interpretation stimulates yours and yours 
stimulates another’s, so much the better. Indeed, if this does not happen, 
then one is probably not doing scriptural reasoning in any meaningful 
sense. The correction of error, through the presentation of more secure 
knowledge, tends to inhibit the practice of scriptural reasoning. This is 
somewhat outrageous and delinquent from a scholarly point of view. A 
scriptural reasoner might offer an interpretation that is profoundly unlikely, 
given what is known about the context in which the text was produced; but 
it may be rather difficult to challenge such an interpretation from the text 
alone. The scriptural reasoner whose expertise leads to a clear diagnosis 
of what appears to be a glaring error is thus in a difficult position. From 
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a scholarly point of view, error invites critique and correction. But if the 
generativity of discussion is likely to be compromised, if the energy will 
probably be forcibly dissipated, by pointing it out, it is not entirely clear 
what the most fitting course of action should be. This is a matter of the 
good judgment of the scriptural reasoner; but the question of judgment 
would probably not arise at all in a scholarly practice. If someone makes 
a mistake, one has a duty to point it out. This is a duty many scholars 
discharge with impressive dispatch. To inhibit such corrective discipline, 
by requiring the suspension of expertise, is, I suggest, a further offensive 
quality of scriptural reasoning.
Temporariness
Fourth, the interpretations that are produced in scriptural reasoning are 
typically short-lived. One of the remarkable aspects of the practice of 
scriptural reasoning is the intensity of the discussion, and the depth of many 
of its interpretations and, yet, the fleeting quality that they have. Attempts 
to capture particular interpretations for long-term dissemination are often 
frustrated, and success in preserving scripturally reasoned interpretations for 
posterity frequently prove elusive. One possible reason for this is somewhat 
prosaic: if interpretations of the New Testament are generative and even 
profound in a session of scriptural reasoning because of their resonance with 
previous interpretations of a passage in the Qur’an, which the group studied 
earlier in the day, this is obviously a rather contingent matter, and in two 
ways. First, it is contingent on what happened to have been said previously; 
second it is contingent on what is said about a Qur’anic text, and this is not 
a respectable point of comparison, in scholarly terms, for illuminating a New 
Testament passage. For this reason many interpretations are destined to 
glow brightly for a short season, before dissipating, unlikely to return. This 
is not always the case: many scriptural reasoners have found uses for their 
or others’ interpretations in their scholarly work. I am drawing attention to 
those cases where this is not the case. From the point of view of an expert, 
an interpretation that has only a present, and no future, is of negligible value. 
An interpretation that cannot, perhaps even should not, be recorded cannot 
be cited. Nothing could be worse.
An aid to scholarship
Strong contrasts have been in play so far. I have tried to specify not only 
the salient differences between scholarly practices of interpretation and 
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those of scriptural reasoning, but also to capture something of the offense 
that scriptural reasoning causes to those who are highly skilled in the 
academy. And I have suggested that the suspension of expertise in scriptural 
reasoning, while often perceived as an unwelcome and even unrespectable 
requirement, is necessary given the goods at which scriptural reasoning 
aims. These goods are significantly bound up with questions of shared 
agency, the flow of energy, the generativity of certain temporary insights 
for other temporary insights. Scriptural reasoning is genuinely odd, when 
judged from a scholarly perspective. One should thus expect that it might 
be viewed with a certain suspicion within the academy. And this is indeed 
what one frequently sees. One judges the quality of scripturally reasoned 
interpretations according to criteria different from those used to judge 
conference papers or journal articles.
I want to end, though, with a short note on a surprising outcome of 
scriptural reasoning for many scholars who suspend their expertise in 
order to practice it: it aids their scholarship in ways that are relatively 
easy to specify.
At its simplest, scriptural reasoning sometimes produces undoubtedly 
interesting and fruitful interpretations that actually can be preserved for 
posterity and put to use in more scholarly contexts. It is not entirely clear 
whether such interpretations require scriptural reasoning in order to be 
produced, however. It seems to me more likely that at least in principle 
any practice of interpretation could have produced them. It is nonetheless 
striking that they were produced during the practice of scriptural reasoning 
and not in one of the myriad other possible practices.
More interestingly, however, scriptural reasoning may attune its 
practitioners to questions of polyphony, of change, and of contingency. 
The practice of scriptural reasoning is, in some ways, a microcosm of what 
happens to scripture in traditions. There are many voices, which often do 
not converge; interpretations undergo mutations depending on what texts 
are on the table; their meanings are to a significant extent dependent, at a 
particular time, on what has just been. It is quite possible that scriptural 
reasoning produces interpreters who are particularly sensitive to these 
kinds of issues.
Most significantly, however, scriptural reasoning may generate models 
of collaborative interpretation that are otherwise difficult to find in the 
academy. There are publications in which members of different traditions 
address an issue of common concern, each interpreting their own tradition’s 
texts, with a view to shedding light onto contemporary problems and 
potential ways to address them. This is not scriptural reasoning, but it is 
one possible product of scriptural reasoning. But this kind of approach is 
not restricted to scriptural texts. Anver Emon, of the University of Toronto, 
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published a collection of essays by scholars of Islamic law and Jewish law, 
proceedings of a series of meetings where scholars from two traditions 
read and interpreted legal texts from two traditions, and discovered in the 
process that this approach cast a new and unexpected light on familiar 
texts.2 These workshops did not require any suspension of expertise, but 
their very existence was suggested by the practice of scriptural reasoning. 
Had its editor not participated in scriptural reasoning, it is unlikely that 
his project would have taken the form it did.
There are many other examples of scholarly practices which are 
transformed by the practice of scriptural reasoning. These include what 
Peter Ochs calls the cure of “binarism” and what I have referred to as the 
sustaining of long-term disagreements.3
What is the significance of all this? I have offered an hypothesis to 
account for the uncertain position that scriptural reasoning occupies in 
the academy: it requires the suspension of expertise, and this requirement 
is offensive in various ways. It also contravenes other scholarly rules in 
its emphatic lack of commitment to agreement, consensus and enduring 
forms of transmission. These might appear somehow less serious and less 
worthy of one’s time, from a scholarly perspective. But I have also tried to 
draw attention to the necessity of these alternative disciplines if one is to 
do justice to certain kinds of shared agency and certain forms of collegiality.
Of course it is quite possible that the university is the problem, and 
that the practice of scriptural reasoning throws its deficiencies into sharp 
relief. But that is a battle for another day.
2 Anver Emon (ed.), Islamic and Jewish Legal Reasoning: Encountering Our Legal 
Other (London: Oneworld, 2016). 
3 See Ochs, op. cit. (note 1); Nicholas Adams, “Long–Term Disagreement: Philosophical 
Models in Scriptural Reasoning and Receptive Ecumenism,” in the same issue of 
Modern Theology.
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On the Way Towards a 
Dialogical Theology
Katja Drechsler and Thorsten Knauth4
Introduction
How a religious text is adequately and legitimately interpreted and 
understood is of great importance to all religious traditions. Theological 
efforts to interpret religious diversity outside dominant schemes of mission, 
confrontation, hierarchy and ignorance have intensified over recent decades. 
How can adherents of different religious traditions encounter each other 
in an open and appreciative way? And what do the sacred sources tell us 
about the encounter with the religious “other”? How do they describe the 
relation with other religions? A relationship between the understanding 
of one’s own religious tradition and an attitude towards others is obvious: 
if my religion is the only legitimate way to truth and to salvation, there is 
not much left for the other.
The reconstruction and rereading of one’s own texts while being 
aware of other religions also claiming to be ways to truth and salvation 
4 This article is based on collective work of Thorsten Knauth, Carola Roloff, Andreas 
Markowsky and Florian Jäckel and a lecture held by Katja Drechsler and Thorsten 
Knauth, “Interreligiöse Hermeneutik und neue Ansätze in islamischer Theologie,” 
November 2015, University of Hamburg. For full coverage of the multi-perspective 
hermeneutical experiment, see Thorsten Knauth, Carola Roloff, Katja Drechsler, 
Florian Jäckel and Andreas Markowsky, “Auf dem Weg zu einer dialogisch-
interreligiösen Hermeneutik,” in Katajun Amirpur et al. (eds), Perspektiven 
dialogischer Theologie. Offenheit in den Religionen und eine Hermeneutik des 
interreligiösen Dialogs (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2016), 207–315.
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constitute only a first step that might be taken without talking to the other. 
It is important to go further: if one’s own and the other religious tradition 
are mutually and collectively interpreted, the other can become a partner 
in a joint effort to understand religion. Understanding becomes dialogical.
This article provides some insights into current research within the 
international and interdisciplinary project “Religions and Dialogue in Modern 
Societies” (ReDi). After introducing the Academy of World Religions at the 
University of Hamburg and the ReDi-project in general, the development, 
aims and outcomes of this multi-perspective hermeneutical experiment and 
our, preliminary, understanding of a dialogical theology will be discussed 
in greater detail.
Academy of World Religions, University of Hamburg
In Hamburg schools, pupils of all confessions, religious or non-religious 
affiliations together experience the subject of religion; we call this “Religious 
Education for All” classes (“Religionsunterricht für alle”). In this context, 
the Academy of World Religions plays a crucial role in further developing 
this inclusive and dialogical concept and diversifying the training of 
religious education teachers (along with Protestant theology, there are 
currently programs for Islam and Alevism5). Research and teaching at 
the Academy are also shaped in such a way that theological concepts from 
Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Alevism do not 
merely coexist but dialogically engage each other within the context of 
an academic discourse.6 How this works is well explained by our research 
project ReDi, which is funded by the Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF). The project seeks to contribute to the research on questions of 
interreligious dialogue with a simultaneous study at two levels:
(1) Dialogical theology: Considering existing approaches of plural, 
intercultural and especially interreligious theology, a team of experts from 
different religious traditions is working on developing a dialogical theology. 
The context-oriented nature of our research requires strong reference to 
5 Alevism is by some considered a branch of Shi’a Islam that is practiced in Turkey 
and the Balkans among ethnic Turks and Kurds, and is related to—though distinct 
from—Alawism in Syria. Others maintain that Alevism is a religious tradition of 
its own.
6 In addition to research and teaching, the Academy of World Religions is engaging 
in interreligious “dialogue in the city.” For further information, see https://www.
awr.uni-hamburg.de/website-content/pdfs-flyer/awr-flyer-englisch.pdf
69
observed forms of actual interreligious dialogue in real life, which will be 
studied at the second level.
(2) Dialogical practice: By applying methods of empirical qualitative 
research, the belief about and practice of interreligious dialogue as it 
exists today are studied. The surveys include both actors inside religious 
communities and those unaffiliated with them. Further, the possibilities 
and limitations of fostering interreligious dialogue, especially in education, 
are studied in depth.
“Dialogue in action: the hermeneutical project”
While in the first year of the project (2013), each religious tradition 
researched its own textual sources on possibilities for and also limitations 
of dialogue and openness towards the religious “other,” the aim of the 
second year was to start a dialogue between the religious traditions 
and concentrate on hermeneutical questions. Starting from the idea of a 
“dialogical research laboratory,” we developed a project, which we called in 
German “Auslegungsgespräche.” These were four experimental dialogues 
that took place from April to June 2014 with a researcher from each religious 
tradition—Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam—being present in the 
Hamburg team. In these dialogues, everyone presented a selected “religious 
key text” concerning the subject of openness to the religious other. These 
texts were mutually interpreted together.
Methodological approach
The logic behind this practical approach was not to develop dialogical 
hermeneutical theory out of an already existing theory, which would 
constitute a purely reconstructive approach. We felt it necessary to collect 
and analyze our own data about our practical hermeneutical experience 
like an experiment conducted in a “laboratory” (as opposed to field study). 
The aim was to provide data, in the form of faithful transcriptions of our 
encounters that could lead to a better understanding of dialogical dynamics 
in the field of joint interpretation of sacred texts. Thus, our research, as 
in Anne Hege Grung’s study, was more focused on process and dialogue 
than on content.7
7 Anne Hege Grung, Gender Justice in Muslim–Christian Readings. Christian and 
Muslim Women in Norway Making Meaning of Texts from the Bible, the Koran, and 
the Hadith (Amsterdam: Brill Rodopi, 2015).
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The transcripts proved to be a meaningful tool to analyze our own 
experience. They allowed us to consider our intense dialogues from a distance. 
Furthermore, they helped us to question our first interpretations of the 
dialogues. We could trace back our collective interpretation processes and 
observe how different interpretive perspectives intertwined and overlapped. 
Additionally, the transcripts enabled us to compare the different dialogues 
and to identify common characteristics such as the search for similarities 
and differences in each dialogue, the respective roles of the participants 
and recurring strategies or themes. Theory was developed by analyzing and 
recalling the dialogues, which were considered as a model for a dialogue-
oriented understanding. A further theoretical study of different approaches 
in interreligious hermeneutics/hermeneutics of recognition took place in a 
second step. To combine exegetical practice with analytical and theoretical 
work constitutes a new approach in theological research.
The structure of the dialogues
The underlying understanding of “dialogue” is that of a mutual relationship. 
The opening up towards the other includes the possibility of transformation. 
This also includes the increased significance of individual perspectives: 
it is not the religions which talk to each other but their adherents, that is, 
the people.8 In addition, context shapes conversations: “A conversation is 
a contextual event between individuals.”9 Symmetry is important: people 
should meet each other as equals. Different perspectives have the same 
right to be heard and recognized in the interpretative process. This includes 
an attitude of openness towards any new interpretations or perspectives 
that might emerge.
To ensure a variety of perspectives in our dialogues, we set up a four-
step guideline, which was continuously adapted and developed throughout 
the talks.
Step 1: Interpretation of the text from the position of a “beginner’s mind”
Initially, the dialogue partners read and interpret the text as if they 
knew nothing about it, that is, in an unprejudiced and consciously naive way. 
The text should not be instantly rated and limited by specific knowledge. It 
should be read as a new message and whatever comes to mind can be said.
8 Cf. Michael von Brück, “Gibt es eine interreligiöse Hermeneutik?” in Zeitschrift 
für Theologie und Kirche (2/1996), 284.
9 Volker Küster, Einführung in die Interkulturelle Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2011), 150.
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Step 2: Hermeneutical thought experiment
This openness towards the text is also pursued in the second step. 
The participants are asked to read the text as if it were a text of their own 
religious tradition, for example, as if a certain verse of the Qur’an were found 
in the Talmud, the New Testament or in the Pali Canon. The text should 
be interpreted by using one’s own tradition’s interpretative methods. Of 
course, this step is a strong provocation to classical hermeneutics because 
the text is alienated and maybe even colonized. But this step helps to bridge 
the gap and identify with the text.
While the first two steps aim at getting close to the text, the third step 
places it in its own horizon of meaning.
Step 3: Expert knowledge
In this step, the text is understood in its original context, that is, its 
origin in intertextual relations; such interpretations of this text already 
exist. The fact that it is a sacred text is also taken into account. The expert’s 
knowledge may lead to less dialogical sequences but, in that case, monologue 
is to a certain extent necessary to do justice to the text and its context.
Step 4: Balancing traditional and new readings and 
reflections on the way towards a dialogical theology
We worked on the basis of the hypothesis that by interpreting the text 
from different perspectives, new interpretations or meanings would emerge. 
So our reflections on what we were doing already began during this step 
as we asked ourselves, Does my understanding of the text change through 
the other’s perspective? And if it does, in what way? And what happens if 
we understand the text as one for all humanity rather than as belonging 
only to one particular religious tradition?
Example
We will give one short example to illustrate how our dialogues worked. It 
is taken from the first of our discussions, which was centered around the 
Qur’anic verse 5:48. This reads (in the translation of Yusuf Ali):
To thee we sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the Scripture that came before 
it, and guarding it in safety: so judge between them by what Allah hath revealed, 
and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the Truth that hath come to thee. 
To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If Allah had so 
willed, He would have made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in 
what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is 
to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute.
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Katja Drechsler chose this verse because it is seen as central to most 
Muslim arguments supporting a positive view of religious diversity. At the 
same time, it was clear that there is a problematic textual context of this 
verse; Q 5:51, for example, warns Muslims not to take Jews or Christians 
as awliyā‘, which can be translated as friends, allies, guardians or helpers.
Traditionally, Islam is considered as a religion for all humanity and its 
prophet Mohammed the last of a series of prophets who were all bearers 
of the authentic divine message. Islam thus has a universalistic message 
and the perception that as the latest message, Islam has abrogated former 
messages, is common. The hermeneutical challenge of this verse consists 
of the basic question, Who is in and who is out?
When analyzing Muslim theological approaches to religious pluralism 
today, we witness a paradigm shift. Instead of understanding “Islam”—which 
literally means devotion—as a reified religion that is superior to other 
religions, the emphasis is now shifting towards an understanding of islām 
as a universal and individual principle in the relationship between human 
beings and God or the transcendent. This might include people of other 
religious affiliations. Connected with this is the perception of religious 
difference: are religions other than Islam seen as “wrong” and is it finally 
desirable that all humanity accept Islam? Or is religious diversity something 
that God willed for us and that has a deeper meaning? One’s stance regarding 
the question of understanding Islam and religious difference determines 
how we accept and implement certain hermeneutical premises and methods.
Over the last twenty years, we have seen an increase in Muslim 
understandings of the Qur’anic claim of universality—not as a claim of 
superiority but, rather, as an acknowledgement that other religions might 
also be true and a way to salvation.
Farid Esack, for example, refuses traditional interpretations of verse 
Q 5:48. In his view, the metaphor of competition (Yusuf Ali: “So strive as 
in a race in all virtues”) that comes directly after the diversity of religious 
paths is confirmed has not been taken seriously enough.10 According to him, 
good and just deeds are not monopolized by one single (religious) group (Q 
49:13) and the results of a fair competition are not known in advance.11 Even 
if the Qur’an clearly postulates supremacy in defining forms of adequate 
devotion to God,12 Muslims cannot be regarded as socially superior to others. 
Freedom and diversity are seen as fundamental prerequisites for unfolding 
faith and being tested by God.
10 Esack, Farid, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism. An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious 
Solidarity against Oppression (Oxford/Rockport: Oneworld Publications, 1997), 170.
11 Ibid., 171.
12 Ibid., 174.
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In our dialogue, verse Q 5:48 underwent a further extended interpretation. 
Among other themes in the first two steps of the dialogue (interpretation 
from the stance of a beginner’s mind and experimentally reading the text 
as if it were in one’s own tradition), the meaning of ahl al-kitāb (the people 
of the book) was discussed.
Strikingly, the Buddhist participant justified being the first to react by 
suggesting that she was the “farthest away” from the text and its tradition. 
She talked about the different concepts in this verse and explored the 
question of who might be talking to whom in this verse. Does the pluralis 
majestatis suggest that God is talking? And does the “scripture that came 
before it” point at Jews and Christians? She then formulated the idea that 
she herself might have become part of the “people of the book” because she 
had just received this text and its message. Through this interpretation, 
her initially felt distance from the text and its tradition was nullified. 
From her Buddhist point of view, she drew a link between the concept of 
competition and the Buddhist concept of Karma.
Because the Buddhist participant felt addressed by the first words of the 
verse “To thee We sent the Scripture” (which Muslims of course understand 
as God speaking to the Prophet Muhammad), she engaged in a direct and 
personal examination of the text. In the following conversation, all the 
participants dialogically picked up her idea and tested the plausibility of 
her suggestion. Through this critical investigation, her interpretation was 
exposed to a hermeneutical “pressure test.” During this dialogical process, 
a collectively developed pattern of interpretation emerged.
Certainly, the legitimacy of this multi-perspective and dialogical 
process can be questioned, especially from the viewpoint of traditional 
interpretative methods of Islamic sources. The question of who is justified 
to interpret religious sources is found in every religious tradition. In 
contemporary Muslim approaches to hermeneutical questions, we find a 
range of suggestions that encourage a contextual understanding of theology. 
This includes thinking about the meaning of the interpreter’s subjectivity 
or positionality that we find, for example, in the work of Farid Esack and 
Khaled Abou el Fadl.
Jerusha Lamptey’s approach, which she herself calls “Muslima Theology 
of Pluralism,” supports the interpretation that emerged in our interreligious 
dialogue.13 Without explaining her concepts in depth, the striking point 
here is that she understands membership in particular religious groups not 
as being supremely important but as the fulfillment of taqwā. Often simply 
translated as piety, Lamptey understands taqwā as being a permanent 
13 Jerusha Tanner Lamptey, Never Wholly Other. A Muslima Theology of Religious 
Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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awareness of God’s existence, which affects a human person’s whole being 
and action. She points out that taqwā has many different aspects and that 
while all human beings have the same potential for it, most only partly 
implement it. Preference for one of the many different aspects of taqwā is 
not justified.14 Even the theologically central aspect of tawḥīd (the unity 
and uniqueness of God) would not be a sufficient criterion. So, according to 
her approach, it is absolutely possible that even human beings who do not 
believe in the one and only God have or implement taqwā or certain aspects 
of it. In support of this theory, she emphasizes the Qur’anic statement that 
God left no people without revelation (Q 10:47, 16:36). This means that God 
has sent a messenger to all people; all are in possession of divine guidance 
and revelation and so are justified to follow their own way.
Results: Dialogical hermeneutics as a 
balancing act between fields of tension
We found all the dialogues to be shaped by fields of tension. This is no 
accident but, on the contrary, inevitable when religious texts are interpreted 
from multiple perspectives. Dialogical understanding takes place only when 
fields of tension exist. If these conflicts or tensions are avoided, dialogue 
and understanding fall into a crisis.
The main fields of tension we found in our dialogues were the following:
Tension of knowledge
For our text-centered dialogue, it was important that lay perspectives be 
recognized. That nobody is expert in all religious traditions had to be 
acknowledged. In this way, all participants are able to meet at the same 
level. The differences in knowledge caused by respective proximity and 
distance to a particular religious tradition must also be acknowledged. 
Expert knowledge is important for an adequate understanding, but should 
not hinder the dialogue between participants. Thus, balancing between 
these poles of knowing and not-knowing is essential: required knowledge 
is to be provided, but new and unfamiliar readings are also to be admitted.
14 Ibid., 238. 
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Tensions between contexts: e.g., original 
and contemporary contexts
Another tension is that between the texts’ original and a contemporary 
context that might be totally different. Here as well, it seems important 
to relate both claims to each other and mutually to limit these claims. To 
consider only the original context may hinder a lively debate on the meaning 
of texts. And if only the contemporary context is considered, the text is cut 
off from the nourishing semantic stream of its tradition.
Tension between sacredness and profanity of texts or rather 
a divine origin of the text and cultural-historic experience
What does the sacredness of texts establish? On the one hand, the text can be 
understood as an essential and direct expression of divine or transcendent 
revelation, in the sense of knowledge that cannot be obtained otherwise. 
This truth from above would be more important for the meaning of the text 
than the context. On the other hand, the text could also be understood as 
a culturally and historically caused expression of an experience with the 
divine or the transcendent. This would imply that the meaning of the text 
is strongly related to a specific time in a particular culture and society. 
Talking about the sacredness of texts takes place in the field of tension 
between these two poles.
Tension between a hermeneutics of trust 
and a hermeneutics of suspicion
The last example relates to the tension between the attitudes in which a 
text is encountered. Is it an attitude of appreciation or of critical distance? 
A hermeneutics of trust acknowledges the text and views its meaning as 
a bridge towards the other. This is very important for dialogue. But texts 
can also bear problematic statements. To find disturbing and challenging 
meanings of the text is the function of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Especially 
where the text is promising heaven on earth, a hermeneutics of suspicion 
points at those who might be excluded.
Our thesis is that understanding in multi-perspective dialogue 
succeeds when we are able to balance both contact and contents. None of 
the poles can be permanently overemphasized without throwing dialogue 
and understanding into crisis. An awareness of these tensions is required. 
The tensions cannot be eliminated but, rather, their presence is desirable.
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Processes of understanding: dialogical 
hermeneutics as dialogical co-construction
A second important result of our experiment was the discovery that 
interpretation takes place in a shared process of meaning making. The 
meaning and interpretations that were developed throughout the dialogues 
could only occur because this dialogue took place. This is not to say that 
all the interpretations that emerged during the dialogue were shared by 
all participants. But all of these meanings and interpretations constituted 
a shared stock that all the participants could use. Because the meanings 
were dialogically connected, making meaning was more of a process 
than a fixed result. Dialogical understanding in fields of tension has 
nothing to do with a harmony-seeking hermeneutics of “cuddling.” On the 
contrary, dialogue is a challenging space of debate and thought. For an 
understanding of dialogical theology, this means implementing practice 
and reflection. Dialogical theology thus remains dependent on people 
of different religious and non-religious affiliations coming together and 
entering into a conversation. Dialogical theology needs thinking spaces for 
its development in which diverse voices, positions and faces are present 
to each other and dialogically make meaning together.
Transformative Readings 
of the Qur’an
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Developing Islamic Theology 
in the European Context
Safet Bektovic
Introduction
In recent decades, the question of a new interpretation of Islam in the 
European context has been raised in discussions on the integration of 
Muslims in Western Europe. Being considered a crucial part of the future 
development of Islam, Islamic theological thought has become very topical 
for many researchers of Islam, not least for politicians. In this contribution, 
I will discuss the legitimization of the idea of European Islamic theology, 
explore further dimensions and perspectives of Islamic theological thought 
in Europe and discuss its relevance to the training of imams and Muslim 
identity in Europe.
Legitimating European Islam and 
European Islamic theology
There are significant differences in culture and ways of thought between 
the various peoples of Europe, between southern Europeans and northern 
Europeans. Nevertheless, it is quite common to discuss a European identity, 
particularly when Europe is being compared to “the others.” In this regard, 
many refer to a common history and values, such as humanism, freedom 
and democracy, as something being specifically European, particularly 
modern European.
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How does this general approach to European history and identity or 
a common feeling of belonging to Europe, which is characteristic of most 
Europeans, affect Muslim minorities in Europe? How do they consider 
themselves as citizens of European countries and in what way do they feel 
themselves as Europeans?
Muslims in Europe belong to different national and ethnic groups. With 
the exception of Balkan Muslims, Tatars and small indigenous Muslim 
communities in south-eastern and central Europe, most European Muslims 
have an immigrant background and have come from Asian and African 
countries. The question of whether it is possible to identify a specific 
European way of being Muslim does not seem to be directly relevant for the 
so-called first generation of immigrants, who initially identify with other 
(non-European) cultures and traditions and do not have a long experience 
in Europe.
However, it seems to be much more relevant when it comes to the 
younger generations. They are Europeans by birth and education, they 
have acquired a number of European norms and values and many will 
argue that their “European” experience may affect not only their cultural 
identity but also their interpretation of Islam.1 
However, cultural, moral and even political similarities do not 
necessarily reflect the same theology or the same religion. For example, 
religious Christians and religious Muslims from a particular area, for 
example, the Middle East or the Balkans, share a number of cultural and 
moral values despite having different religious backgrounds. Conversely, 
it is possible to have different cultural and political values yet to share a 
common theological background. This can be exemplified by comparing 
Hanafi-Muslims from Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans, who 
share the same tradition regarding Sharia and religious practices but are 
radically different in terms of culture and their understanding of the role 
of religion in society.
One might argue that Muslims in Europe tend to have a common 
cultural and religious identity, described as European Islam, but this 
does not necessarily mean that this identity refers to a common specific 
1 It is important to note that the younger generations are not monolith when 
it comes to the interpretation of Islam and attitudes to Europe. In spite of this 
common experience, one can identify several different typological models of 
being a young Muslim in Europe, which furthermore reflect different degrees of 
social and cultural integration. See Jørgen Nielsen, “The Question of Euro-Islam: 
Restriction or Opportunity?,” in Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds), Islam in 
Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 34-48; Safet Bektovic, Kulturmøder og religion. Identitetsdannelse blandt 
kristne og muslimske unge (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 2004).
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European Islamic theology. In many ways, it may be quite legitimate to talk 
about being Muslim in a European way (and even about European Islam), 
but not necessarily about European Islamic theology as a distinct brand. 
Historically, Islam has established itself in various parts of the world from 
East Asia to North Africa without developing any particular, geographic 
and culturally based theological traditions. As argued by many orthodox 
Muslims, Islamic theology and Shariah principles were never determined by 
a local culture. Thus, what is needed today is not a European interpretation 
of Islam but an interpretation of Islamic principles in a European context.2
However, the relationship between sociocultural identity and religion/
theology in a modern Europe is quite complex and cannot be directly 
compared with the previous traditional conditions. The role of religion in 
modern European society has radically changed and new challenges have 
emerged which, in many cases, demand quite new and specific answers. 
This also applies to the current presence of Islam in Europe and not least 
its role for a European Muslim identity, seen within a secular and minority 
context.
Thus, the discussion about European Islamic theology, understood as 
a theological reflection on the new challenges, is not meaningless. Quite 
the contrary!
In my opinion, in order to explain the idea of European Islamic 
theology, two key issues remain to be clarified: first, the question of the 
legitimation of such an idea; and, secondly, the relationship between a 
potential European Islamic theology (or Islamic theology in the European 
context) and European Islam, defined as social-cultural expressions of 
Muslim life in Europe.
Methodological questions
To what extent and in what way do historical, geographical, cultural and 
political conditions determine the content of Islamic theology? What is the 
impact of Muslim encounters and experiences with others on the development 
of Islamic theology? Does it make sense to speak about African, Middle 
Eastern or European Islam?
We can partially answer these questions by going back to the early 
classical period, when Islamic theology, known as kalam, emerged. Muslim 
2 This is a hallmark of Muslim individuals and groups advocating global or transnational 
Islam and being under the influence of fundamentalist interpretations, which maintains 
the un-changeability of Islam’s essence. See Jocelyne Cesari, “Muslim Identities in 
Europe: the Snare of Exceptionalism,” in Al-Azmeh and Fokas, ibid., 49–67.
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encounters with Christians in Syria and Iraq during the eighth and ninth 
centuries played a critical role in this emergence. The discussions with 
Christians left their mark on both the content and form of Islamic theological 
thought. It is within this context that we can understand why Muslims 
began to discuss topics such as the concept of God, the relationship between 
reason and revelation, free will and predestination.3
Muslims had their own motivation for engaging in these discussions. 
Among the most important was the need to defend Islam theologically and 
to formulate a coherent political theory that could justify the caliphate. In 
this regard, Muslims were not afraid to use arguments and ideas from 
others, including Christian theology, Greek philosophy and Persian tradition.
Al-Farabi formulated his theory of the ideal Islamic state by taking 
direct inspiration from Plato’s theory of the ideal state. Mu’tazilites, who 
used to present themselves as the people of tawhid and defenders of Islam, 
used an Aristotelian way of argumentation. And finally al-Ash’ari, who 
successfully opposed the mu’tazila, was influenced by the Christian dogma 
in his formulation of Islamic orthodoxy.4
Here, we must mention that Muslims were not the only ones to seek 
inspiration from outside their own ranks. The same is true for Christians. 
They also formulated their theology under the influence of Greek thought 
and were later, in the classic medieval age, affected by Muslim theologians 
and philosophers. Thus, the flow of ideas was definitely stimulating and 
beneficial to both Muslims and Christians and this exchange shaped their 
respective theologies.
If we move forward in time and focus on Islamic modernism from 
the second part of the nineteenth century, we again find very intensive 
interactions between Muslim thinkers and the West. Afghani, Abduh, Iqbal, 
Kharputi—the famous protagonists of the reopening of ijtihad within Islamic 
theology—were influenced by Western philosophy while at the same time 
being engaged in defending Islam against Western objections. They strongly 
3 Methodologically speaking, kalam reflects a process by which a problem is clarified 
through discussion and argumentation. For this reason, it is also known as dialectic 
theology. As emphasized by Josef van Ess, kalam emerged as “a dialectic discipline” 
within a form of discussion, through which the participants in a discussion had 
a common goal: to resolve a dilemma and to come up with an explanation, often 
evolving into the formulation of a principle or rule. See Josef Van Ess, The Flowering 
of Muslim Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2006), 2.
4 Mu’tazilites accused him and the so-called traditionalists of being under the 
influence of the Christian Trinity doctrine in formulating the doctrine on the 
un-created Qur’an. See Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward and Dwi S. Atmaja 
(eds), Defenders of Reason in Islam Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern 
Symbol (New York: Oneworld 1997), 76-79.
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advocated for the revitalization of the “philosophical spirit” within Islam 
and for a new kalam (ilm kalam djadid in Arabic and Persian and yeni ilm-i 
kalam in Turkish), emphasizing the relevance of Muslim interaction with 
modern philosophy and science. This is clearly expressed by Kharputi, who 
stated that “just as early mutakallimun reacted to Aristotelian philosophy 
selectively, today’s mutakallimun should study modern thoughts accurately 
and choose according to Islamic principles what is necessary from them 
so that a new contemporary lm-i-kalam can be established.”5
And what is the current situation? The relationship between the so-
called Muslim world and the West, identified with Western political powers, 
is still characterized by political and cultural tensions. At the same time, 
there are very intense interactions between Christian, Muslim and secular 
intellectuals. For the first time, Muslims have started to experience the 
West and modernity by living in the West from within. Many Muslim 
scholars are now employees at Western universities and some of them are 
doing Islamic theology in cooperation with their non-Muslim colleagues.6
This has resulted in an improved understanding of the relationship 
between Islam and the others’ religions and has provided new insights into 
Islam’s potential to respond to challenges that come from the West. The 
question is how those interactions affect the development of Islamic theology.
Impact of the West
A number of experts on current developments in Muslim-majority countries 
argue that Muslim societies all over the Muslim world are strongly affected 
by Western civilization.7 Nevertheless, many Muslims claim to maintain 
5 See Sait Özervarly, “Attempts to Revitalize Kalam in the Late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries,” in The Muslim World, vol. LXXXIX, no. 1. (1999), 95.
6 Examples of this are, Timothy Winter—University of Cambridge, Tariq Ramadan—
Oxford University, William Chittick—Stony Brook University, Timothy Gianotti—
University of Waterloo, Amina Wadud—Virginia Commonwealth University, Yahya 
Michot—Hartford Seminary, Yaser Ellethy—VU University Amsterdam, Khalid 
Blankinship—Temple University, Racha el Omari—University of California-Santa 
Barbara, Asad Q. Ahme—University of California-Berkeley.
7 One of those who claim that Muslims are dominated by Western civilization is 
Ibrahim Abu Rabi. For him not only the masses but also Muslim elites are totally 
influenced by the West. He claims directly “the Muslim world has culture, but 
lacks its own distinctive civilization.” See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, “Contemporary 
Islamic Intellectual History. A Theoretical Perspective,” in Islamic Studies, vol. 44, 
no. 4 (Winter 2005), 503–26.
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Islamic normativeness at the moral level, regardless of how much they are 
influenced by Western lifestyles. 
We can always discuss how the West influences various Muslim societies, 
but it is almost a logical conclusion that if Muslims in the Muslim world 
are influenced by Western cultures, then this influence affects Muslims 
residing in the West.
Bearing in mind that European ways of living and thinking are part 
of the context in which Muslims live, it would be rather naive to believe 
that Muslims, as a minority in the West, remain unaffected by the majority 
culture. The integration of Muslim immigrants is far from perfect in the 
eyes of many European politicians, but this does not mean that Muslims 
are resistant to cultural and political change. The European experience 
has a significant influence on their way of life and an impact on their way 
of thinking. Let us take a couple of examples that confirm this statement.
The first is about the general challenges of being Muslim in Europe 
today and the second a vivid experience of Muslim-European identity in 
the case of Bosnian Muslims.
European secular ways of organizing society and specific working 
conditions have challenged religious Muslims to find new and alternative 
ways to practice Islam and also to search for new interpretations of Islamic 
normativeness.
Besides the effort to solve practical issues such as fasting in the Nordic 
region during the polar or long summer days, Muslims are challenged 
to reflect on a number of theoretical questions, for example, on the 
contextual interpretation of the Qur’an and on the implementation of 
Islamic normativeness and justice within the new context. The point in 
question is further emphasized by the fact that many Western European 
societies meet Islamic principles of social justice better than many of the 
existing Sharia-based Islamic societies.8 Moreover, they are also challenged 
to reflect on the principles of Islamic ethics in relation to universal ethics 
and humanism in new multi-religious and multi-cultural contexts. Finally 
yet importantly, they must reflect on the question of Islamic normativeness 
and the meaning of Sharia in a secular society.
In this sense, we can speak of a constant tension between the challenge 
to reflect in an innovative way and an attempt to maintain Islamic identity 
under new circumstances. On the one hand, Muslims are aware of the 
necessity of developing new ideas and new models of interpretation but, 
8 A remarkable insight into this is given by the survey, “How Islamic are Islamic 
Countries?,” by Scheherazade S. Rehman and Hossein Askar from George 
Washington University (2010), see http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gej.2010.10.2/
gej.2010.10.2.1614/gej.2010.10.2.1614.xml 
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at the same time, many of them wish to preserve their Islamic identity in 
relation to the majority community. As highlighted by Ramadan, Muslim 
immigrants fear “the potential loss of their religion, culture and distinct 
identity.”9 In the situation of being thrown into an open space between the 
need for a new Islamic identity and the fear of assimilation, they respond 
very differently to the question of rethinking Islamic theology in a European 
context. Some are very enthusiastic; others take rather an opportunistic 
position in regard to established theology, as long as it can satisfy their 
needs; and some are skeptical or dismissive of any theology of Islam being 
developed under the influence of Western academia.10
The tension between “Islamic” and “European” does not characterize 
the identity of Muslims who live in Europe like the Bosnian Muslims and 
who have a long experience of living as a religious minority in a secular 
society. Unlike Muslims with an immigrant background, Bosnian Muslims 
are not required to “integrate” and they rely on a well-established Islamic–
European tradition based on the historical institutionalization of Islam in 
a secular state and a well-developed system of religious education.11
They are used to being part of a multi-religious society and they have 
experienced that you do not necessarily lose your religious identity just 
because you live in a non-Muslim, even communist–atheist, society and 
because you are open to “the other.”
As pointed out by Xavier Bougarel, Bosnian Muslims contributed to 
“the building of a European Islam” by creating autonomous institutions 
and integrating them into a modern national state. This process already 
9 Tariq Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe?,” in Shireen 
T. Hunter (ed.), Islam. Europe’s Second Religion (London: Praeger, 2002), 207.
10 Apart from the Muslims who maintain dichotomy between Islam and the West (such 
as radical salafists and Hizb ut-Tahrir), there are voices in the public debate who deny 
the possibility of a European Islam, either by arguing that there is an incompatibility 
between European culture and Islam, or by arguing that Muslims are not interested in 
integration in Europe but in the islamization of Europe, see Nezar AlSayyad, “Muslim 
Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture,” in Nazer AlSayyad 
and Manuel Castells (eds), Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam. Politics, Culture, and Citizenship 
in the Age of Globalization (London: Lexington Books, 2002), 9–29. 
11 However, Bosnian Muslim identity is not monolithic. Some Bosnian Muslims 
tend to minimize the importance of Islam for their identity and attach a crucial 
importance to pre-Islamic Bosnian heritage. On the contrary, some others tend 
to glorify Islam as the essence of their identity (e.g., salafist groups). The largest 
majority of them, those who consider themselves as representatives for the so-called 
Bosnian traditional Islam, insist that they belong to both Islam and European culture. 
See Enes Karic, Essays on our European never-never Land (Sarajevo: OKO, 2004).
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began in the period when Bosnia, after the Ottoman withdrawal from the 
Balkans, became part of the Austro–Hungarian empire.12
Factors such as the establishment of religious, cultural and educational 
institutions (Rijaset, faculties for Islamic studies, high schools for religious 
education [madrassa], periodicals and publications) were crucial for the 
articulation of Islam in a European context and for the development of a 
specific identity based on the harmonization of Islamic principles with 
European humanist values. 
Influence of the Muslim intellectual elite
European Islam includes different elements of the sociocultural and 
intellectual fields in the everyday lives of Muslims but also within Muslim 
theological thought. However, there is no direct correlation between how 
Muslims in the European context practice Islam on a daily basis and how 
the Muslim intellectual elite interpret Islam. As immigrants in Western 
countries, Muslims do not always lean on Western-Islamic contextual 
interpretations but rather on a uniform (e.g., salafist) interpretation or on 
interpretations from their respective countries of origin.
The question of the role of modern thought in Islam and particularly the 
role of Muslim intellectuals living in the West is fundamental in relation 
to current developments in Islam. The Western (Muslim) interpretations 
are relevant not only for Muslims in the West but also for all Muslims in 
general, but their real impact seems to be rather weak due to a lack of 
adequate reception.
In general, the question of the influence of the Muslim intellectual elite, or 
rather the progressive thinkers, on the wider population is quite complex. It is 
clear that this influence cannot be treated independently of the sociopolitical 
conditions and academic climate in Muslim countries, which are often 
characterized by conservatism and ideological exclusivism. In the absence of 
academic autonomy and any real opportunity for free-thinking and critique, 
as well as scientific research institutes and international cooperation, it is 
also difficult to expect an intellectual movement towards mass enlightenment. 
If progressive Muslim thinkers living in Muslim countries do not 
exert a real influence on the wider population in their societies, how can 
one expect intellectuals living in the West to have a big impact on these 
populations?
12 Xavier Bougarel, “The Role of Balkan Muslims in Building a European Islam,” in 
EPS Issue Paper Nr. 43 (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005), 1–31.
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However, we are slowly witnessing a new development: Muslims who 
normally write in Western languages such English, French and German are 
being partially translated into “Muslim” languages such as Arabic, Urdu, 
Farsi. Muslim intellectuals are beginning to collaborate across different 
parts of the world. They are exchanging experiences and opinions more 
often than before and thus their ideas are becoming increasingly accesible. 
Discussing Islamic theology and new ideas on modern Islam, it may 
be noted that what is decisive is not whether they have originated in the 
West or in the East but their content. In what ways are these ideas relevant 
for the understanding and resolution of new challenges?
In order to answer questions about a possible European Islamic 
theology (as debated by politicians and others who seek and demand a new 
interpretation of Islam), we must first consider the content and profile of 
such a theology. What do we expect from it? Besides being an expression 
of theological reflection on the aforementioned issues, many would expect 
that a European Islamic theology live up to modern methodological 
requirements such as the contextual and hermeneutical interpretation 
of texts, an analytical and critical approach to religious phenomena, etc. 
And this development is already taking place within Muslim theological 
thought. Examples include the rethinking of Sharia and Muslim identity 
in a secular context (A. El-Fadl, A. An-Naim); the rethinking of Islamic 
political theories and Islam’s relationship to democracy (W. Hallag, A. 
Soroush, A. El- Effendi); Qur’anic hermeneutics and the reinterpretation of 
Islamic orthodoxy (F. Rahman, M. Arkoun, Abu Zayd); rethinking Islamic 
normativeness within a European context (T. Ramadan, F. Karcic, T. Oubrou).
These developments are not located in a specific geographical area 
and the aforementioned thinkers have lived in various parts of the world 
(although mostly in the West). We cannot geographically locate progressive 
thinking, just as we cannot pinpoint conservatism or religious extremism to 
certain areas. This means that ideas one might consider as highly relevant 
for European Islam may also occur elsewhere, for example in Indonesia or 
Morocco—countries that have experienced a flowering of modern Islamic 
thought. However, it is quite natural to consider that these ideas come 
largely from Europe, being generated by the struggle to define Islam in a 
European context. In that sense, we can talk of a new phenomenon called 
European Islamic theology.
I began by arguing that one can talk about European Islam in a 
sociocultural sense without relating it to a distinct European Islamic 
theology. But in fact, valuable theological reflection as exercised by the 
previously mentioned thinkers can take place without having any real 
impact on the wider Muslim population. These thinkers are not very well 
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known and discussed within broader Muslim circles and their ideas need 
systematic dissemination.
Therefore, it makes sense to ask two questions here. First, is there 
a cause-and-effect relationship between progressive Islamic theological 
and philosophical thought and the lived reality of Muslim populations in 
Europe? And second, should European Islamic theology be regarded as a 
precondition or as an outcome of the integration of Muslims in Europe?
Islamic theology at European/
Scandinavian universities
Compared to the Netherlands and especially Germany, where centers for 
Islamic studies, including Islamic theology have been established, the 
Scandinavian countries are a bit behind. However, we have partly managed 
to establish theological studies of Islam at some universities (Copenhagen, 
Oslo and Uppsala).
In Denmark, the Faculty of Theology at University of Copenhagen 
housed a Center for European Islamic Thought from 2007 to 2011, but it 
was closed because of research reprioritization and financial cutbacks. 
The same faculty hired a professor of Qur’anic studies in 2013 and as of 
2016, it is running a masters program on Islam with a primary focus on 
Islamic chaplaincy.
In Norway, at the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo, there is 
a masters program (“Religion and Society”) that includes different Islamic 
subjects such as Islamic theology, philosophy, ethics and Sufism, aiming 
to contribute to both Islamic theology and interreligious theology.
In Sweden, in 2012, Uppsala University established a bachelors program 
in Islamic Studies entitled “Training in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence.”
The entire discussion about Islamic theology goes back to the 2000s, 
when the issue of education programs for imams was raised. Several public 
figures and politicians claimed that the integration of Muslims in Europe 
depended on whether Muslims had a modern European interpretation of 
Islam that was contrary to the conservative and radical Islam preached 
by many imams.
Since then, we have had many discussions about the need and importance 
of Islamic studies at university level with the participation of university 
employees, politicians and Muslim representatives. We have come to the 
conclusion that it would be unrealistic to establish imam training as such 
at the present time, but that it is possible and necessary to teach Islamic 
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theology at universities as a subject accessible to all interested, including 
those who wish to become imams.
Muslim representatives and organizations in Denmark and Norway 
are still quite skeptical about initiatives to establish study programs in 
Islamic theology at secular universities. However, this has changed to 
a certain extent since some imams have been employed by the state as 
hospital or prison chaplains and more Muslims, including imams, have 
participated in the existing courses on Islam at the Faculty of Theology in 
Oslo, and after having discussed it at several conferences and consultations 
during the last few years. This is evident in Denmark since several imams 
actively participated in the establishment of a masters program in “Islamic 
theology and practices” with a focus on Islamic chaplaincy at the Faculty 
of Theology in Copenhagen.
I remember the first conference on Islamic theology in Denmark in 
2005, organized by the University of Copenhagen, whose goal was to discuss 
the possibilities and the experiences of other countries and Danish local 
ambitions in relation to academic studies in Islamic theology. Surprisingly, 
the Danish politicians and Muslim representatives present agreed not to 
launch such a program, although their motivations differed. The politicians 
argued that education in Islamic theology is an internal Muslim issue, 
whereas the Muslim representatives emphasized that a study of Islamic 
theology, which they perceived as being in fact imam training, should not 
be organized by Danish secular universities. In addition, I can mention 
our colleagues from the humanities, who were ultimately skeptical about 
theology, especially Islamic theology, as an academic subject.
There was a similar process in Norway. At the University of Oslo, on 
the initiative of the Faculty of Theology and in collaboration with the 
Islamic Council in Norway, a working group was established in 2007 to 
examine the possibility of establishing a Center for Islamic Studies in 
the Faculty of Theology. The initiative was not realized partly because of 
Muslim skepticism about the very idea of studying Islamic theology at a 
Christian theological faculty. The Muslims questioned whether it would not 
mean doing Islamic theology in a Christian way. It was also because the 
faculties of theology and humanities were unable to agree on the location 
of the center. A Center for Islamic and Middle East Studies was established 
at the Faculty of Humanities in 2011, but its field of research and teaching 
did not include studies in Islamic theology.
Coming back to the original question about the relationship between 
Islamic theology and the everyday life of European Muslims, we can come 
to the following conclusion based on the Scandinavian experience: the 
establishment of academic studies in Islamic theology, fully accepted and 
supported by Muslims, will remain a difficult task as long as Muslims 
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are not familiar and comfortable with the concept of theological studies 
within a secular university. Despite the already existing study programs at 
some universities, which actually do contribute to the continued education 
of imams, the majority of practicing Muslims continue to prefer imams/
theologians who are trained at traditional madrasas and Islamic colleges/
universities. Nevertheless, theological reflection related to the European 
context is already an important part of the Muslim self-understanding and 
the future study of Islamic theology will most likely be an integral part of 
the existing European academic system.
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The Authors of the Qur’an 
are Still Alive: The Qur’an as 
an Act of Communication 
Mouhanad Khorchide 
The Qur’an is not a monologue
I am aware that the title of my presentation can be provocative for us Mus-
lims because it suggests that the Qur’an has been written by humans who 
are still alive. But that is not what I intend to express. To avoid any misun-
derstanding, I say very clearly that there is no question for Muslims that 
the Qur’an is the Word of God. But the question is how we can understand 
the act of revelation of the Qur’an and can therefore also comprehend the 
act of understanding the Qur’an.
The term Qur’an means something that is recited. The Qur’an under-
stands itself as speech or recitation and not as a book. The Qur’an as a 
book was compiled after the death of the prophet Mohammed. If you read 
the Qur’an, you’ll find phrases such as: “Mohammed, they ask you about…
Tell them this and that” or “O you mankind…”, “You believers”, “People 
of the book” and so forth. These phrases indicate that the Qur’an is not a 
monologue; communication clearly takes place and various protagonists 
get a chance to participate in this communication.
Beside these forms of communication, we find passages in the Qur’an 
in which the human being gets a chance to speak—directly rather than 
being quoted. For example, the first Sura in the Qur’an, the Sura al-Fatiha, 
the one that is most often recited by Muslims because it is found in every 
prayer and every prayer unit, reads as follows: 
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In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher 
and Sustainer of the worlds; Most Gracious, Most Merciful; Master of the Day of 
Judgment. Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek. Show us the straight way, 
the way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, those whose (portion) 
is not wrath, and who go not astray.1 
So who is speaking in this Sura? It is not God who speaks to the human 
and says: “Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek; show us the straight 
way.” Rather, it is the believers who speak to God and who beg God for 
guidance. Nevertheless, it is a Sura from the Qur’an which contains the 
Word of God. Why does God quote humans when they say: “Show us the 
straight way”? Human beings seek to be guided and to get the help of God. 
There are many other passages in the Qur’an in which not God but 
human beings speak. For example:
Our Lord! Condemn us not if we forget or fall into error; our Lord! Lay not on us 
a burden like that which Thou didst lay on those before us; Our Lord! Lay not on 
us a burden greater than we have strength to bear. Blot out our sins, and grant 
us forgiveness. Have mercy on us. Thou art our Protector; Help us against those 
who stand against faith (2:286). 
Here, the human being’s concern is also to receive forgiveness. Human 
beings utter their longing and this is part of the Qur’an.
God speaks in the Qur’an and the human being speaks through God’s 
Word. And likewise, God uses human language. As Nasr Abu Zayd says, 
the Qur’an is the God-human word.2 God speaks in the Qur’an through 
human beings because God employs their linguistic and cultural language, 
but the human being also speaks in the Qur’an through God because the 
Qur’an carries God’s revelation. 
I would like to underline that for me as a Muslim, the Qur’an constitutes 
God’s Word. I say this so that no brother or sister in faith will misunder-
stand me and ascribe to me a belief that humans wrote the Qur’an. What I 
want to say is that God does not hold a monologue or speak independently 
from human beings. The Qur’an itself states: “We have made it a Qur’an in 
Arabic, that ye may be able to understand” (43:3), so that the first recipients 
directly addressed here could understand it. In other words, we can say 
1 Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
2 Cf. Nasr Abu Zayd, “The Qur’an: God and Man in Communication,” lecture on 
27 November 2000 at the University of Leiden, at http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/
forum/01_1/onderzoek/lecture.pdf
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that in the revelation act of the Qur’an, God borrowed the human linguistic, 
psychological and cultural language of the first recipients. 
The first and main recipient of the Qur’an was the prophet Mohammed. 
According to the Islamic and Qur’anic conception, he did not receive it 
directly from God but by communication through the angel Gabriel. Why 
was this? Because God’s Word needs translation. God does not speak in 
a divine, absolute manner that is not accessible for humans, but rather 
imparts God’s Word so that it becomes comprehensible.
The Qur’an is thoroughly divine 
What makes the Qur’an divine? In the first place, it is its aesthetics. Under-
stood as God’s revelation, the Qur’an represents a medium for the encounter 
with God. It is God whom I encounter when reciting or hearing the Qur’an. 
Muslims who recite or hear the Qur’an are often deeply moved by it. It 
touches them in their hearts, even if they do not understand its content. 
This is not primarily about content but about the aesthetics of the Qur’an.
The Qur’an is likewise thoroughly human 
What makes the Qur’an human? By revealing Godself in the Qur’an, God gets 
involved with the human being. This means that in their everyday reality 
the first recipients to whom God speaks participate constitutively in God’s 
speech. God’s speech is a result of the communication between God and hu-
mans. When I say human, I mean the first recipients. If God speaks to them 
for example about war material, God speaks of the horses they shall prepare: 
Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your 
enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. 
Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye 
shall not be treated unjustly (8:60). 
God does not talk about jet fighters and tanks and if he mentions transporta-
tion, he talks about donkeys and horses rather than cars and airplanes: “And 
(He has created) horses, mules, and donkeys, for you to ride and use for show; 
and He has created (other) things of which ye have no knowledge” (16:8). 
Indeed, the Qur’an claims to address not only Mohammed and the people 
of his setting, the first recipients, but understands itself as God’s message 
to all human beings at all times. So the Qur’an also asserts the claim that 
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he addresses me here today in Europe just as he addresses you, too. The 
first recipients participated as constituents in the form of Qur’anic speech. 
The hermeneutical challenge
As readers we need to deal with the hermeneutical challenge that the form 
was fixed by its written compilation. The Qur’an as speech is dynamic, but 
it adjusts itself to the language of the particular situation of its first recipi-
ents on the seventh-century Arabian peninsula. On the contrary, the Qur’an 
as a book, as scripture, is fixed. Its form no longer changes. Today, in the 
twenty-first century, I read in the Qur’an that donkeys and horses are my 
means of transportation. I read a certain perception of women. I cannot ex-
change those words with terms such as car, jet or equal rights because the 
form of the language has been already fixed in written form. An alteration 
of the language would be a falsification of the Qur’an. So all that remains 
is to project my everyday reality into the text so that as transportation, I 
understand cars and airplanes instead of horses and donkeys, for example. 
But why is that even possible? It is only possible on one condition: if I 
understand the Qur’an not as a text or a book but as speech or communication 
that also takes place here and now when I read or hear it. The Qur’an speaks to 
me, indeed God speaks to me, especially in the act of reading and/or hearing 
the Qur’an. Even if God uses the same form in God’s speech as God did with 
the first recipients, God leaves it up to me to decode this form, to understand 
God’s message for me here and now according to my life’s reality. 
So that is why I am, here and now in my real life, constitutively con-
tributing to this speech with God. My life reality and I as an individual are 
communicating with God here and now. If the Qur’an had been revealed 
today, today’s language would have to be written in the Qur’an as well. But 
since that is not the case, because the revelation process of the Qur’an has 
already been completed, my communication with God through the Qur’an 
remains as speech today.
In the words of the great philosopher Paul Ricœur: “To interpret a 
text is to follow the path of thought opened by the text, to place oneself en 
route towards the orient[ation] of the text.”3 “What must be interpreted is 
a proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of 
my own most possibilities.”4 Ricœur agrees that the text “invites multiple 
3 Paul Ricœur, From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics, II, transl. Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1991), 122.
4 Ibid., 86.
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readings.” Understanding oneself in relation to the text, he argues, is con-
siderably more than “projecting oneself and one’s beliefs and prejudices; it 
is to let the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding 
which I have of myself.”5 
But contrary to Ricœur’s hermeneutics, there is a special feature in 
the Qur’an. If I read the Qur’an, the act differs from reading another book 
in an essential dimension: God, as the originator of the Qur’an, not only 
still exists, but still communicates with me, in fact constantly. Just as the 
Qur’an itself speaks about God breathing life into the human person from 
God’s spirit, there exists a medium inside human beings that enables them 
as limited creatures to communicate with the unlimited and thus to com-
municate with God directly. God continuously inspires the human being 
and this divine inspiration also accompanies humans when they read, hear 
or recite the Qur’an. When reading the Qur’an, the author is thus present. 
This author does not sit in front of the reader or hearer and speak in an 
objective language to them, but rather is closer than their own carotid ar-
tery, as the Qur’an says. The author is, in a metaphorical sense, inside the 
human person and the author does not speak an objective language that is 
divided from humans but through humans, through their fears and their 
hopes, through whatever they are engaged in or what they suppress, etc.
Therefore, there cannot be a single, forever valid interpretation of the 
Qur’an. Even in the life of the individual believer interpretations may change 
in relation to the different stages and experiences in their lives. God speaks 
to the human person throughout different situations. Qur’anic speech has 
various connotations and different meanings at different moments in the 
life of the individual. Hence, it is necessary to read and recite the Qur’an 
frequently. If the content were static, it would be sufficient to read the Qur’an 
once or twice in one’s life; the message would then have been understood. 
But that is not the way it is because the Qur’an does not impart objective 
insights that exist independently of the reader/hearer. Rather, it develops 
its message steadily in interaction with the reader. Imam Ali, the forth 
Caliph, already said: “It is not the Qur’an which speaks; rather humans 
make it speak. Phrases like: “The Qur’an says…”, or “the Qur’an suggests…” 
must be observed carefully. It is more correct to say: “I understand that 
the Qur’an wants to tell me…tomorrow I will understand that the Qur’an 
wants to tell me something else…” etc. In this way, the interaction between 
God and human beings remains an open communication.
5 Paul Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays on Language, Ac-
tion and Interpretation, transl. and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 178
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Some could argue that this consideration could lead to a random in-
terpretation of the Qur’an. This is true, but it is not so bad because we as 
humans have different concerns about which we communicate with God 
and the Qur’an should address everyone’s individual request. On the other 
hand, we must protect against inhumane interpretations of the Qur’an so 
that the randomness of understanding is not understood in the sense of 
it being legitimate to read everything into the Qur’an. Because if I can 
read everything into the Qur’an, I silence it so that finally, God will not be 
available anymore as a communication partner and the Qur’an will stop 
being a communication. 
God’s mercy
The Qur’an itself describes God’s highest attribute as mercifulness and 
highlights mercy as a God-addressed Qur’anic demand that is propagated 
by the prophet Mohammed. God says: “We sent thee not Mohammed, but as 
a Mercy for all creatures” (21:107). Every interpretation of the Qur’an that 
contradicts this criterion of mercy is therefore to be rejected. Mercy plays 
a central role in the Qur’an. The creation of the human being is already 
about mercy: “The most Gracious! It is He Who has taught the Qur’an. He 
has created man” (55:1-3) and “the mercy of God extendeth to all things” 
(7:156). But this mercy has been revealed not as a monologue but, rather, 
through human beings, their actions and life plans. It is not God who 
intervenes directly in this world to manifest God’s mercy, but rather this 
is realized through human beings who act as God’s tools if they say “yes” 
to God in freedom. This is exactly what the Qur’an wants to express with 
the word “caliph” as a synonym for human being. The human person is 
the medium through which God’s intention of love and mercy is expressed. 
He/she has been assigned to that. The prophet Mohammed said: 
In the hereafter, God will say to a man: ‹I was sick and you didn’t visit me, I was 
hungry and you didn’t give me anything to eat, and I was thirsty and you didn’t 
bring me anything to drink.’ Astonished, the man will thereupon ask: ‹But You 
are God, how can You be sick, thirsty or hungry?!’ God will answer him: ‹On such 
and such a day, one of your acquaintances was sick and you didn’t visit him; if you 
had visited him, you would have found Me there at his place. One day, one of your 
acquaintances was hungry and you didn’t give him anything to eat, and one day 
one of your acquaintances was thirsty and you didn’t bring him anything to drink.’”6
6 Transmitted via Muslim, Hadith Nr. 2569.
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This revelation of God’s mercy through the action of humans applies equally 
to the Qur’an: the Qur’an claims to be a message of mercy which can only 
be unfolded through the human being in Qur’anic speech because humans 
participate constitutively in Qur’anic speech through their communica-
tion with God. Where human beings fail, where they are not available as 
God’s tools, God’s mercy can only partly reveal and unfold itself and this 
also in the Qur’an, because the Qur’an is God-human-speech. This also 
explains why in the Qur’anic text, God’s mercy is not always mentioned. 
When I read: “Remember how the Unbelievers plotted against thee, to 
keep thee in bonds, or slay thee, or get thee out (of thy home). They plot 
and plan, and Allah too plans; but the best of planners is Allah” (8:30), 
then God speaks with the voice of a Muslim community which has long 
been oppressed. This situation is difficult because the Qur’an portrays a 
surface and likewise a product of the interaction with humans. God does 
not ignore the community to whom God addresses God’s message; God 
shares their joy as well as their rage because God speaks through them. 
God also speaks through Mohammed and so shares his worries, his hopes 
as well as his fear, grief and fury: “Their purpose was to scare thee off the 
land, in order to expel thee; but in that case they would not have stayed 
(therein) after thee, except for a little while” (in Mekka) (and finally fall 
victim to the judgment) (17:76) and “When ye turn away from them and the 
things they worship other than Allah, betake yourselves to the Cave: Your 
Lord will shower His mercies on you and dispose of your affair towards 
comfort and ease” (18:16).
Qur’anic speech and the maturity of the recipients 
So where the first recipients’ situation was too difficult and God’s mercy 
might have come into effect, the human response to the situation prevented 
mercy from unfolding itself; here one may read one or another more ag-
gressive passage in the Qur’an. Hence, the speech of the Qur’an develops 
with the maturity of the first recipients. This can be compared with parents 
who talk to their children aged 6, 16 or 26: to impart the same message, the 
parents use different forms, images and expressions at each stage. Their 
discourse evolves depending on their child’s level of maturity, but in all 
their discourses, they wish to express one thing: their love and responsibil-
ity for their children. Even if they threaten their child with punishment, or 
tell the child that the parents of the child who hit their child unjustly will 
be the ones to judge the child, the aggressive tone is due to the situation.
Thus we read verses like 2:190–192 in the Qur’an, which allow Muslims 
to defend themselves in the case of military attack. But where the situation 
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is almost ideal and humans are in paradise, it reads: “Allah says: ‘This is a 
day on which the truthful will profit from their truth: theirs are gardens, 
with rivers flowing beneath, their eternal Home: Allah well-pleased with 
them and they with Allah. That is the great salvation, (the fulfillment of 
all desires)’” (5:119). Here, mercy comes into full effect; here there is talk 
of the fact that humans should be satisfied with God. God lets Godself be 
evaluated by humans and it is God’s concern that they be satisfied with 
God. In my view, this is a major statement in the Qur’an.
The Qur’an as a medium and likewise a product of interaction of hu-
mans with God and God with humans in their different human needs is 
not a monologue. Neither is it the pure Word of God, nor the pure word 
of the human being. If the Qur’an says: “Nothing have we omitted from 
the Book” (6:38), then this does not denote a juridical or normative level 
in the sense that the Qur’an has regulated and determined everything. 
Rather, it points to the weakness as well as the strength of human beings, 
their anger, joy, hope, etc. All human beings can find themselves in the 
Qur’an in every situation of their lives. The criterion of mercy shall be a 
protection against inhumane interpretations of the Qur’an; here the Qur’an 
intervenes correctively.
Because the Qur’anic text is fixed, the act of speech, of communication 
between God and humans is no longer fixed in the text but, rather, in its 
interpretation. Therefore, exegesis today portrays the result of communica-
tion between God and humans who meet in the Qur’an when they read or 
hear it. The Qur’an is the stage on which they meet. The exegesis becomes 
dynamic: it does not say what the Qur’an means or what God wants to 
say to us but, rather, it is the result of the communication between those 
who are involved in the development of this exegesis and God. There are 
many participants, immediate and intermediate. Everyone who shapes our 
religious discourse also influences our communication with God through 
the Qur’an and sits at the communication table.
Nevertheless, the more mature the reader of the Qur’an, the more 
mature will be their interpretation of the Qur’an. Those who are merciful 
will be more likely to interpret the Qur’an in the sense of mercy, but those 
who carry hate in their hearts are more likely to read this hate into the 
Qur’an. The Qur’an gives us the concept of mercy as an indicator to avoid 
randomness. The Qur’an says in the second Sura that it provides guidance 
for the pious. So, it assumes piety, a certain inner maturity that allows 
humans to read mercy rather than hatred into their communication with 
the Qur’an. How we interpret the Qur’an reveals more about us than about 
God or the Qur’an itself. So our duty today is fully to unfold this mercy in 
the exegesis of the Qur’an. 
99
The Qur’an on the Exclusivist 
Religious Truth Claim: A Ma‘nā-
cum-Maghzā Approach and its 
Application to Q 2:111–113
Sahiron Syamsuddin
Introduction
Religious exclusivism is one of the factors leading to intolerance among 
the various religious communities. Religious exclusivism is the position 
that the truth belongs to one religion alone, and that all other religions 
that differ from it are simply false. Because of such truth claims certain 
groups believe other groups to be on the wrong path and that only their 
followers will be saved. This attitude is widespread in our societies and 
poses a serious challenge to today’s pluralistic societies. This theological 
position has a negative socio-political impact since it is used to legitimize 
the discrimination against others. I believe that an exclusivist religious truth 
claim is still alive in Muslim communities, including those in Indonesia.
For a good Muslim, the Qur’an provides guidance for their daily life. 
Since good Muslims try to behave according to their understanding of the 
Qur’an it is important that Muslim scholars of Qur’anic studies make it easily 
comprehensible. In the following, I shall attempt to interpret Qur’anic verses 
that refer to the religious truth claim. While there are many verses that 
can be discussed, I shall focus on Q 2:111—113, analyzing and interpreting 
these verses using the ma‘nā-cum-maghzā-approach:
(111) They also say, “No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.” 
This is their own wishful thinking. [Prophet], say, “Produce your evidence, if you 
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are telling the truth.” (112) In fact, any who direct themselves wholly to God and do 
good will have their reward with their Lord: no fear for them, nor will they grieve. 
(113) The Jews say, “The Christians have no ground whatsoever to stand on,” and 
the Christians say, “The Jews have no ground whatsoever to stand on,” though 
they both read the Scripture, and those who have no knowledge say the same; God 
will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection concerning their differences.1
Ma‘nā-cum-maghzā approach
The ma‘na-cum-maghza approach is an exegetical approach where the interpreter 
tries to grasp the original historical meaning (ma‘nā) of a text (i.e., the Qur’an) 
as it was understood by its first audience and then to develop its significance 
(maghzā) for the contemporary situation. There are other terms whose 
methodical substance is similar to this approach. Fazlur Rahman calls it the 
“double movement” approach. In his work, Interpreting the Qur’an2 and Reading 
the Quran in the Twenty-first Century,3 Abdullah Saeed develops what he calls 
a “contextualist approach.” However, both Rahman’s double movement and 
Saeed’s contextualist approach appear only to be applied to the interpretation 
of Qur’anic legal verses, while the ma‘nā-cum-maghzā approach is supposed 
to be applicable to the whole Qur’an (except al-hurūf al-muqatta‘a).
This approach presupposes that every text, including the Qur’anic text, 
has, first, a historical meaning specific to its own context since the Qur’an was 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in a particular situation. The meaning 
of a certain Qur’anic text becomes universal through the process of further 
interpretation. On this basis, in order to understand its original meaning, it 
is crucial that the interpreter pays attention not only to the textuality of the 
text, but also to its historical context. In this case, the analysis of the Qur’anic 
language in light of seventh-century CE/first century AH Arabic is obligatory. 
This process is based on the fact that every language has synchronic and 
diachronic aspects. The synchronic aspect is the linguistic one that does 
not change, whereas the diachronic one is the one that changes over time. 
In order to avoid misunderstanding a text, the interpreter has to be aware of 
the development of the meaning of a word, idiom, phrase and structure. For 
example, the Arabic word ikhlās, which basically means the state of making 
something pure, is subject to development. In the pre-Islamic tradition, the 
word refers to the action of making something pure in a secular context. In 
1 This Qur’an translation is from Abdul Haleem.
2 Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Qur’an (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
3 Abdullah Saeed, Reading the Qur’an in the Twenty-first Century: A Contextualist 
Approach (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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the Qur’an this word is used either in a secular or in a religious context. In 
relation to its Qur’anic usage in a religious sense, it means a monotheistic 
belief and action, so that its meaning is the same as that of tawhīd (the unity 
of God). This is supported by the fact that the sura, whose verses talk about 
monotheism, is called sūrat al-ikhlās.4 The term is then defined by Muslim 
scholars as an act of directing all good deeds only for the purpose of receiving 
God’s mercy. It means that it has pre-Qur’anic, Qur’anic and post-Qur’anic 
meanings, although its basic meaning still exists.
In order to understand the historical meaning which, according to Jorge 
Gracia, constitutes the “historical function of interpretation,”5 one must also 
pay attention to the broader historical context in which a certain verse or 
sura was revealed. In this case, the asbāb al-nuzūl (“occasions of revelation”) 
and the historical accounts of culture, tradition, legal system, socio-political 
situation and economic condition to which the Qur’an possibly responded 
are very helpful. Many classical Muslim scholars asserted that nobody could 
understand the Qur’an properly unless they knew its asbāb al-nuzūl. ‘Alī 
ibn Ahmad al-Wāhidī (d. 468 H.), for example, writes in his work Asbāb al-
Nuzūl, “The Asbāb al-Nuzūl are the most complete aspect to be understood 
and the first one to be paid attention to, because it is impossible to interpret 
a verse and its intention without understanding its story and explanation.”6 
According to Fazlur Rahman, it can lead someone not only to grasp the original 
meaning of the Qur’anic text, but also what he calls ratio legis on which a 
Qur’anic ruling was based.7 Abdullah Saeed points out that the knowledge 
of the socio-historical context can help one decide whether the message of a 
certain Qur’anic verse should be particularly or universally applied.8 
However, the understanding of the original/historical meaning 
constitutes a starting point for further, deeper interpretation, which 
4 See Ibn al-Munzūr, Lisān al-‘Arab (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, n.d.), 1227.
5 Jorge J.E. Gracia, A Theory of Textuality (Albany: State University of New York 
Press,1996), 155. Garcia writes, “The aim of the interpreter is to recreate in the 
contemporary audience, first, the mental acts of the historical author of the text, 
not as creator of the text, but as audience. In other words, the aim of the interpreter 
taken in this sense is to produce an understanding in the contemporary audience 
that is intensionally the same to the understanding the author had of the text. The 
interpreter, second, has in mind the re-creation in the contemporary audience of 
the acts of understanding through which the historical audience of the text or the 
audience for which the work was intended went or were expected to go.”
6 ‘Alī ibn Ahmad al-Wāhidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, ed. Isām ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin (Dammam: 
Dar al-Salāh, n.d.), 8.
7 See Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 6f.
8 See Saeed, op. cit (note 2), 123f.
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is relevant for the time in which such is conducted. There are several 
hermeneutical ways to develop and broaden the meaning of the Qur’anic text 
so that it can be understood in and applied to a contemporary environment. 
One of the ways to find out what the text means can be called maghzā 
(significance), or main message of a verse, or in Gadamer’s word “general 
sense” (sinngemäß). Gadamer says:
The task of interpretation always poses itself when the meaning content of the printed 
work is disputable and it is the matter of attaining the correct understanding of what 
is being announced. However, this “thing that is being conveyed” [Kunde] is not what 
the speaker or writer originally said, but rather what he would have wanted to say 
to me if I had been his original interlocutor. It is well-known that in the interpreta-
tion of “commands” or “order’” [Befehlen] as a hermeneutical problem, such orders 
are to be followed “according to their general sense” [Sinngemäß] and not in their 
literal meaning. Accordingly, we must say that a text is not simply a given object but 
a phase in the execution of the communicative event [Verständigungsgeschehen].9
Interpretation of Q 2:111—113
The ma‘nā-cum-maghzā interpretation takes into consideration both the 
language of the verses under discussion and their socio-historical context 
for the purpose of grasping, first, their original historical meaning and, 
second, producing their new meaning for the period during which their 
reinterpretation is conducted.
Linguistic analysis of the verses
Wa qālū lan yadkhula l-jannata illā man 
kāna hūdan aw nasārā (Q 2:111)
The plural pronoun in the verb qālū (they said) refers to the Jews and 
Christians in Medina. This reference can be understood from illā man kāna 
hūdan aw nasārā (unless he is a Jew or a Christian). So, the abovementioned 
statement can be translated as follows: They [i.e., the Jews and the Christians] 
said, “No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.” Their 
statement constitutes a truth claim. However, it is not clear, whether the 
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” in Diane P. Michelfelder and 
Richard E. Palmer (eds), Dialogue & Deconstruction. The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter 
(Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1989), 35. 
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intention was to humiliate each other, or the Muslims. According to Fakhr 
al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the first possibility seems to be closer to the meaning of 
the text, as indicated in verse 113 that will be discussed. He says that Q 
2:113 constitutes a more detailed explanation of Q 2:111 by mentioning the 
statement of the Jews against the Christians and vice versa.10
Tilka amāniyyuhum (Q 2:111)
The word amāniyy is a plural form of umniyya, meaning “wish for something.” 
It has the same meaning as munya (singular) or munā (plural).11 The phrase 
was interpreted by Muqātil ibn Sulaymān as tamannaw ‘alā Allāh (they 
wished on God).12 This word is translated by Abdul Haleem as “wishful 
thinking.” The phrase is accordingly translated as “This is their own 
wishful thinking.” The similar meaning can be found in Hartmut Bobzin’s 
German translation of the verse, “Das sind jedoch nur ihre Wünsche.” This 
indicates that their truth claim was denied by God. 
Qul hātū burhānakum (Q 2:111)
The phrase hātū burhānakum means “to bring or produce your evidence.” 
The word hāti, according to al-Zamakhsharī, has the same meaning as ahdir 
(provide; make something available).13 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān interpreted the 
words burhānakum as hujjatukum min al-tawrāt wa al-injīl (your evidence 
from the Torah and gospel).14 In order to reject such a truth claim, the 
Prophet Muhammad was ordered to challenge them to provide evidence 
(burhān). This was difficult because entering into paradise is one of the 
eschatological aspects that are known only to God.
Balā man aslama wajhahū li Allāhi wa huwa muhsinun (Q 2:112) 
According to al-Zamakhsharī, the word balā is mentioned here in order for 
the Prophet Muhammad to reject the truth claims of the Jews and Christians 
of Medina.15 The phrase man aslama wajhahū li Allāhi is interpreted by al-
Zamakhsharī as man akhlasa nafsahū lahū lā yushriku bihī ghayrahū (anyone 
10 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Mafātih al-Ghayb, vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 8.
11 Ibn al Manzūr, op. cit (note 4), 4283.
12 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, ed. Ahmad Farīd, vol. 1 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2003), 72.
13 Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, vol. 1 (Riyad: Maktabat al-‘Abikan, 1998), 311.
14 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, op. cit. (note 12), vol. 1, 72.
15 Al-Zamakhsharī, op. cit. (note 13), vol. 1, 311.
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who purifies himself for God and does not associate others with Him).16 It means 
that he believes in the One and Only God. Similarly, al-Tabarī interprets the 
phrase as “those who submit themselves to God in a sincere way.”17 Al-Rāzī 
has a similar interpretation. He insisted that the meaning of man aslama 
wajhahu is “those who submit their heart to the obedience of God (islām 
al-nafs li tā‘at Allāh).” A modern interpreter, Ibn ‘Āshūr, says in his al-Tahrīr 
wa al-Tanwīr, that the meaning of the word islām is “taslīm al-dhāt li awāmir 
Allāh” (the total obedience of the person to God’s commands). Accordingly, he 
says, “Paradise will not be a monopoly for anyone, but it will be possessed 
by all those who submit to God.”18 All these interpreters agree on the point 
that the word aslama does not mean to enter Islam exclusively, but to submit 
to God, regardless of the fact whether a person is a Jew, Christian or Muslim.
In terms of the phrase wa-huwa muhsinun, interpreters differ. According 
to al-Tabarī, it means that someone’s submission to God had to be sincere. 
Unlike al-Tabarī, al-Rāzī said that it means that “someone’s obedience to 
God must be followed by good deeds, not by bad ones.”19 Ibn ‘Āshūr tried to 
combine the two opinions by saying it is not enough only to submit one’s 
heart to Allah and to conduct good deeds without ikhlās (sincere devotion).20
Fa lahū ajruhū ‘inda rabbihi wa lā khawfun 
‘alayhim wa lā hum yahanūna (Q 2:112)
This statement insists that those who devote themselves will be rewarded 
by God, that there is no fear for them, and that they will not grieve. There 
are no difficult words here, except the structural change or alteration from 
the singular to the plural pronoun.
Wa qālat al-yahūdu laysat al-nasārā ‘alā shay’in wa 
qālat al-nasārā laysat al-yahūdu ‘alā shay’ (Q 2:113)
According to al-Zamakhsharī, the combination between the negative particle/
verb laysa and the unspecific word shay’ indicates the exaggeration in the 
16 Ibid.
17 Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Jāmi‘ al-Bayān fī Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, vol. 2 (Cairo: 
Dār Hajar, 2001), 431.
18 Muhammad ibn al-Tāhir ibn ‘Āshūr, al-Tahrīr wa al-Tanwīr, vol. 2 (Tunis: al-Dār 
al-Tūnīsiyya li al-Nasyr, 1984), 674.
19 Al-Rāzī, op. cit. (note 10), vol. 4, 4.
20 Ibn ‘Āshūr, op. cit. (note 18), vol. 2, 675.
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negation.21 The Qur’anic statement indicates that the Jews and Christians 
were in a conflict and each group accused the other group of going astray.
The immediate historical context: The 
occasion of revelation (Asbab al-Nuzūl)
Before mentioning the historical context of the verses, it is helpful to remind 
ourselves of Angelika Neuwirth’s insight:
We used to understand the Qur’an as the ‘Islamic text’ par excellence, though 
historically viewed, this is not evident at all. The Qur’an, before rising to the rank 
of the Islamic structure, for more than twenty years was an oral communication. 
Its message was not addressed to Muslims yet, ... but to the pre-Islamic listeners 
whom we might best describe as late antique educated persons, be they pagans, 
or syncretic believers familiar with monotheistic tradition, or be they even Jews 
and Christians.22
Q 2:111–113 were revealed to Prophet Muhammad in Medina. The audience 
were the Jews and Christians of Medina. According to Muslim historians, 
they dealt for the first time with the Christians of Najran and the Jewish 
rabbis in Medina. It is reported that on the occasion of the revelation (asbab 
al-nuzūl), when the Christian delegation of Najran came to the Prophet 
Muhammad, some Jewish rabbis came to them and said that they were 
not at all on the right path in terms of their religiosity. Responding to this 
accusation, the Christians said the same thing.23 In his Qur’an commentary 
Fakhr al-Rāzī also provides the same report in a bit more detail. He quotes 
a report that describes how when some people of Najrān had come to the 
Prophet Muhammad, Jewish religious scholars or rabbis (ahbār al-yahūd) 
came to them and a serious debate among the two parties ensued and that 
their voices were high and strong. The Jews said, “You are not on the right 
track in terms of the religion.” The Jews did not believe in Jesus and his 
Injīl (gospel). The Christians, in turn, accused the Jews of not believing 
21 Al-Zamakhsharī, op. cit. (note 12), vol. 1, 312: He says, ‘fa idhā nufia itlāq ism al-shay’ 
‘alayhi fa qad būligha fī tark al-i‘tidād bihī ilā mā laysa bi ‘adad’ (If the mentioning of 
something is negated, it is exaggerated in not counting it up to what is not counted).
22 Angelika Neuwirth, “The Discovery of Writing in the Qur’an: Tracing an 
Epistemic Revolution in Late Antiquity,” in NUN: Jurnal Studi Alquran dan Tafsir 
di Nusantara 2, 1 (2016), 31-32.
23 See al-Tabarī, op. cit. (note 17), vol. 2, 435.
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in Moses and his Torah in a right way.24 Knowing this context can help 
the interpreter to comprehend the verses, even though they need other 
historical sources in order to deepen their understanding. Muhammad 
‘Abduh says that in order to understand the verses, one should look at the 
history of religions and religious communities, so that one knows whether 
such belief is universal or applies only to a certain group of them. 
The broader historical context: Encounter 
between religious communities in Medina
The population of pre-Islamic Medina consisted of pagan Arabs and Jewish 
clans. The Aus and Khazraj constituted the biggest Jewish tribes. It is 
not clear whether they came from Palestine. A relatively small number 
of Christians also lived in this pluralistic city.25 Thanks to the migration 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and the conversion of the 
Medinan people to Islam, the city became even more pluralistic. Now also 
Muslims lived in the city. Even Q 2:62, which is a Medinan verse, not only 
mentions the Jews and Christians, but also the sābi’ūn. With regard to 
this term, there are diverse opinions among Muslim scholars. Some say 
that the sābi’ūn are those who did not have any religion, i.e., atheists. This 
opinion is mentioned on the authority of Mujāhid ibn Jabr,26 a successor 
(tābi‘ī) and student of Ibn ‘Abbās. 
The main message (maghzā) of the verses
These verses clearly prohibit any exclusivist religious truth claims. Even 
if they refer to the truth claims by the Jews and Christians in Medina, the 
prohibition is directed at every religious community, including Muslims. 
This message can be inferred from the Qur’anic rejection of the religious 
truth claim, balā man aslama wajhahū li Allāhi wa huwa muhsinun. 
According to this, salvation will be received in the hereafter by anyone who 
submits to the One and Only God and conducts good deeds, regardless of 
their religion. This is why the Qur’an did not state, for example, balā man 
ittaba‘a muhammadan (in fact, anyone who follows Muhammad).
24 See Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, op. cit. (note 10), vol. 4, 8. 
25 See Marco Schöller, “Medina,” in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia 
of the Qur’ān, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill 2003), 368. 
26 Al-Tabarī, op. cit. (note 17), vol. 2, 35.
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The rejection of any truth claim is also mentioned in other verses. Q 
2:135–136 reads:
(135) They say, “Become Jews or Christians, and you will be rightly guided.” Say 
(Prophet), “No, (ours is) the religion of Abraham, the upright, who did not worship 
any god besides God.
(136) So, [you, believers], say, “We believe in God and in what was sent down to 
us and sent down to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and what 
was given to Moses, Jesus, and all prophets by their Lord. We make no distinction 
between them, and we devote ourselves to Him (muslimūn).’
From these verses, we can conclude that the rightly guided people are 
those who submit to the One and Only God (muslimūn, in a general sense). 
The people mentioned here are Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, 
Jesus, and other prophets. While the Prophet Muhammad and his followers 
submitted to the One and Only God, it is important to note that it is not 
explicitly stated that the rightly guided community is exclusively a Muslim 
community. This indicates that Muslims should not make truth claims as 
the Jews and Christians of Medina did at the time. Therefore, all those who 
devote themselves to God are the rightly guided.
On this basis, God will save every religious community that submits 
to Him. Q 2:62 states that the believers in the Prophecy of Muhammad, the 
Jews, the Christians and the Sabians will be saved in the Hereafter, given 
rewards by God and will not grieve.
Yet, some Muslims imagine that only Muslims (the followers of 
Muhammad) will be saved and enter paradise. Such opinion can be found 
in several exegetical works. While interpreting Q 2:62, Ibn Kathīr, a student 
of Ibn Taymīya, says in his Tafsīr,
I said, “This is not contradictory to what was reported by ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha on the 
authority of Ibn ‘Abbās who said that after the revelation of inna lladhīna āmanū 
wa alladhī hādū wa al-nasārā ... [Q.2:62], God revealed the verse wa man yabtaghi 
ghayra l-islāmi dīnan fa lan yuqbala minhu ...[Q. 3:85]. Indeed, what is said by Ibn 
‘Abbās is information that God will not accept any way and deed unless it agrees 
with the sharī‘a of the Prophet Muhammad after God appointed him as a messenger. 
Yet, before his prophecy, all people who had followed their messenger were on the 
right guidance and way, and would be given salvation. The Jews were the followers 
of Moses, who consulted the Torah in deciding any legal aspects in their time.”27
27 Ismā‘īl ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azhīm, vol. 1 (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-hadītha, 
2000), 431.
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Before expressing such an opinion, he quotes another report by al-Suddī 
on the authority of Salmān al-Fārisī, who reportedly informed the Prophet 
Muhammad of the existence of people [i.e., Salmān’s friends] who prayed 
and fasted; they also would believe in his prophecy; they believed that 
he would be the last messenger. After listening to Salmān, the Prophet 
Muhammad said, “O Salmān, they would go to Hell.” On the basis of this 
report, Ibn Kathīr then said that the Jews’ belief was only accepted before 
the coming of Jesus, and the Christians’ belief was only accepted before 
the coming of Muhammad.28 His statement is an example of an exclusivist 
truth claim made by Muslims. It seems to me that this has influenced many 
Muslims all over the world today.
Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the main message of Q 2:111–113 
and such verses as Q 2:65, we will find that such a truth claim should be 
avoided. Many interpreters of the classical, modern and contemporary 
periods have interpreted the verses in an inclusive, even pluralistic way. 
In addition to the abovementioned interpreters, we can name Muhammad 
Sharūr who, in his work al-Islām wa al-Īmān, interprets the Qur’anic term 
islām in a pluralistic way. After collecting the word and its derivations 
and comparing them with the word īmān and its derivations in Qur’anic 
usage, he concludes that the criteria, according to which people will be 
saved on the Day of Judgment, are belief in the One and Only God, belief 
in the Hereafter, and good deeds. Those who fulfill these criteria are called 
“muslimūn” (those who submit themselves to God), and accordingly there 
are “al-yahūd al-muslimūn” (the Jews who devote themselves to God), “al-
nasārā al-muslimūn” (the Christians who devote themselves to God), and 
al-mu’minūn al-muslimūn (the believers in the prophecy of Muhammad, 
who devote themselves to God).29
Concluding remarks
In today’s world, Muslims need a new Islamic theology that also deals 
with the problem of religious truth claims. Exclusivist religious truth 
claims have led religious communities to misbehave and even to create 
social conflicts. Therefore, it is very important for us critically to review 
28 Ibid.
29 See Muhammad Shahrūr, al-Islām wa al-Īmān (Damascus: al-Ahālī, 1996). See 
also Andreas Christmann, The Qur’an, Morality, and Critical Reason: The Essential 
Muhammad Shahrur (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 20–70; and Sahiron Syamsuddin, Die 
Koranhermeneutik Muhammad Šahrûrs und ihre Beurteilungen aus der Sicht 
muslimischer Autoren: Eine kritische Untersuchung (Wuerzburg: Ergon, 2009), 170–90. 
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such truth claims. Q 2:111–113 can be an Islamic theological foundation 
for the prevention of any exclusivist religious truth claim. Even though the 
verses speak about the truth claim between the Jews and the Christians of 
Medina, but their main message (significance; maghzā) is that all people 
who submit themselves to the One and Only God and conduct good deeds 
will be saved, and, therefore, no believer should hold onto an exclusivist 
claim to the truth.
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Adam and Eve from the 
Perspective of Contemporary 
Feminist Exegesis of the Qur’an
Dina El Omari
Introduction
In Judaism, Christianity and Islam the story of Adam and Eve is potentially 
a source of controversy, because it is often used as the starting point for 
discussions about gender equality. The various religious texts can be 
interpreted very differently with respect to discrimination. Interpretations 
range from the discriminatory to the equitable.
In my view, the Qur’anic tradition of the Adam and Eve story offers a 
more favorable basis for an equitable interpretation of the text than the 
Old Testament. Nonetheless, traditional Qur’anic exegesis has not produced 
interpretations that support gender equality. Voices, especially those 
of women, demanding a new interpretation of the creation of humanity 
and therefore a breaking free from traditional, deadlocked patriarchal 
interpretations and their substitution by those with a gender-equitable 
understanding, have only come to the fore since the 1980s.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the creation story of Adam and 
Eve (or that of human beings) as it is found in the Qur’an from a contemporary 
feminist perspective as well as its impact on feminist exegesis. First, we 
have to consider the following: in the Qur’an, some verses deal directly 
with the creation story while there is a corpus of verses that are only about 
the creation of female and male in general and do not refer to the creation 
story. I would like to begin my article by citing the relevant Qur’anic verses 
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of the creation story and their dynamic. Then I will present a popular way 
of interpreting the story in traditional exegesis as an example and finally 
I will focus on feminist exegesis and its approach to the creation story.
The dynamic of the creation story
The Qur’an mentions Adam and his wife in different verses, but the focus differs 
from one passage to another. It is important to say that Eve is not mentioned by 
name in the Qur’an. Adam’s spouse, as she is referred to in the Qur’an, is only 
mentioned in three of the five Qur’anic passages of the creation story. The two 
narratives without the woman are basically about the dialogue between God 
and the devil (Sura 15 and Sura 38). Three other passages are highly relevant 
to my argument: Q 20:115–124; Q 7:11–28; Q 2:30–38.
The beginning of the complex of verses 115–124 of Sura 20 contains 
God’s warning to Adam not to eat from a tree in paradise, followed by the 
scene where the angels are enjoined to prostrate themselves before creation, 
which the devil refuses. In verse 117, God warns Adam about the devil’s 
intention to expel the couple from paradise. In this passage, Adam’s wife 
is mentioned for the first time. God promises both human creatures that 
they will be well supplied in paradise. Verses 120–121 recount the devil’s 
temptation: they eat from the fruit and their nudity is exposed. Both cover 
themselves with leaves, but it is Adam who, despite the fact that both human 
creatures have transgressed, is addressed as the disobedient one. And he 
alone is also addressed by God regarding God’s subsequent forgiveness 
and guidance. However, the couple is sent down to earth together with the 
warning that only the rightly guided will live a good life there.
Verses 11–28 of Sura 7 begin with the creation and molding of both 
human creatures. Here, the angels’ command to bow down to Adam and 
the devil’s refusal are repeated. This is followed by the dialogue between 
God and the devil and the warning to Adam that he and his wife must not 
eat from the tree, the temptation of the two by the devil, the appearance 
of their nudity and God’s admonition to them. Both human creatures beg 
for forgiveness, but in this passage, forgiveness is not explicitly mentioned. 
In fact, both of them are sent down to earth with words of warning.
The group of verses 30–38 of Sura 2 then reveals the reason for which 
God created the human being: God wants to appoint the human being as 
a vicegerent. A dialogue with the angels and the ensuing command to 
prostrate themselves before Adam follow. All the angels comply with the 
command except Iblis, who refuses. The rest of this passage is similar to 
that of Sura 20: Adam and his wife are expected to inhabit the garden but 
not to eat from the tree. Both are seduced by the devil, whereupon God 
113
orders them to leave the garden. But after this command, God forgives 
Adam and sends both with God’s guidance down to earth.
According to Nöldecke, the verses of each sura are listed chronologically.1 
The chronology of all the passages as a whole is presented as follows: four 
of the suras originate from the Meccan and one of them from the Medina 
period: 20, 15 and 38 are mid-Meccan, 7 is late-Meccan and 2 is from the 
Medina period. Here we see a certain dynamic. While in Sura 20, the 
woman is mentioned, the focus is primarily on Adam. But this changes in 
Sura 7 and 2 to the effect that Eve also increasingly comes into focus. In 
Q 20:117, we find the following passage:
Then We said: “O Adam! Surely this is an enemy to you and to your spouse. Do 
not let him drive you both out of paradise, so that you be wretched! Surely it is 
given to you neither hunger therein, nor to go naked, and that you neither thirst 
therein nor suffer the heat of the sun.” But then Satan whispered to him (wicked 
ideas). He said: ‘Adam! Shall I indicate to you the tree of eternity and a kingdom 
that does not decay?’ So the two of them ate of it, and their shameful parts became 
displayed to them, and they took to splicing upon themselves some of the leaves 
of paradise. And Adam disobeyed his Lord; so he became misguided.”
Q 7:19 states in much more detail:
And (God said): “Adam! Dwell you and your spouse in paradise. So eat (fruits) 
of where you both decide! But do not approach this tree, lest you be among the 
wrongdoers.” But Satan whispered to them (wicked thoughts) to make apparent 
to them what was concealed from them of their private parts (until then). He said: 
“Your Lord did only forbid you this tree (to prevent) that you become angels or be-
come of the immortal.” And he swore to both of them (and reaffirmed): “I advise 
you well.” And so he misled them both by delusion. As soon as they both tasted 
from the tree, their private parts became apparent to them, and they began to 
tack together over themselves the leaves (of the tree) of Paradise. And their Lord 
called to them, ‘Did I not forbid you to eat from that tree and tell you that Satan 
is a clear enemy to you?’ They said, ‘Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves, and if 
You do not forgive us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers.’”
This dynamic indicates that a gradual shift in perspective has taken place 
and that, interestingly, it is first Adam and then Adam and Eve together 
1 See Theodor Nöldecke, Geschichte des Qorans, Teil 1, 5th reprint of 2nd edition 
(Hildesheim: Olms, 2005), 74ff., following Angelika Neuwirth Sura 15 has been 
revealed temporarily before Sura 20. See Angelika Neuwirth, Der Koran, vol 2: 
Mittelmekkanische Suren: Ein neues Gottesvolk (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2017).
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who are responsible for consuming the forbidden fruit. This way of telling 
the story allows for a gender-equitable interpretation of the text, which we 
will see in detail later, since it does not support the dominant Christian 
perception that the woman is responsible for the fall of humanity. Rather, 
it lays responsibility on both. However, the latter perception is not put 
forward in traditional Qur’anic exegesis. I will now illustrate this point.
Interpretation of the so-called “fall of 
humanity” in traditional Qur’anic exegesis
The problem of Muslim classical interpretation is that it differs significantly 
from the Qur’anic narration because of the impact of the Jewish-Christian 
tradition, which led to a change in how the creation story was understood. This 
phenomenon is evident with regard to the role of women in history. Medieval 
interpretations implied that women by nature lack rationality and moral liability. 
This perception was incorporated into Muslim exegesis, in which traditions 
of a misogynous nature were accepted as authentic material. This attitude 
changed only slowly in the nineteenth century as the authenticity of this 
material judged not to be in accordance with the Qur’an was being questioned.2
The early exegete Tabari is a good example of how the Jewish–Christian 
tradition influenced the exegesis at the time. In his monumental work, 
Tabari quotes many biblical passages which he had either learned from 
“the people of the Torah and the Bible” (the so-called Isrāʾīliyyāt) or picked 
up from popular Muslim scholars. However, he always notes: “God knows 
it best in the end,” indicating his less than complete certainty about this 
material. The references to “Adam’s spouse” in his exegesis are interesting 
when considered from a feminist perspective.
Regarding the creation of Eve, Tabari relates that Adam felt lonely and so 
God put him to sleep. He then extracted one of Adam’s ribs. When Adam woke 
up, he found a woman next to him. Eve received her name—in Arabic Hawwa—
from Adam. He asked her what her name was and she answered, “woman.” He 
then asked her, “Why were you created?” and she replied, “So that you will 
find peace with me.” The angels asked Adam what the woman’s name was and 
he told them that it was “Hawwa” because she was made of something alive.3
As for the temptation by the devil, Tabari quotes traditions which accuse 
both human creatures, although those which only accuse Eve, seeing the cause 
2 For example Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 64.
3 See Franz Rosenthal (ed.), The History of al-Tabari, vol. 1: General Introduction 
and From the Creation to the Flood (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1989), 273.
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of the fall in female weakness, predominate.4 Here, we have different versions: 
the devil tempted Eve with words that she uses later with Adam/she orders 
Adam to eat the fruit/she fools him/Adam was poisoned by her/Adam is subject 
to his sensual desire.5 As a result, their private genitalia were exposed, but 
only Adam is ashamed. Adam wants to hide from God because he is ashamed.6
We also find influences of the Jewish–Christian tradition regarding God’s 
punishment: God condemns the woman, but not Adam. God condemns the 
earth from which Adam was created and so its fruits become thorns. God 
condemns Adam to live a life of needs and duty while God’s curse on the 
woman is clearly fatal. Because Hawwa causes the tree to bleed by picking 
its fruit, women menstruate once a month; they must also bear the pains of 
childbirth, which can cause their death. Although he created her sapient, 
God makes women ignorant, morally and mentally weak.7
Especially these narratives led to an imbalance between men and 
women in the Islamic tradition but they must also be seen as being in 
strong contrast to the Qur’an. Some exegetes tried to lay patriarchal 
interpretations of the biblical narrative like a pattern over the Qur’anic 
creation story, without taking obvious conflicts and distortions with and 
within the Qur’anic text into account. These misogynous interpretations of 
the creation story provide the ideal soil on which patriarchal interpretations 
of other Qur’anic passages that stress the imbalance between men and 
women could grow even more easily.
Feminist exegesis and its approach 
to the creation story
Feminist exegesis aims to end this imbalance and to achieve a gender-
equitable understanding of Islam. It begins with the creation story as well 
as with the story of the general creation of human beings. One feminist 
Qur’anic exegetical method, the intertextual method, relies on a holistic 
reading of the Qur’an. Qur’anic verses are read with other verses on the 
same topic in light of what the exegetes call the Qur’anic nucleus: justice 
and equity for all human beings.8
4 Ibid., 274ff.
5 Ibid., 275ff.
6 Ibid., 277. 
7 Ibid., 277f.
8 See Amina Wadud, “Towards a Qur’anic Hermeneutic of Social Justice: Race, Class 
and Gender,” in Journal of Law and Religion 12.1 (1995–1996), 43.
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Modern scholars like Amina Wadud speak in this context of an 
interior coherence in the Qur’an (naẓm al-qurʾān).9 The idea of this method 
already existed in traditional exegesis (tafsīr al-qurʾān bi-l-qurʾān) but was 
not frequently used. Traditional exegesis is criticized by these modern 
scholars because its concentration on single isolated words cannot lead to 
an understanding of the whole interior coherence, the strong thematic and 
structural unity of and within the Qur’an.10 Moreover, for these scholars, 
the Qur’an as a whole contains a specific worldview, a definite attitude 
towards life. The common atomistic reading in traditional exegesis has 
led instead to a distorted picture of the role of women.11
A starting point and ruling principle of the intertextual exegetical 
method is the creation story, which can be read as a sign of the equity 
between men and women. According to such feminist scholars as Amina 
Wadud and Riffat Hassan, all verses that deal with the relationship between 
men and women can be read in light of this understanding of the creation 
story. One aspect of the Qur’anic creation story—the openness of the text’s 
linguistic formulations—is relevant here. Mention is made of Adam and, 
literally, his “partner creature” (zawj), who is very often equated with “his 
spouse.” But the term zawj is a neutral term and can refer to either gender.
The term “Adam” comes from the Hebrew word אָָדם (ādām) meaning 
“human,” which is also a gender-neutral description of this creature. Because 
the fellow creature in the Qur’an is at no point declared as feminine and 
because the name Eve is not mentioned, the text enables a gender-neutral 
interpretation, i.e., God has created the human being and his fellow 
creature.12 This concept is assured through further Qur’anic passages 
that do not address the creation story directly but the creation of human 
beings in general. Q 4:1 reads:
O you mankind, fear your Lord, who created you of one soul (nafs), and created 
from the same nature as (minha) its spouse (zawjaha), and who let many men and 
women emerge from both of them who dispersed on Earth.”
9 See Mustansir Mir, Coherence in the Qur’an (Indianapolis: American Trust 
Publications, 1986), 3–4.
10 See Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual 
Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 2.
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 See Riffat Hassan, “Feministische Interpretationen des Islam,” in Claudia 
Schöning-Kalender et al. (eds), Feminismus, Islam, Nation. Frauenbewegungen im 
Maghreb, in Zentralasien und in der Türkei (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997), 217–33.
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This verse includes a general description of the process of creation of men 
and women. Traditional exegesis presupposes that woman was created 
from man. But feminist exegesis posits the equal creation of both.13 Their 
argument is based on several elements of the verse. First, the term nafs is 
neither male nor female although grammatically it is female, which is why 
the female pronoun—ha in minha and zawjaha—relates to it. So, feminist 
scholars state, there is no textual or linguistic reason to judge that nafs 
is male or that it refers to Adam. They argue, moreover, that zawj cannot 
conceptually be male or female, even if it is grammatically a feminine 
noun. If the particle min relates to zawj, it should not be understood as a 
derivative; rather, it can mean “of the same nature as,” thus underlining 
the equality of nafs and zawj from which men and women descend.14
As well as examining the Qur’anic text, it is also possible to include 
concepts from Late Antiquity that the Qur’an may have included, especially 
in Q 4:1. The Qur’an is a communication between God, the Prophet and 
his community and, accordingly, did not arise in a vacuum. Rather, the 
community had a certain prior knowledge that was involved in the 
communication. This is perhaps reflected in Q 4:1, in the idea of a creation of 
a male-female creature—an idea that is definitely not new in human history. 
It can be traced back to Plato, whose account of the evolution of gender is 
similarly constructed with both originating from one creature.15 In such 
literature as Midrasch Bereschit Bara VIII, it is also said: “When the One 
Saint created Adam, He created him as hermaphrodite […] He created him 
with two faces and then He split him […].”16
Based on the arguments up to this point, we can state that the first 
woman was neither created from man nor for him. For this reason, the idea 
that Eve was created from a rib should not be accepted. It should be seen 
as due to the influence of the Jewish–Christian tradition that is different 
from the Qur’an. The influence of this tradition began in the early days 
of exegesis; such exegetes as Muǧāhid (d. 722) explained the creation 
story—a very short one in the Qur’an—with the help of Jewish and Christian 
converts who added more details from their religious contexts.17 The idea 
of the creation of Eve from a rib is more difficult to deal with because it is 
13 See Riffat Hassan, “Muslim Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam,” in Paula M. 
Cooey, William R. Eakin, Jay Byrd McDaniel (eds), After Patriarchy: Feminist 
Transformations of the World Religions (New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 47f.; Amina 
Wadud, Qur’an and Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25.
14 Wadud, op. cit. (note 8), 18f.
15 See Plato, Symposium (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006), 55ff.
16 Harry Freedman (ed.), Midrash Rabbah (London: Soncino Press, 1961), 54. 
17 See Muǧāhid, Tafsīr Muǧāhid b. Ǧabr, ed. Abū an-Nīl (Kairo, 1989), 265. 
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based only on the following hadith: “The woman was created from a rib 
and you cannot straighten her. If you would like any benefit from her, you 
will have to do it despite her bend. If you try to straighten her you’ll break 
her, and to break her means to expel her”18.
Traditional exegesis assumes this hadith to be authentic while 
particularly within feminist exegesis, not accepting this hadith is well 
established. A third possibility in my opinion would be to ignore the 
question of the authenticity of the hadith and to interpret it metaphorically, 
knowing that the prophet used metaphorical language very close to that 
used by the Arabs at the time. In this case, we could suggest knowledge 
of the biblical creation story upon which the prophet based his comments. 
He clarified to his congregation that men should treat their women with 
care and not twist them around because this would harm them.
A further argument against the idea of Eve being created from a rib 
of the sleeping Adam can be found in the Qur’an, where God shows them 
the Garden of Paradise just after their creation. The assertion that Eve 
was created because Adam felt lonely in paradise contradicts the Qur’anic 
statement. Furthermore, regarding the idea that Eve is to blame for the 
fall of humanity, the Qur’an at no time mentions that Eve alone is guilty 
of the sinful action. According to the chronology, it is rather Adam who is 
blamed first and then later both of them.
The idea of original sin must also be also clearly rejected from a Qur’anic 
perspective, based mainly on two arguments: (1) the verse “I am deploying 
a vicegerent on Earth” from the second Sura points out that the human 
being was already appointed for the earth at the time of the creation, so 
that sending them down onto earth cannot be seen as a punishment but as 
part of the divine plan. The idea of gender equality also appears here when 
the Qur’an states that the destiny of the human per se is as a responsible 
vicegerent. This is stated in the latest revealed sura at a point where the 
dynamic of the story focuses on both genders. It emphasizes that the destiny 
of the human being, the task of being a responsible vicegerent, applies 
equally to men and women. (2) The second argument for rejecting the idea 
of original sin is the fact, mentioned many times in the Qur’an, that Adam 
and Eve were forgiven before they were sent down to earth; there can 
thus be no talk of God’s punishment. The doctrine of original sin and its 
interpretations, even those of a misogynous nature, therefore are obsolete.
We can thus conclude that God’s creation was an undifferentiated 
humankind and not man and woman; both arose in the same way, out of 
the same substance and at the same time. They share the same origins and 
18 Hūd b. Muḥakkam al-Hawwārī, Tafsīr Hūd b. Muḥakkam al-Hawwārī, ed. Al-Ḥaǧǧ 
b. Saʿīd aš-Šarīfī, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1990), 345f.
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are thus equal partners in the creation. The fact that the Qur’an mentions 
several times that everything was created in pairs supports this thesis. Two 
separate individuals form an entity. These couples are essentially equal, 
no explicit characteristics are associated with them and their function is 
to be found alike at the physical, social and moral levels. Feminist exegetes 
point out that the Qur’an explicitly determines the equality of both partners 
regarding moral virtues and rightly guided actions (Q 33:35 as an example). 
Both partners are encouraged to protect each other in their relationship 
(Q 9:71). And when the Qur’an characterizes men and women as mutual 
moral leaders, it strengthens the equality of their moral potential. Many 
Qur’anic passages refer to the fact that on the Day of Judgment, both men 
and women are entitled to receive the same reward and each person stands 
individually before God.
Based on the story of the creation of human beings, their moral abilities, 
their fear and their reward in the hereafter, contemporary exegetes have 
created solid ground for their thesis that the universal position of the 
Qur’an is the equality of men and women. Every interpretation of the Qur’an 
must meet this universal requirement, this Qur’anic principle, i.e., every 
interpretation related to women must be coherent with this principle and 
all interpretations that do not comply with it are invalid. I should also note 
that women exegetes partly underline the biological differences between 
men and women, even if the Qur’an makes only marginal mention of this. 
For example, on the topic of pregnancy, Amina Wadud argues that men are 
obliged to protect and support their wives wherever necessary, meaning 
that they are responsible for them.
Let us finally come back to the creation story. One element in traditional 
literature echoed by the Qur’an in another passage is the statement that 
Eve was created to be a place of peace for Adam. The defense of this 
harmony and of mutuality in marital relationships is another substantial 
principle of the Qur’an according to the intertextual method. The verses 
about the relationship between men and women should be read in light 
of this universal content. On this topic, feminist exegetes quote Q 30:21:
And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves spouses (as He first 
made a single creature and from it a creature similar to him) that you may find 
tranquility in them; and He placed between you amity (mawadda) and mercy (rahma).
The idea that devout men and women should act as friends and protect each 
other, that they should be equally responsible for their moral activities in 
the world, that human beings should live in peace and tranquility with 
their spouses and that marriages lead to divine love and mercy, together 
reflect the ideal of sexual relationships.
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Holy Scriptures and the Challenge 
of Animal Ethics: Fundamental 
Guidelines of Animal Ethics in Islam1
Asmaa El Maaroufi-Ulzheimer
Introduction
Then do they not reflect upon the Qur’an,  
or are there locks upon [their] hearts?
(Qur’an 47:24)
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been numerous 
disputes over human beings’ ethical and moral responsibility towards animals. 
Through factory farming, animal experiments, genetic engineering etc. 
human beings inflict suffering on animals. This has given rise to numerous 
(bio-) ethical questions and the necessity to discuss possible approaches to 
solving the question of what constitutes a morally acceptable treatment of 
animals. Since over eighty percent of the world’s population identify with 
a religious group, a closer look at religion is warranted.2 Religions are 
1 A revised German version of this article will be printed in Asmaa El Maaroufi, 
“Und sie sind Gemeinschaften gleich euch! Eine Einführung zum Tier im Qur’an,” 
in Rainer Hagencord et al. (eds), Jahrbuch Theologische Zoologi, vol. 2 (Wirbel der 
Schöpfung) (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2017), 39–50.
2 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Werte, Religion und 
Entwicklung. Die Potenziale von Religion erkennen und einbeziehen, at https://www.
giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/Final_Factsheet_SV_Werte_Religion_Entwicklung.
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seen as providing impulses for environmental and animal protection, and 
sustainable and environmentally conscious action. Religions are called 
upon to take a new look at their scriptures and to reinterpret text, tradition 
and context. Although the scriptures themselves do not contain concrete 
examples of environmental or animal protection, we can still discover in 
them basic ideas that provide orientation in this field. It is necessary to 
distance ourselves from a radically anthropocentric reading of scriptures 
and to relate the basic ideas in scripture to current challenges.
Many of the verses in the Qur’an apply to creation as a whole, to nature 
and especially to animals. Animals are mentioned in over 200 passages 
and throughout Islamic intellectual history these verses have been used by 
the addressees of the Qur’an, human beings, either for or against animals. 
From revering animals as god-fearing fellow creatures to their limitless 
exploitation—everything can be legitimated by the Qur’anic verses. The 
relationship to the animal within Islamic intellectual history is ambivalent. 
What do we actually learn from the Muslims’ primary theological source, 
the Qur’an? What are the basic assumptions made? And what does this 
tell us about the relationship between God and animals? The following is 
an introduction to these questions, showing which aspects of the Qur’an 
must be considered for a transformative reading of the Qur’an in order to 
contribute to current questions in animal ethics. This article does not claim 
to provide a complete picture. It sheds some insight into how animals are 
dealt with in the Qur’an and the relationship between God and animals.3 
In addition to the Qur’an I shall refer to the Sunnah or Aḥādīṯ.4
pdf. Of interest is also the following quotation: “What people do about their ecology 
depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. 
Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny—that 
is, by religion.” Jr. Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” in 
David Spring and Eileen Spring (eds), Ecology and Religion in History (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1974), 18.
3 Within this work some aspects are not mentioned but they should also be subject 
to a critical investigation, e.g., animals as allies of God (God sends birds to support 
an army [Qur’an, 105:1-5]; in the context of the history of Moses people are plagued 
with various animals [Qur’an, 7:133]. Interesting are also the metaphors in the 
Qur’an and the transformation of humans into animals (as a punishment of God, 
Qur’an, 2:65, 5:60). See Sarra Tlili, Animals in the Qur’an (New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2012), 123 ff. 
4 The Sunnah (tradition) denotes the prophetic tradition and represents together 
with the Qur’an the second source of Islamic jurisprudence, and thus has a nor-
mative character. Considered as Sunnah are all sayings, silent permissions or 
disapprovals, actions, as well as biographical information of the Prophet Muham-
mad. The transmission or rather written tradition of the Sunnah are the Aḥādīṯ 
(narrations, reports, songs, Ḥadīṯ). 
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Animals in the Qur’an
According to Islam, God’s revelation was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad 
(through the angel Gabriel), and recorded in written form in the Qur’an. 
This book is the supreme legal source of Islam and considered a guideline 
for Muslims.5
Six of the 114 chapters (Surah) of the Qur’an are named after a certain 
species or group of animals. For example, Surah 2 (The Cow), Surah 6 (Cattle), 
Surah 16 (The Bee), Surah 27 (The Ant) and others. It should be noted that 
the actual term “animal” cannot be found in the Qur’an. Even though in 
written and colloquial Arabic there is a term for animal (ḥayawān)6 it does 
not appear in the Qur’an.7 Therefore, there is no general concept that 
refers to the counterpart of humanity.8 Instead, certain animal groups 
5 We use the term “animal” in relation to non-human animals.
6 The word ḥayawān (originated from the root ḥ-y-y and has the basic meaning of 
life or living) is often found in various encyclopedias of the Middle Ages (e.g., Kitāb 
al ḥayawān [Book of the animals] of al-Jāḥiẓ [d. 869] in which the term refers to 
both human and non-human animals. Therefore, for the delineation of man from 
the non-human animal, he was named al-ḥayawān al nāṭiḳ (the speaking animal/
the articulating animal). See Boratav Pellat et al., “Ḥayawān,” in P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel (eds), Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition, 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0279 .
7 The word ḥayawān is not used in the Qur’an at any point to refer to the animal. 
The word can be found once but it refers to the afterlife. “And this worldly life is 
not but diversion and amusement. And indeed, the home of the Hereafter—that 
is the [eternal] life [al- ḥayawān], if only they knew.” [29:64]. See Arne Ambros, 
“Gestaltung und Funktionen der Biosphäre im Koran,” in Zeitschrift der Deutschen 
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft vol. 140 (1990), 290—325, 294.
8 In fact, there are discussions on the extent to which the term dābba, which can be 
found eighteen times in the Qur’an, cannot be used as an equivalent to the non-human 
animal. Accordingly, we find in many translations that this word is translated with 
animal (excluding the human being). The special feature is that all those who represent 
this opinion would translate the term dābba differently in different contexts within the 
Qur’an (creatures, non-human animals, living beings, etc.). Even the classical Qur’an 
exegetes al-Qurṭubī and al-Suyūṭī interpret the term dābba in some verses as universal 
(relating to the human and the animal) and in other verses only as a word referring 
to the non-human being. The problem with using the term dābba as an equivalent to 
the (non-human) animal is found in Sarra Tlili, “The Meaning of the Qur’anic Word 
‘dābba’: ‘Animals’ or ‘Nonhuman Animals’?,” in The Journal of Qur’anic Studies, vol. 12 
(2010), 167–87. The Meaning of the Qur’anic Word “dābba,” Musa Furber, Rights and 
Duties Pertaining to Kept Animals: A Case Study in Islamic Law and Ethics (Abu Dhabi: 
Tabah Paper Series), 4. Opposing opinions can be found in Richard Foltz, Animals in 
Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), 11. For 
him the term ḥayawān specifically refers to non-human animals. 
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are repeatedly mentioned in the Qur’an; e.g., terrestrial animals (dābba), 
fish (samak), birds (ṭuyūr).9 Individual animals are mentioned—both large 
animals (elephant) and tiny animals (ant, mosquito). These animals can be 
found in various contexts, e.g., in didactic plays, parables and admonitions.
In the following, we will look at the descriptions of animals in the Qur’an 
which, as far as possible, are related to all animals. It is also important 
to take into account the verses that provide information about a possible 
relationship between God and the animal. We learn how God treats all 
creatures, including animals, and enables us to determine the location of 
the animal within the cosmos.
About the characteristics of animals
In the Qur’an, animals appear as God praising creatures10 and therefore 
in direct contact with God.
The seven heavens and the earth and whatever is in them exalt Him. And there is 
not a thing except that it exalts [Allah] by His praise, but you do not understand 
their [way of] exalting. […] [17:44]11
Theologians and scholars of Islam, such as Al-Ḥafiz Basheer Ahmad Masri 
(1914–1993), have concluded that animals have a consciousness and a spirit 
(different from that of human beings) based on the abovementioned verse, 
which states that animals praise God, are able to worship God and have their 
own way of praising God, which human beings cannot understand. In his 
book, Animal Welfare in Islam, Al-Ḥafiz Masri, one of the most prominent 
twentieth-century authors who discusses the question of the animal in 
Islam, points out that “all living creatures possess a non-physical force of 
spirit and mind which, in its advanced form, we call ‘psyche’ [...], although 
animals psychic force is of a lower level than that of human beings [...].”12 
According to the Qur’an, animals have a certain knowledge about God:
9 More on the importance of the animal in the individual Surahs can be found in 
Basheer Al-Hafiz Masri, “Stellung des Tieres im Islam zu Lebzeiten des Propheten 
bis zum Kalifat (610–1492 n.Chr.) anhand religiöser Quellen,” in Tierärztliche 
Umschau, vol. 65 (2008), 449–56.
10 See Qur’an, 17:44, 24:41, etc.
11 The English Sahih International Qur’an translation is quoted unless otherwise 
indicated. 
12 See Basheer Al-Hafiz Masri, Animal Welfare in Islam (Leicester: The Islamic 
Foundation, 2007), 19.
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Do you not see that Allah is exalted [yusabbiḥu] by whomever is within the heavens 
and the earth and [by] the birds with wings spread [in flight]? Each [of them] has 
known [ʿalima] his [means of] prayer and exalting [Him] […] [24:25]
The use of the word ʿalima, which implies possessing knowledge, is 
remarkable.13 Its use in relation to animals shows that the animal possesses 
a kind of knowledge which, according to Masri, proves that animals have 
more than just instinct. In this context the following verse is cited:
And your Lord inspired [awḥā]14 to the bee, “Take for yourself among the mountains, 
houses, and among the trees and [in] that which they construct. [16:68]
The word awḥā used here is translated as “inspired to.” Interestingly, this 
word has been used in the Qur’an in the context of God’s (self-) revelation 
to the prophets.15 According to Masri, only assumptions can be made as 
to which (non-verbal) form of communication God uses with animals.16
Nevertheless, “It proves the basic fact that animals have a sufficient 
degree of psychic endowment to understand and follow God’s messages—a 
faculty which is higher than instinct and intuition.”17
In addition to this aspect, another verse states
And there is no creature on [or within] the earth or bird that flies with its wings 
except [that they are] communities [Arabic: umam] like you. […] [6:38]
As already mentioned, animals are considered as living in communities. 
More importantly, animals do not only have communities but also their 
own languages as it is mentioned that the Prophet Solomon learned “the 
language of the birds.”18 Solomon communicates with a hoopoe and an 
ant.19 It is particularly interesting to point out that animals do not adopt 
13 Derivation of the word ʿilm (to have knowledge, to be informed, transl. Hans 
Wehr, Arabic dictionary). 
14 Derivation of the word waḥy (inspiration [spiritual], revelation [theol.] transl. 
Hans Wehr, Arabic dictionary).
15 In this context, it would be interesting to examine and evaluate the different 
interpretations or exegetical approaches to this verse.
16 See Masri, op. cit. (note 12), 21.
17 Ibid.
18 Qur’an, 27:16. Precisely, the Qur’an merely mentions that Solomon learned the 
language of the birds. However, it is also mentioned in a following verse (27:18-19) that 
he understood the language of the ants. More about this and the concept of language 
(manṭiq) is discussed extensively by Sarra Tlili. See also Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 176 ff.
19 Qur’an, 27:18–19.
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the language of human beings, as is usually the case in narrations. Rather, 
God emphasizes that he had taught Solomon the language of the birds. Here 
we see human beings turning toward the animal.
We can summarize all of this by saying that in the Qur’an animals are 
understood as God worshipping creatures, living in communities. They 
communicate directly with God, without requiring any intermediary.
We must now turn to the verses in which animals are mentioned in 
the context of their fellow-creatures. Since the addressee of the Qur’an is 
the human being, the animal is particularly mentioned in the context of 
humanity. Many verses mention animals as being for the benefit for humanity.
About the benefits of animals for human beings
According to the Qur’an it is possible to differentiate between the material, 
spiritual and aesthetic benefits20 that human beings can gain from animals. 
The material benefit is mentioned in two verses of Surah 16. However, it 
should be noted that the following is not about the benefit of animals in 
general, but rather about a specific animal group, anʾām (cattle or livestock).21
And the grazing livestock He has created for you; in them is warmth and [numer-
ous] benefits, and from them you eat. And for you in them is [the enjoyment of] 
beauty when you bring them in [for the evening] and when you send them out [to 
pasture]. And they carry your loads to a land you could not have reached except 
with difficulty to yourselves. Indeed, your Lord is Kind and Merciful [16:5-7].
Therefore, this verse commands the use of animals, especially cattle, as 
a source of food,22 pack animals for riding, and animals as a source for 
clothing.23 The aesthetic benefit is also mentioned here “And for you in 
20 We already find this subdivision by Sarra Tlili. See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 79.
21 In the following, it should be noted that the Qur’anic verses used in this context 
do not refer precisely to all animals. Rather the Qur’an mentions the benefit of 
certain animal groups.
22 Here the flesh of anʾām or bahīmat al-anʾām is meant. However, the wild [ṣayd 
al-barr] and the fish [ṣayd al-baḥr] are also allowed elsewhere.
23 However, it should be noted that there are guidelines for all those “functions.” 
There is, for example, a ban on Muslims on pilgrimage to hunt animals in the 
countryside. Moreover, the Qur’an allows humans to use the wool of animals; but 
in the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad several prohibitions for the use of the 
skins of wild animals etc. can be found. See Abul Fadl Mohsin, Ebrahim, Organ 
Transplantation, Euthanasia, Cloning and Animal Experimentation. An Islamic View 
(Lane: Islamic Foundation 2001), 13.
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them is [the enjoyment of] beauty when you bring them in [for the evening] 
and when you sent them out [to pasture].” This verse is also discussed by 
Qur’an exegetes who discern the concept of beauty and the associated joy 
while viewing the animal as a feeling that enriches the soul.24 Here the 
call of the Qur’an is to find in God’s creation the proof of the truthfulness 
of God’s words. For it is the beauty of animals that reminds the created, 
i.e., the human being, of the creator and makes them part of the beauty 
of creation.25 In this consciousness, humanity can come closer to another 
benefit of the animal, namely that by its mere existence the animal 
reminds us of the creator and can thus increase an individual’s religiosity 
or spirituality. Here God’s demand in the Qur’an to understand creation, 
and especially also animals, as a sign (āyāt) and a miracle of God and to 
ponder over this miracle is fulfilled.26 Here, animals together with the rest 
of nature function as God’s signature. According to this, animals also are 
of spiritual not only practical benefit for humanity.
But what do these “uses” of the animal by the human being say about the 
animal itself? This question is briefly examined in the following to determine 
the extent to which animals fulfill their purpose on earth only by being of 
use to humanity. This step is also necessary in order to locate the animal 
within the cosmos: by means of the location of humanity—and a possible 
boundary—it becomes clear how animals are to be placed within creation.
About the mission of humanity on earth
The Qur’an assigns to humankind a special role within creation:27
And We have certainly honored (Arabic: karrama)28 the children of Adam and carried 
them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred 
them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference. [17:70]
Human beings were thus distinguished by God in a special way. This 
distinction (takʿīm) is made more concrete in a later passage when it is 
24 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 88 ff.
25 Ibid., 89.
26 See also: Qur’an, 45:45, 14:45, etc.
27 It should be kept in mind that the commission of humanity refers only to our 
planet, the earth (cf. reference to the term vicegerent in connection with the 
statement “vicegerent on earth.” See Qur’an, 2:30, 24:55, 38:26).
28 The usual translation (also according to H. Wehr) for the word karrama here is 
“excellent” or “honored.” 
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said that God appointed the human being as ḫalīfa (vicegerent) on earth.29 
In order to determine how to understand the distinction between human 
beings and animals, we have to examine two basic concepts of the Qur’an: 
the controversial term tasḫīr (often translated as serviceable) and taḏlīl (often 
translated as subjugation).30 These concepts show how extensive humanity’s 
power is over the rest of creation. Let us first consider the concept of tasḫīr:
Do you not see that Allah has made subject to you [Arabic: saḫḫara lakum] whatever 
is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth and amply bestowed upon you His 
favors [Arabic: niʿam], [both] apparent and unapparent? […] [31:20]31
At this point we are talking about everything on earth that has been put at 
the service of humanity. Within the context of discussing the submissiveness 
of all things on earth, we also encounter the already mentioned term taḏlīl 
(subjugation). This is not infrequently mentioned in literature in connection 
with the idea of the authority of humanity and the servitude of animals 
since this is more frequently thought of as subjection or submission.
Do they not see that We have created for them from [ḫalaqna lahum] what Our 
hands have made, grazing livestock [al-anʿām], and [then] they are their owners 
[mālikūn]? And We have tamed them for them [or subdued; ḏallalnāhā lahum], so 
some of them they ride, and some of them they eat. And for them therein are [other] 
benefits and drinks, so will they not be grateful? [36:71–73]
These verses are often used to legitimize the absolute supremacy of human 
beings over the animal world. From this perspective, humanity as a distinct 
creation should be able to subjugate animals and deal with them according 
to their own interests, without taking into account the interests of other 
creatures. This is justified by the fact that it is said that God has created for 
them [ḫalaqna lahum], i.e., for human beings, cattle that the human being 
owns [mālikūn] and gains many benefits from.
29 “It is He who has made you successors [ḫalīfa] upon the earth.” [35:39]. M.A. Rassoul 
says vicegerent instead of successor. On the problem of the term ḫalīfa as well as a 
discussion of the position of man within creation, see Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 222 ff.
30 Because of the overlaps in the meaning it is difficult to translate these terms clearly. But 
it can be said that the term taḏlīl is the one, which “[...] comes closest to the biblical idea of 
dominion in the Qur’an [...], because this term combined “[…] both elements of authority and 
servitude more discernible than they are in the idea of tasḫīr.“ (Tlili, op. cit. [note 3], 74 ff.).
31 This verse is not infrequently used to suggest the absolute supremacy of humanity 
over the environment and thus against animals; what is more, with reference to the term 
saḫḫara (make subject to, the verb of the noun tasḫīr.) it is often interpreted as meaning that 
humanity on earth possesses everything at their disposal and consequently also rules. 
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However, if we discuss the two concepts in a more differentiated way, we 
realize that these concepts cannot be interpreted simplistically. An analysis 
of the terms is also found in the works of Sarra Tlili. She evaluates the 
abovementioned verses, taking into account other, similar verses in her work, 
and examines the interpretation of four classical Qur’an exegetes.32 Regarding 
verse 36:71–73 mentioned above she remarks that we must consider three things: 
first, we have to discuss the term al-anʿām, which is here translated as cattle. 
Since the verses in this constellation refer only to anʿām (cattle), this should not 
be transferred to all animals as it has been described by the aforementioned 
exegetes.33 In other words, even if the abovementioned verse is interpreted in 
such a way as to affirm an “annexation” of the anʿām, this is nevertheless only 
related to a particular animal group and therefore only valid for it.
If we look at the concept of taḏlīl and its interpretation in more detail, 
we must consider that this concept was not understood as the absolute 
authority of humanity over this group of animals, but much more as God’s 
grace that made it possible for human beings to subdue a camel, which 
is physically superior. Because of these aspects, the concept of taḏlīl was 
frequently supplemented by the statement that one should meet the interests 
of the animal groups, since God demands that we show gratitude. It is 
precisely this gratitude which becomes clear when human beings do not 
cause any evil on earth and accordingly do not inflict harm on animals.34
According to Tlili, based on these aspects we cannot conclude that humanity 
is legitimized to understand itself as the ruler over the rest of creation, 
since God is always the ruler in the last instance. Therefore, at no time does 
humanity have an authority over the environment and thus the animal. The 
abovementioned verse also clarifies this statement. For the Qur’an uses the verb 
saḫḫara (make subject) also with regard to other things, such as solar systems, 
32 Aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 923), ar-Rāzī (d. 1209), al-Qurṭubī (d. 1273) and Ibn Kaṯīr (d. 1373). 
33 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3). 76 f; Abū ʿ Abdallāh al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʿān 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2000), 15:38.
34 It is interesting to note that this aspect or the notion of not being allowed deliberately 
to harm animals was included in some state regulations. For example, the second caliph 
ʿUmar (d. 644) issued a law to regulate how much weight a load-bearing animal could 
bear. Non-compliance with this law led to punishment, which is actually transmitted to 
us in a case. (Tlili, op. cit. [note 3], 86. Quoted from al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ  li-aḥkām al-Qurʿān 
10:49). From this Tlili derives that “[…] in addition to being morally wrong; mistreating 
animals of burden in violation of Islamic law is an act punishable in this world as well, and 
not only in the next” (Tlili, ibid., 86). The fact that the disregard of animals not only has 
consequences for the human being in the afterlife but can also be punished in this life leads 
to the addition of animals within a moral community as beings able to cope with suffering. 
In this community they are regarded as moral objects (moral agents) and therefore have 
to be given moral consideration as well as rights by the moral subject, the human being.
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seas, clouds, etc. This raises the question of how this term is to be understood 
in this context. Can humanity also have the sun and the moon at its disposal?35 
It should also be borne in mind that the concept of tasḫīr is not a concept solely 
applied to humanity. In the Qur’an, certain elements are subjected to animals 
(for example the heaven to the birds [Qur’an, 16:79]). This sheds doubt onto 
the extent to which hierarchical structures can be derived from this concept. 
In addition, it may be surprising why the concept of tasḫīr is interpreted so 
extremely positively and, in particular, as supremacy, while it is actually much 
less than that. If we consider the contexts in which the term tasḫīr appears, we 
find that this term is often followed by the phrase “that you might be grateful” 
(laʿallakum taškurūn). This is what the Qur’an says in one place:
That you may settle yourselves upon their back and then remember the favor of your 
Lord when you have settled upon them and say. “Exalted is He who has subjected 
this to us, and we could not have [otherwise] subdued it. [43:13]
We can therefore state that human boundaries and weakness are clearly located 
within the cosmos. This also shows human beings’ dependence on the rest of 
creation, without which the human being “would not be able” to do certain things.36
We find similar interpretations of these Qur’anic verses by classical 
Qur’an exegetes such as Abū ʿ Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī 
(d. 1272), Faḫr al-Dīn al-Razī (d. 1209) and Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr (d. 
1373). They not only associate the concept of tasḫīr with a form of weakness 
of humanity since it often underlines the dependence on fellow creatures. 
Rather, they emphasize the statement that the fact that God has made 
something subject to human beings (among others) is no proof that they 
can fully instrumentalize creation or animals and merely use them for their 
own benefit.37 It is God who has absolute authority over God’s own creation. 
According to this, human beings cannot understand themselves as being 
intermediaries between God and animals. Rather, they must join the rest of 
creation as a special creation.38 Consequently, it would be oversimplified to 
say that God created everything solely for the benefit of the human being. 
Rather, God has made available to every creature what it needs.39
35 “And He has subjected for you the night and day and the sun and mood, and the 
stars are subjected by His command (amr). Indeed, in that are signs for a people 
who reason.” [16:12]. See 14:32-33, 45:12-13, etc.
36 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 99.
37 See ibid., 79 ff.
38 See Ibid., 92.
39 “And there is no creature on earth but that upon Allah is its provision, and He 
knows its place of dwelling and place of storage. […]” [11:6]. See Qur’an, 29:60.
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In addition, as we approach the Qur’an we must bear in mind that the 
addressee is the human being and as such God highlights God’s graces 
towards this addressee. Therefore, due to their physical capacity, what 
distinguishes human beings is their task as ḫalīf on earth, which should 
be characterized by responsibility towards fellow creatures. However, we 
should never understand this distinction as freedom of action or as having 
absolute authority over the rest of creation.40
“And cause not corruption upon the 
earth after its reformation”41
Both human beings and animals are the result of God’s creative act and 
this act implies God’s decision for humanity and for animals. This fact 
alone should be enough to give animals an intrinsic value that should 
not be denied. This is underlined by the fact that God communicates with 
the animal and allows it to communicate. There is a divine immediacy, a 
“you” is created in the light of God and the animal. A “you” that seems to 
be able to serve the genuine purpose of being on earth in the Qur’anic 
sense—constantly to serve God. There are no grounds in scripture that 
allow human beings to harm their fellow creatures. The fact that we share 
a common origin, God, should be sufficient to make efforts on behalf of 
animals. Moreover, we must not forget that wounding an animal prevents 
a God praising animal from glorifying God.42
A reductionist anthropology can still be observed that radically focuses 
on the human being and thus leaves no space for fellow creatures. This is also 
40 Ebrahim, op. cit. (note 23), 12.
41 Qur’an, 7:56.
42 Because of this aspect, among the Sufis certain individuals and groups follow a 
vegetarian diet, although the Qur’an allows the consumption of certain animals. 
Some of them are mentioned in Richard C. Foltz, “Is Vegetarianism Un-Islamic?,” in 
Studies in Contemporary Islam 3/1 (2001), 39—54. More about vegetarianism can again 
be found in Foltz, op. cit. (note 8), 105 ff. Also interesting is the following narrative 
of the well-known Muslim mystic Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya al-Qaysiyya (d. 801): “Rabiʿa 
ventured into the mountains for a day and was ‘soon surrounded by a flock of deer 
and mountain goats, ibexes, and wild asses.’ When Hasan of Basra approached, the 
anymals fled, causing him to feel dismayed. He asked Rabiʿa ‘Why did they run away 
from me and associate so tamely with you?’ Rabiʿa minces neither flesh nor words, 
asking him: ‘What have you eaten today?’ Rabiʿa knows that he has been feeding 
on bits of anymal bodies, and asks a second direct question: ‘Why then should they 
not flee from you?’” Farīd ad-Dīn Aṭṭār, Muslim Saints and Mystics: Episodes from the 
Tadhkirat al-Auliya, transl. A. J. Arberry (New York: Penguin Books 1990), 44–45.
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noticeable in the interpretation of the Qur’an over the last centuries, where 
animals are not paid attention in interactions with prophets and therefore 
remain unmentioned. This has led to a focus on the human being to the 
detriment of the animal. But is not this perception of the fellow creatures 
in which human beings are solely driven by their own interests against an 
Islamic conception of the world, which understands itself to be universal?
It is therefore necessary to reread the Qur’an and at the same time look at 
all fellow creatures. Here, too, we have to look for the subtleties of the Qur’an 
with regard to animals. What can we learn from the history of Noah and the 
rescue of all animals? And what does it mean that the Prophet Jonah finds refuge 
from humans in an animal (a fish)43 and is alive in the animal? And further, 
what does the Qur’anic story about the ant, which in Surah 27 warns its own 
people about the carelessness of the Prophet Solomon, tell us?44 These and other 
questions show to what extent our view of our fellow creatures must be more 
sensitive and that we must reposition ourselves within the cosmos in order to 
fulfill the task of a holistic interpretation of the Qur’an: against the neglect of 
the animal within our theology and towards a theology in which every fellow 
creature finds consideration inside the house of creation. It is only when we face 
this task that we can adequately meet the challenge of a transformative reading 
of the Qur’an for the evaluation of various current (animal) ethical questions.
I wish to call you in the mountains 
Amidst the rocks, 
With the birds in the cities, 
With the fish in the depth of the seas, 
With the gazelles in the plains. . ., 
With the doves which sing, 
In the songs of nightingales, 
And through the voices 
Of those who love you and call you, 
I want to call you God.45
(Yunus Emre, thirteenth century)
43 Qur’an, 37:142. According to the Qur’an Jonah (Arabic: Yunus) is devoured by a fish (ḥūt).
44 “Until, when they came upon the valley of the ants, an ant said, “O ants, enter 
your dwellings that you not be crushed by Solomon and his soldiers while they 
perceive not.” See Qur’an, 27:18 f.
45 Najib Ullah, Islamic Literature: An Introductory History with Selections (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1963), 377. (Quoted from Lisa Kemmerer, Animals and 
World Religions [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011], 262). 
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Images of God in Crisis Situations
Naveed Baig
God will give me suffering to give me strength!? It is people that have harmed me 
and God has seen it. He has felt with me. I don’t believe that God wants to harm 
us. Should a child be sexually abused so that the child will be more God-aware? 
I will harm you now so that you can come close to me?! 
(Sarah, a sexually abused Muslim woman)
Introduction
Qur’anic ideals of patience (sabr), thankfulness (shukr), steadfastness in 
tribulation (istiqamah), self-purification (tazkiyyah), reflection (fikr) and 
reliance (tawakkul) are some of the religious concepts that Muslims navigate 
with in times of suffering and pain. What is interesting to observe in a 
secular context, is whether Muslim patients turn to other coping mechanisms 
at such times. Tradition and orthopraxy are two dimensions of religious 
coping mechanisms for Muslim patients during times of crisis. But there 
are also signs that traditional Muslim coping ideals are being expressed in 
a variety of ways during times of suffering and need, quite independently 
of the individual’s personal situation and environment. There is a “talking 
with God” that defines new ways of perceiving God and the images of God.
This paper first provides a general introduction to Islamic spiritual 
care. Then, patients’ coping mechanisms and “talking with God” will be 
addressed and elaborated upon.
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Islamic spiritual care
Every religious tradition has a spiritual dimension interwoven into its 
teachings. In the Islamic tradition, the spiritual dimension cannot be 
separated from the divine injunctions and vice versa. Care is an existential 
need of the living. Linking “spiritual” and “care” means providing a specific 
type of care that “moves” the spirit.
Tariq Ramadan defines Islamic spirituality thus: it is not a half-hour 
routine neither is it achieved through one’s separation from the external 
world, nor is it deprivation of life’s pleasures and enjoyments. Instead it is 
“a perpetually liberating process, a purification and nourishment for the 
soul.” There is no disconnection between spirituality and religion.1
The process of individualization in the West has forced minority religious 
traditions to find way and means to deliver spiritual care in settings 
where earlier, families and society at large took care of that function. This 
institutionalization has resulted in―amongst other things―a renewed and 
systematic understanding of spiritual care.2 
Islamic spiritual care is the Muslim term to describe religiously-based 
spiritual care offered by religious and spiritual leaders to congregations 
and individuals.3 Its essence is founded on the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Even though Islamic spiritual care is an independent discipline, it is 
related to other forms of Islamic care such as Islamic education, preaching, 
ethics and spiritual healing. It has many forms and levels to help Muslim 
patients to broaden their understanding of life and abilities to face the personal, 
relational or public challenges, which include grief and loss, emphatic listening, 
parenting, etc. Islamic spiritual care is more than clerical responsibility. The 
main goal is healing, sustaining, guiding and reconciling.4
Four maxims of Islamic spiritual care can sum up the spiritual 
caregiver’s role with a special focus on the view of the human being and the 
world from a theological perspective. These maxims try to reformulate and 
compress the theological material that is available in the Islamic tradition 
in relation to spiritual care.5
1 Amira Ayad, Healing Body and Soul (Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing 
House, 2008).
2 Naveed Baig, Islamic Spiritual Care (Copenhagen: Master thesis. Faculty of Theology, 
Copenhagen University, 2015).
3 Nazila Isgandarova, “The Evolution of Islamic Spiritual Care and Counselling in 
Ontario in the Context of the College of Registered Psychotherapists and Registered 
Mental Health Therapists of Ontario,” in Psychology & Psychotherapy (2014), vol. 
4, no. 3, 143. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Baig, op. cit. (note 2). 
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Maxims of Islamic spiritual care
Seeing people as the creation of God, “Allah created Adam in His image” 
(ala suratihi). This is recorded by both Bukhari and Muslims in their 
hadith collections. This hadith on God fashioning Adam in Allah’s own 
image is widely debated. To understand this narration, one must first 
recall a fundamental aspect of Islamic belief, namely the transcendence 
of Allah and Allah’s complete dissimilitude from created things. This is 
unwaveringly reported in the Qur’an itself when it states, “There is nothing 
whatsoever like Him” (42:11) and also by the foremost and most notable 
theological texts from the Islamic tradition. One way of understanding the 
word “image” is through attributes such as hearing, seeing, etc., which both 
God and Adam possess. God’s attributes are eternal and absolute whereas 
Adam’s are relative. Allah being the creator gives God superiority, and 
God “creating something” is not to be understood as a biological process 
as we know it. Another hadith attributed to the Prophet is Al-khalq ayal 
Allah, meaning “Creation is from the family of God.” This is also to be 
understood metaphysically since God has no family and is free from human 
characteristics. “... [A]nd breathed into him (Adam) of My soul” (38:72) 
signifies God’s particular attention and care in forming humankind.
The Qur’an addresses not only Muslims and believers but all humankind 
(ya ayuhan naas) on many occasions. It also refers to humankind as the 
progeny of Adam (bani Adam) honored by God (17:70).
Meeting people according to their own understanding
Relating to people at their own level of thought and intelligence is prophetic 
behavior (Bukhari). The Prophet’s counsel to people differed according to 
their mental, social, educational and geographical backgrounds. He spoke 
to the chieftains of Mecca as well as to the Bedouins from the desert. He 
met foes and dear friends according to their stature and mentality. Meeting 
people where they are is not a weakness but a sign of mental and spiritual 
grandeur.
“Merciful presence”: Spreading the 
wings of mercy onto everyone
Allah instructs the Prophet in the Qur’an “…and lower thy wing (in tenderness) 
for the believers” (15:88). The same message is given in another place:
Thus it is due to mercy from Allah that you deal with them gently, and had you 
been rough, hard-hearted, they would certainly have dispersed from around you; 
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pardon them therefore and ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in 
the affair; so when you have decided, then place your trust in Allah; surely Allah 
loves those who trust (3:159).
In the hadith of mercy, it is said:
The merciful are shown mercy by the Merciful. Be merciful to those on Earth, 
and He who is in heaven will be merciful to you. Kinship ties are connecting 
branches from the Merciful. Whoever maintains them will be maintained by God, 
and whoever cuts them will be cut off by God (Tirmidhi).
“God is not merciful to the one who is not merciful to people” (Bukhari 
and Muslim).
Reminding them of their original home
The journey back to God is the final destination, the point of eternity for 
Muslims. There was a blissful time where all were part of the “world of 
souls” in the intimacy of God. The souls in this world long for that.
The Qur’an says: “Indeed, to your Lord is the return” (96:8).
Islamic coping ideals—experiences from Denmark
Islamic coping strategies, methods and skills are deeply embedded in 
Islamic spirituality. They are intertwined with various forms of worship 
and moral-ethical disciplines. The strategies Islam advances for Muslims 
provide remedial potential for coping with unexpected life situations.6
In my professional work as a hospital chaplain from 2005 until the 
present, I found that most patients had some sort of coping strategy or 
another. Coping can be defined as the response of an individual or group 
to unexpected life situations. In a spiritual care setting, these coping 
mechanisms are sometimes reinforced by the patients themselves and 
sometimes recalled by the chaplain when talking to them and their relatives. 
They include:
• Faith (iman)
• Trust and reliance on God (tawakul)
6 Cf. Meguellati Achour, Benaouda Bensaid, Mohd Roslan Bin Mohd Nor, “An Islamic 
Perspective on Coping with Life Stressors,” in Applied Research in Quality of Life 
(2015), vol. 11, no. 3, 663–85. 
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• Patience (sabr)
• Thankfulness (shukr)
• Endurance (istiqamah)
• Purification (tazkiyyah)
• Reflection (fikr)
• Remembrance (dhikr)
• Hope (aml)
The list is not ranked in any order. Some patients use various coping ideals 
whereas others use only a few. One central and frequently returning coping 
ideal is the reliance or tawakul on the will of God. Trust and reliance on 
God gives Muslims a strong coping ideal since Muslims have faith in the 
will of God. The Qur’an encourages Muslims to place their unconditional 
trust in God in all matters and further to take God as the ultimate source 
of guidance and comfort in all of their businesses and decision making. A 
Qur’anic verse illustrates the point, “Say, ‘Never will we be struck except 
by what Allah has decreed for us; He is our protector. And upon Allah let 
the believers rely’” (9:51).
For Muslims, the reliance on God (tawakkul) represents one of the most 
effective ways to steer motivation and enhance behavioral performance. 
It represents an intrinsic part of Muslim life, especially during times 
of stress and hardship. Trusting God’s plan, however, does not imply a 
fatalistic stance where Muslim involvement in self-change is neglected 
or barred altogether.7 Rather, the individual struggle generates a state of 
intimacy with God at the center of which Muslims realize that God’s plans 
are just and wise and that no matter how challenging life’s difficulties 
may be, they should place their trust in God who has the power to change 
conditions for the better.8
The Qur’an also stresses personal responsibility: “Indeed, Allah 
will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in 
themselves….” (13:11).
The will of God and personal struggle endure a parallel movement and 
common fate. The will of God is there all along, but individual responsibility 
is rewarded by its intentions and efforts, ultimately fusing with the will 
and plan of God.
The Qur’an says that Allah’s plan is preeminent, “... but they plan, and 
Allah plans. And Allah is the best of planners” (8:30).
7 Naveed Baig, Marianne Kastrup, Lissi Rasmussen, Tro, omsorg og interkultur’ 
(Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2010).
8 Ibid.
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Talking with God during times of crisis
The Qur’an recounts many incidents of God talk during times of calamity. 
The Qur’anic story of Abraham and the birds is a special one. The Prophet 
Abraham’s experience with the birds is one of the favorite stories in the 
Qur’an. The theme it evokes touches the souls of all who seek a kind of 
reassurance that satisfies our natural instincts for belief and proof. Abraham 
wanted to ascertain how God gives life to the dead. He was a believer, but 
yet wanted a sign to strengthen his heart with certainty and satisfaction.
And when Abraham said, “My Lord, show me how You give life to the dead,” (Allah) 
said, “Have you not believed?” He said, “Yes, but (I ask) only that my heart may 
be satisfied.” (Allah) said, “Take four birds and commit them to yourself. Then 
(after slaughtering them), put on each hill a portion of them; then call them―they 
will come (flying) to you in haste. And know that Allah is Exalted in Might and 
Wise” (2:260).
The Prophet Ayuub (Job) and his bodily sickness are mentioned in the 
Qur’an and God praises him for his patience and endurance.
And Job, when he called to his Lord, “Indeed, adversity has touched me, and you 
are the Most Merciful of the merciful” (21:83).
(So he was told), “Strike (the ground) with your foot; this is a (spring for) a cool 
bath and drink.”
And We granted him his family and a like (number) with them as mercy from 
Us and a reminder for those of understanding.
(We said) “And take in your hand a bunch [of grass] and strike with it and do 
not break your oath.” Indeed, We found him patient, an excellent servant. Indeed, 
he was one repeatedly turning back (to Allah)” (38:41–44).
These verses provide the longest account of Job in the Qur’an. As in the 
Bible, Job provides an example of patience and forbearance. But unlike 
the Bible, the Qur’anic accounts do not comprise a didactic meditation on 
the problem of evil.
Prophetic God talk
The Ta’if episode is a decisive part of the prophetic life narrative. After 
being stoned and ridiculed and his shoes covered with blood in the city 
of Ta’if by opponents who were dissatisfied with the Prophet’s message of 
the new faith, he said the following prayer:
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O Allah! I complain to You of my weakness, my scarcity of resources and the hu-
miliation I have been subjected to by the people. O Most Merciful of those who are 
merciful. O Lord of the weak and my Lord too. To whom have you entrusted me?
To a distant person who receives me with hostility? Or to an enemy to whom 
you have granted authority over my affair? So long as You are not angry with me, 
I do not care. Your favor is of a more expansive relief to me. I seek refuge in the 
light of Your Face by which all darkness is dispelled and every affair of this world 
and the next is set right, lest Your anger or Your displeasure descends upon me. 
I desire Your pleasure and satisfaction until You are pleased. There is no power 
and no might except by You.9
The Prophet’s turning to God without condemning his adversaries is an 
example from the literature that Muslims refer to as exemplifying his 
regard for enemies. This is intensified with the Prophet’s reaction when 
the angel of the mountains met him outside Ta’if following his supplication 
and offered to cause the mountains surrounding the town to crumble over 
and destroy it, to which the Prophet replied, “No, I hope that these people 
will one day come to worship only Allah and Him alone.”10
“Why does God do this? He gives me a baby 
just to take it away after a few hours 
in my arms” (A Turkish mother)
A Turkish mother who had lost her premature baby was angry. Her anger 
was directed towards the divine and she was assailed by many questions 
immediately after the baby’s death. Interestingly, she was not expressing 
contempt or hatred towards God, but was addressing God sincerely. This 
“inner complaint” of the mother can be portrayed as an example of her 
relationship with and not her disconnection from God.
Another patient said:
In the beginning of my sickness, I thought a lot inside of myself, wrestled with 
Allah, complained to Him. Asked “why me?” Then I thought I was the cause of my 
sickness. I had committed an offense. So I sought forgiveness from friends and 
family and called everyone. That gave me a feeling of satisfaction.
I had a direct line to Allah. I didn’t think about anyone else. Read a lot of Istagh-
faar (reciting the repentance formula) (Hasan, a liver patient). 
9 Safiur Rahman Mubarakpuri, Ar-Raheeq al Makhtum (Riyadh: Darussalam 
Publishers, 1996), 137.
10 Ibid., 138. 
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The patient also mentioned that he recited the Qur’an with translation daily and 
prayed and recited the asma al husna (Ninety-nine “beautiful’’ names of God).
A well-known hadith from the Prophet attributed to his companion Abu 
Hurayra enumerates 99 “beautiful names” by which God may be known. 
These “beautiful names” refer to God in multiple ways. One way the names 
have often been classified is as either jalaal (majestic), or jamaal (beautiful).
Another classification calls them tanzih or tashbih, often translated 
as transcendent and immanent. Tanzih names are incomparable and 
unknowable. They establish the greatness of God and the smallness of the 
human being or the reality of the Real and the unreality of the unreal. The 
names situate people in their right relationship with their Lord. They allow 
them to understand that they are servants of God, and that they must act 
like servants. Tashbih names, by contrast, are intimately familiar: these 
include names such as al-Mujeeb, “the Responder to Prayer,” or al-Ghafoor, 
“the Forgiver and Hider of Faults.” To comprehend tashbih is to experience 
God’s nearness, immanence and approachability.11
The asma al husna as indicated by the patient are also used for assistance 
and guidance. The Qur’an instructs:
Say: “Call upon Allah (God), or call upon Rahman (the All-Compassionate): By 
whatever name ye call upon Him, (it is well): For to Him belong the most beauti-
ful names” (17:110).
Rumi and God talk
The famed mystic, poet and theologian Jalaludeen Rumi (d. 1273) is best 
known for his sixty thousand verses of mystical poetry, both didactic and 
lyric. But his disciples also captured some of his metaphysical insights 
that were written down later. He says:
There is an inner world of freedom where thoughts are too subtle to be judges. 
As the saying goes, “We judge by externals, and God will take care of innermost 
thoughts.” God creates those thoughts within you, and you cannot drive them 
away with any amount of effort... there is a world of bodies, another of imaginings, 
another of fantasies and another of suppositions, but God is beyond all worlds, 
neither within nor without them.12
11 Cf. Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, transl. David B. Burrell and 
Nazih Daher (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992). 
12 Quoted according to John Renard, Islamic Theological Themes (California: 
University of California Press, 2014), 289
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Rumi here alludes to God’s omnipotence. God is beyond all conceptions of 
Him but at the same time aware of human “exercise”—hidden and manifest. 
Even the minute thought that comes to mind is the will of God, also known 
by God and therefore God is supreme and all “meaning-making” refers to 
back to God. For example a patient relates:
He has put people in this world, some to do good, others bad. Some choose shaytan. 
I don’t understand the evil people, how they can choose that. I don’t think Allah is 
like that and He has not wished this for me. I have told Him that this should not 
take place ever again! He has to show me that He is God and He can stop humans. 
He can do everything (Sarah).
Sarah pleads with the all-powerful and omnipotent God. She is making 
God personal and counseling Him! She does not see the evil acts coming 
directly from God. So where does evil come from?
The Qur’an states, “What comes to you of good is from Allah, but what 
comes to you of evil, [O man], is from yourself…”(4:79). Central to this 
discussion is whether God allows evil to take place. If God is all-powerful 
and everything is under His dominion (including the evils of the world), 
then Islam does not have a theodicy “problem.” If evil has its own “life” 
and “room of influence,” then the theodicy question is very much at the 
heart of Islamic theological discussions. 
Coping with and in faith
These patient examples tell us that tradition and orthopraxy are present in 
religious coping for these patients. But there are also signs that traditional 
Muslim coping ideals are being expressed in a variety of ways, quite 
independently of the individual’s personal situation and setting during 
times of crisis and need. Chaplaincy work indicates that finding meaning 
and direction during times of crisis is essential for patients and relatives. 
There is a religious language and understanding blended with a worldview 
that tries to replace calamities and difficulties with a meaning structure 
that helps one to submit oneself to God and God’s plan. In simplified terms, 
faith is revitalized and gains intensity during calamities and, for many, is 
already deeply rooted in the cosmos of meaning and understanding.
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Reading Genesis— 
An Invitation to Dialogue
Clare Amos
The thesis of this paper is that the shifting presentation of God in one 
particular biblical book—the Book of Genesis—constitutes an invitation to 
us to ask deep questions about the image of God, about God’s relationship 
with humanity and, in particular, to what extent God’s voice heard in and 
through the biblical text is intended as imperative or dialogical.
Listening to stories from Genesis at 
different times and contexts
Like many adults from church-going families of my generation I think I first 
encountered the Book of Genesis as a child in Sunday School. We learned 
about Noah, Abraham, Jacob and Joseph through the stories that we were 
told from Genesis: subtly edited of course—I do not think that we heard too 
much about awkward interludes such as Abraham seeking to pass off his 
wife as his sister, and the distinctly uncomfortable saga of the relations 
between Abraham and Hagar and Sarah and Ishmael were largely omitted, 
while the behavior of Mrs Potiphar was definitely presented in a censored 
format. We did, interestingly enough, get to hear about Abraham’s near 
sacrifice of his son Isaac, and I have vague memories of wondering and 
fearing as a young child whether my own parents were ever likely to hear 
a similar call and command. Strangely enough, in retrospect, the story of 
the flood and the near extermination of the whole of humanity did not fill 
me with the same terror. Somehow the attraction of the rainbow and the 
animals happily trotting in two by two to the Ark managed to remove the 
sting of the story. It was not until well into my adult years that I began to 
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think about the flood as what has been called an “episode of divine cosmic 
child abuse.”
In summary I think we were encouraged to think of the patriarchs as basically 
being moral exemplars for us, above all because they listened to the voice of God, 
and largely obeyed it. Sometimes they got things wrong, as Jacob did when he 
tricked his brother (an excellent moral illustration to prove the dangers of sibling 
rivalry to children), but then although they were punished, in Jacob’s case with 
twenty years of exile, they eventually learned their lesson and so could still 
be useful tools in the Sunday School curriculum. I suspect that in the case of 
Abraham at least, the New Testament use of his figure, particularly, though not 
exclusively, in the letters of Paul, has colored the Old Testament accounts and 
encouraged him to be viewed through a special kind of rose-colored spectacles.
Fast forward to my early adulthood and to my years living in East Jerusalem. 
There another encounter with the patriarchs made an indelible mark on me. 
I lived and worked in the compound around St George’s Anglican cathedral 
and it was there that one day in I think 1977 I met a friend of mine, Najwa 
Farah, a Palestinian Anglican Christian and the wife of the then Anglican 
priest in Ramallah. In her own right Najwa was a distinguished Palestinian 
poet. On this particular day Najwa was almost hyperventilating with 
shock. She had apparently been having lunch at the hostel attached to the 
“other” Anglican church in Jerusalem, which although it was located in East 
Jerusalem, indeed the Old City, saw its ministry as largely related to Jewish 
people. A Christian American tourist, also at lunch, had asked her about 
herself. When Najwa had responded, “I am a Palestinian Christian living in 
Ramallah,” the woman had retorted, “You can’t be a real Christian because 
if you were a real Christian you would have known that God had given this 
land to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and you would have 
got up and left the country.” One can assume that the woman was alluding 
to Genesis 15:18–21—with perhaps a bit of Genesis 12:1–3; 13:14–17 thrown 
in. It does not really need me to spell out the implied biblical hermeneutic 
that lies behind such a theology: the concept of scripture as being the Word 
of God viewed primarily as a command to human beings to be carried out 
on the historical plane, with perhaps special attention and authority being 
given to biblical texts that present themselves as the actual words of God.
The sheer monstrosity of what was said to Najwa has always affronted 
me, and it has had a significant impact on my work on the Book of Genesis 
over the last twenty years or so.1 I have come to believe that the woman’s 
1 Discussion of this and linked subjects is clearly present in the commentary I wrote 
on Genesis. See Clare Amos, The Book of Genesis (Peterborough: Epworth, 2004). 
I also contributed substantially to the Anglican Communion report on Christian 
Zionism, Land of Promise? (London: Anglican Communion, 2012).
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assertion and the theology and hermeneutics that underlie it can and 
should be challenged, from within the Bible, and specifically from the Book 
of Genesis itself. Although what I am now going to explore has I believe 
wider theological implications, the use and misuse of the Bible, specifically 
Genesis, in relation to the Middle East conflict has been for me a motivat-
ing force for my exploration.
The structure of Genesis
I have always felt grateful that I became an academic biblical scholar around 
the time that the discipline began to focus on larger units of scripture, rather 
than brief isolated texts. I am interested in questions such as the ordering of 
the Bible and the two Testaments as a whole, and the structure of complete 
biblical books. I think for example that viewing that potentially problematic 
text, Genesis 15:18–21, within the corpus of Genesis as a whole is not an 
optional extra, but essential for a proper interpretation of the passage.
So just what is the structure of the Book of Genesis? Even a cursory 
view suggests a dividing point towards the end of chapter 11 between the 
primeval and patriarchal history. However I would want to suggest that 
Genesis—as it currently stands—can be divided into five sections, each 
separated by the recurrent use of what is called the Toledot formula. The 
Toledot formula appears ten times in Genesis—strictly speaking eleven, 
but I think one can legitimately consider its use in 36:9 a strengthening 
repetition of its use earlier in the chapter. So the word Toledot appears 
at 2:4; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1; 11:10; 11:27; 25:12; 25:19; 36:1 (repeated 36:9); 37:2. 
It is variously translated in the English Bible: translations of the word 
include “history,” “genealogy,” “descendants,” “list of descendants,” “story,” 
“generations.” Five times the word Toledot introduces a lengthy section of 
narrative, and five times a genealogy (sometimes accompanied by a short 
narrative). Along with a number of other commentators, particularly, though 
not exclusively, Jewish, I believe that the word deliberately divides Genesis 
into five sections. These are: the story of creation (1:1–6:8); the story of the 
flood and its aftermath (6:9–11:26); the story of Abraham (11:27–25:18); the 
story of Jacob (25:19–36:43); the story of Jacob’s sons (37:1–50:26).
It is worth noting that the first use of the word Toledot appears in chapter 
2 of Genesis rather than chapter 1. I would suggest that one possibility is 
that chapter 1 is perhaps intended to be an introduction to the whole book, 
rather than part of a section in its own right. Another suggestion would be 
that the word is intended to help seam together the two accounts of creation 
that are told in each of the first two chapters. My overall argument does 
not depend on whichever of these possibilities is chosen.
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My fundamental argument is that the image of God shifts and changes—
quite radically—between the five sections of the book. The image of God at 
the end of Genesis is very different from the image at the beginning. I will 
give examples from each section of the book. I will also look briefly at the 
shifts in the name of God in the story: between Elohim, Yhwh, El Shaddai. 
I think these differences are not so much the result of an incompetent 
editor, but are deliberately designed to share with us different aspects of 
the divine human relationship.
The story of creation
Putting Genesis 1 to one side for the moment—what is the image of God we 
are given in the story of creation? An activist and personal deity, who seems 
almost to be physically involved in the creation and care of humanity—it is 
by God’s “breathing” into humanity that human beings come to life (2:7), and 
it is by God’s secondary surgery on the man that the woman also comes into 
being (2:21). God walks in the garden (3:8). God gives direct commands to his 
human creation, “but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall 
not eat” (2:17) … and God gets angry and ensures that there are consequences 
when they are broken, whether in the case of the man and the woman (3:11) 
or in the story of the fratricide of their sons (4:10). God also wants to ensure 
that the barriers between humanity and divinity are not transgressed: note for 
example the intriguing comment in 3:22 regarding God’s concern that, “the 
man has become like one of us,” a strange worry for a deity who has in chapter 
1 explicitly created human beings in the image and likeness of God. There is 
perhaps speech between divinity and humanity, but one could not exactly call 
it conversation, much less dialogue. This section draws to its conclusion with 
a brief reference to the intermarriage of the sons of God and the daughters of 
humans (6:1-4)—seemingly an explicit example of the danger of divine human 
intermingling that has been previously alluded to—and then sets up what is to 
come next through divine self-reflection: “The Lord saw that the wickedness of 
humankind was great in the earth, and that every inclination of the thoughts 
of their hearts was only evil continually. And the Lord was sorry that he had 
made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart” (6:5–6).
The story of the flood and its aftermath
At first sight the second section of Genesis, which I have described as 
being the story of the flood and its aftermath, feels as though it is simply 
circling round and revisiting the first. There are indeed many of the same 
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themes—and like the first it too ends with a tale, in this case the Tower 
of Babel, which seems to allude to the divine worry about human beings 
who seek to become like gods. But in fact God’s relationship with creation 
undergoes a major shift during the course of these five chapters. Traditional 
commentators, particularly from within Judaism, have long noticed the 
ambiguity of the figure of Noah, how throughout the whole saga of the flood 
he is mute, speaking not even one word. There is no attempt to plead with 
God, to save others as well as his own family. Indeed such commentators 
sometimes suggest that the praise given to Noah, namely that he was “a 
righteous man, blameless in his generation” (6:9) is deliberately qualified 
and grudging. Chapters 6–8 of Genesis are a one-sided monologue, in which 
other than the occasional speech of God, the only sound one can hear is 
the incessant drumming of the rain. But within these chapters there is 
in fact also a major shift in the divine-human relationship. It is found in 
8:21, “And when the Lord smelled the pleasing odor, the Lord said in his 
heart, ‘I will never again curse the ground because of humankind, for the 
inclination of the human heart is evil from youth.’”
If we remember that back when God announced the flood there was also 
a double use of the word “heart,” leb, referring both to the heart of God and 
the heart of humankind this becomes very significant. After the flood, though 
the “inclination of the heart” of humanity is still evil, but as God “speaks 
to his own heart” once again, this, God’s own heart, has moved from regret 
to compassion. The flood “has effected an irreversible change in God, who 
now will approach his creation with an unlimited patience and forbearance.”2 
God will continue to grieve over human wickedness, but has pledged to show 
forbearance. And this means that the promise that God offers to Noah and 
all creation is one, which will be of great cost to God and necessitate divine 
suffering. God will allow God’s love to be wounded—again and again. God 
will voluntarily limit God’s power, but in giving humanity this new freedom 
God will open up the possibility of a real relationship with them.
Back in Eden God had been fearful of allowing human beings to “grow 
up” and make decisions for themselves. Their childish disobedience had 
been duly punished—for God had not yet realized that if God wants a real 
relationship with humanity it would inevitably involve confrontation. 
The flood is the moment when that original mode of relating reaches its 
climax—and God learns that it is not enough. In the world begun anew after 
the flood God will try another way that will allow us to reflect back God’s 
love. This is the paradox that I believe is at the heart of Genesis: God has 
to allow human destructiveness to exist and take its course in order for 
there to be such a thing as divine love incarnate.
2 Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Louisville, Kentucky: John Knox Press, 1982), 81.
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An example of human destructiveness comes almost straight away. 
With a very bitter irony the first time that Noah utters a word in the story 
it is to curse his son Ham (9:25). Yet even this shows the shift that the 
relationship between God and humanity has undergone—for now it is a 
human being rather than the deity who is doing the cursing—and, as 
we know, Noah’s words were used for generations to justify the slavery 
of millions of Africans. Yet, quite apart from the question of who is the 
intended target of the curse, could we not suggest that the Book of Genesis 
never intended these words to be authoritative and performative: are they 
rather an intentional indication that human beings such as Noah, like God, 
have still much to learn and that we are not yet at the end of the story that 
the writer is sharing with us?
The story of Abraham
Chiastic literary theory would probably suggest that the story of Abraham 
is the center of the book of Genesis, and certainly lies at the heart of what I, 
remembering the conversation with my Palestinian friend, call “the Najwa 
issue.” In this section the portrayal of the divine human interaction has 
shifted from the omnipresent deity of Genesis 1–11. God does pop up and 
intervene fairly frequently in the story, either directly, or via an angel 
of the Lord, or in a vision, or in a word. But there are several episodes 
where God is not clearly present and where the story focuses on human 
interaction—with human beings struggling, but perhaps also learning, 
something about the necessity of relating to each other constructively.
It has often been suggested that the Abraham saga itself is shaped 
chiastically, with the frame provided by two instances of the Hebrew 
phrase Lek Leka—perhaps most literally translated by the words “Go for 
yourself”; one instance comes at the beginning and the other at the end 
of the story. In the first Lek Leka in 12:1, “Go from your country and your 
kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will show you,” Abraham 
is being asked to sacrifice his past. In the second Lek Leka in 22:2, “Take 
your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, 
and offer him there as a burnt offering …” he is seemingly being asked to 
sacrifice his hoped for future. Within this frame the story moves inward 
from either side, to find its perhaps unlikely or unexpected center in the 
story of Hagar and Ishmael in chapter 16.
Genesis seems to try to subvert the idea that particularity can totally 
replace universality, certainly as far as the ethics of relationships between 
human beings are concerned. I do not think it is an accident that Hagar’s name 
contains the exact Hebrew consonants of the word ha-ger. It is a word that is 
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notoriously difficult to capture the exact meaning of, but has been variously 
translated as the stranger, the sojourner, the migrant, the refugee, the alien; 
and I think that in some sense she stands for the universal other. It is by our 
behavior towards Hagar, ha-ger, that human beings judge themselves. This, I 
believe, is what lies behind the cryptic verse in Genesis 15:13, which comes 
just before Hagar makes her first appearance, “Then the Lord said to Abram, 
‘Know this for certain, that your offspring shall be aliens in a land that is not 
theirs, and shall be slaves there, and they shall be oppressed for four hundred 
years;’ … .” This verse, which appears in the context of the covenant being 
made between God and Abraham, includes two words that will significantly 
reappear in the following chapter, which deals with Abraham’s treatment of 
Hagar. The words are “alien”—ha-ger in Hebrew, and “oppress,” which will 
also appear three times as verb or noun in Genesis 16 portraying Abraham 
and Sarah’s behavior towards Hagar (16:6, 9, 11). The slavery and oppression 
of Abraham’s descendants in Egypt are being directly linked to the abuse of 
their Egyptian slave girl. We can say that justice for Hagar is being written 
into the fabric of the covenant between God and Abraham.
The other passage that the thesis of this paper requires me to comment 
on is for me the highlight of the Abraham story, namely the discussion—or 
should we use a stronger word such as debate?—between God and Abraham 
over the fate of Sodom in Genesis 18. It is, I believe, of fundamental importance 
for a proper interpretation of Genesis. Remember just why God decides to 
confide in Abraham what is about to happen. It is significant that this is the 
last divine self-reflection within Genesis. God muses to Godself “for I have 
chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to 
keep the way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice; so that the Lord 
may bring about for Abraham what he has promised him” (18:19). This is the 
first time that the word mishpat (justice) has appeared in the Bible. So it is 
fascinating that only a few verses later the same root shapat is used—this 
time on the lips of Abraham to throw back to God, questioning God’s own 
apparent lack of justice: “Shall not the Judge (Shophet) of all the earth do 
what is just” (18:25). Abraham here is the absolute antithesis of the mute 
Noah. The strength of Abraham’s challenge is reinforced by the repeated use 
of the phrase “Far be it from you,” which appears twice in verse 25 and is 
underlaid by the Hebrew root hrm, which could more literally be translated 
as “profanation.” This is a word often used in connection with cultic worship, 
where it describes objects or people who are polluted and thus “defile” or 
render invalid a holy place or ritual. In effect, Abraham suggests that if God 
allows the innocent to suffer along with the guilty not only is God not just, 
but God is also not holy, and thus not God! Is Genesis deliberately inviting 
us to consider whether the role of human beings is meekly to accept—or to 
challenge—the interventionist God presented in parts of scripture, when 
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God’s interventions seem to us as unfair? As the text itself illustrates, if 
Abraham’s descendants (including ourselves) have learned what is “right 
and just” then we have the responsibility to use that wisdom.
I would argue that some of the theologies that underpin the passions 
alive today in Israel/Palestine feel like a state of arrested development. I find 
it intriguing how many of the current flashpoints for trouble are linked to 
the story of Abraham. There is Hebron—whose Arabic name el khalil (“the 
friend”) actually recalls Abraham (see e.g., Isaiah 41:8; James 2:23), and is 
where he is traditionally buried. There is Jerusalem, where the foundation 
legend for its temple was linked to the almost-sacrifice of Isaac, Abraham’s 
son. There is the area near Nablus/Shechem where a Jewish settlement has 
been named Alon Moreh after an altar built by Abraham (Gen 12:6). But 
Abraham, fascinating character though he is, is not God’s final word—not even 
in Genesis. Humanity cannot, and is not meant, to sustain the ongoing and 
direct involvement of God in its affairs in the way that Abraham experienced.
The story of Jacob
In the story of Jacob God becomes notably less interventionist. In fact there 
are only two episodes of direct divine involvement within the story of the 
adult Jacob, Jacob’s encounter with God first at Bethel (28:10–17) and then 
at Peniel (32:22–32). The latter’s importance is underwritten by the way it 
becomes the moment when Jacob is renamed Israel (32:28). Interestingly, in 
both of these episodes the numinous element of the encounter of humanity 
with the divine is emphasized. But what is also important is the way that 
the wrestling at Peniel between Jacob and the angel, which includes the 
moment when Jacob cries out “I have seen God face to face, and yet my life 
is preserved” (32:30) leads straight into the meeting between Jacob and Esau 
when Jacob tellingly reflects to his brother, “truly to see your face is like 
seeing the face of God—since you have received me with such favor” (33:10). 
I would suggest that this is a marker delineating an important stage in the 
journey of Genesis. For the text suggests that divine intervention now is made 
not through direct divine action, but through the reconciliation of brothers.
The story of Joseph and his brothers
In the story of Joseph and his brothers God does not clearly intervene 
directly in the action. Is this section of Genesis intended as an example in 
the life of a family of what it might now mean to see God through seeing 
the face of one’s brother? Now, instead of God’s direct action or command, 
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we are given Joseph’s own expert guidance as to the meaning of the events 
in which he and his brothers are caught up. In 45:5–7 immediately after 
revealing himself to them Joseph reassures his brothers, “do not be … angry 
with yourselves, because you sold me here; for God sent me before you to 
preserve life. …God sent me before you.” The second example of Joseph’s 
self-proclaimed theological expertise comes in the final chapter, after Jacob’s 
death as the brothers fear that Joseph may be intending to take a delayed 
vengeance on them and he states, “Do not be afraid! Am I in the place of 
God? Even though you intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good, 
in order to preserve a numerous people” (50:19–20). In the story of Joseph 
God has retreated from front stage, yet, in some ways, has through God’s 
human spokesmen now controlled the narrative more completely than ever.
Robert Cohn puts it like this, in relation to the entire book of Genesis, 
“In stages the divine director retreats from the scene permitting the actors 
to shape their own world. Finally, equilibrium is achieved as Joseph and 
his brothers, acting on their own initiative, unwittingly and ironically 
become the agents of providence.”3
Can this offer an answer to “the Najwa question”—namely that we are not 
intended to take the God whom we meet in texts such as Genesis 15:18–21, 
as God or the Bible’s or at least Genesis’ final word? Yet, as it happens, I 
find myself quite uncomfortable with the story of Joseph and the theology it 
implies, for in some sense Joseph does precisely play God, putting himself 
in God’s place, in quite an oppressive way, both with his family and with 
the entire population of Egypt. It is remarkable that Joseph’s behavior in 
enslaving the Egyptians recounted in 47:21 was regarded by the rabbinic 
tradition as so morally questionable that the Masoretic text seems to have 
been amended at this point.4 But perhaps those who were willing to take 
such a liberty on what appears to have been ethical grounds are teaching 
us an important point, namely that readers of the Holy Scriptures have a 
responsibility to study—and perhaps challenge—the text in light of what 
seems to them as right and just. Indeed, is not that precisely what is implied 
in the conversation between Abraham and God regarding the fate of Sodom?
3 Robert L. Cohn, “Narrative Structure and Canonical Perspective in Genesis,” in 
John W. Rogerson (ed.), The Pentateuch: A Sheffield Reader (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1996), 102.
4 The Masoretic text reads here, “He removed them to the cities.” It is on the basis of 
Samaritan manuscripts of the Hebrew text, as well as the early Greek translations 
that it is assumed that what was originally written was, “He made slaves of them.”
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Reading difficult texts with a 
sensibility towards justice
In his paper,5 Professor Oddbjørn Leirvik draws attention inter alia to some 
contemporary Muslim commentators and their efforts to deal with difficult 
texts in the Qur’an. In particular he mentions the view of Khaled Abou el 
Fadl that “the Qur’anic text assumes that readers will bring a pre-existing 
innate moral sense to the text.” Leirvik also quotes the perhaps even more 
radical Muslim writer Ebrahim Moosa,6 who notes
It may be preferable to hear the Qur’an in its patriarchal voice but to understand 
it with the sensibility of an actor/reader/listener/reciter immersed in the process 
of revelation. It is that listener/reciter who discovers through his or her history, 
experience, and transformed inner sensibility that gender justice, equality, and 
fairness is a norm for our time, and not patriarchy. 7
I would want to suggest that one should read the Book of Genesis in a 
similar way, but I would then add to that the very structure of Genesis, and 
the gradual withdrawal within the book of God from direct action, may 
constitute an overt invitation for readers to immerse themselves in the 
process of revelation. Indeed, in the case of Joseph perhaps we are intended 
not merely to treat him as an exemplar of a human being, immersing himself 
in the process of revelation as he seems to do in 45:5–7 and 50:19–20 but 
also as a figure to challenge our own inner sensibilities.
Different names of God indicating different 
aspects of God’s relationship with humanity
One of the often remarked features of Genesis is the variety of names 
by which the divine is called: most usually Yhwh (Yahweh; the Lord) 
and Elohim (God), but also El Shaddai (God Almighty). It was in fact the 
recognition of these different names that was initially responsible in the 
late eighteenth century for the early source critical work on Genesis and 
the rest of the Pentateuch, which argued that the different names reflected 
5 Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Handling Problematic Texts: Ethical Critique and Moral 
Enrichment,” in this publication, 17ff.
6 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam,” in Omad Safi (ed.), 
Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 
111–27. 
7 Ibid., 125.
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different sources. Yet, ultimately I believe that this linking of the variations 
of divine designation with different sources largely falls down—not least 
because of the dual name of Yhwh Elohim, by which the divine is referred 
to in Genesis 2–3, which makes any easy correlation of names with sources 
inherently problematic.
I would suggest that rather than correlating with sources in a mechanistic 
sort of way, the different names are chosen to reflect different aspects 
of God and in particular God’s relationship with humanity. Perhaps the 
name Yhwh appears when an intimate personal interaction with human 
beings—or particular and chosen human beings—is the focus. The name 
Elohim then is chosen to suggest distance and less personal interaction 
between God and humanity. If this is the case then it becomes interesting 
to notice how rarely, for example, the name Yhwh appears in the latter part 
of the Joseph narrative. For after appearing six times in Genesis 39 in a 
context that suggests direct action and specific proactive care for Joseph, 
the name Yhwh does not reappear in the rest of the Book of Genesis, with 
the exception of chapter 49, where it comes in a rather anomalous way in 
verse 18 as an interjection in the middle of the long Blessing of Jacob. It is 
interesting therefore that Genesis, taken as a whole, both begins (Genesis 
1) and concludes (Genesis 41-50) with the designation of God as Elohim, a 
name that suggests both the transcendence of the divine, but seems also to 
be reticent about the direct intervention of God in the affairs of humanity. 
Is it that God as Yhwh (and perhaps also El Shaddai) has ultimately to be 
subsumed to this more abstract concept of Elohim? And what might this 
say to us about our reading of scripture?
The Bible as dialogue partner
Over a decade ago I wrote the chapter on Genesis for the Global Bible 
Commentary. I still believe that my suggestion there that Genesis is intended 
to be read as dialectic rather than command is not only correct, but also 
vital in the context of our contemporary world and its realities:
Perhaps Genesis needs to come with a health warning. Do not treat it as history; 
do not use it as a prophetic blueprint, or as an unconditional charter for a specific 
modern political arrangement in the Middle East. Above all read this book, which 
explores the development of an “adult” relationship between God and humanity, 
with the reflective heart of an adult. It is in some ways unhelpful that so many of 
Genesis’ stories Noah and his flood, Joseph and his brothers are ones which we 
first came to know and love as children, for in reality Genesis is quite a dangerous 
book to use with young people. We risk going wrong if we try (as is often done 
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in Christian education) to use the patriarchs simplistically as moral exemplars. 
To read Genesis properly requires us to stand at a slight distance from the text, 
and explore it quizzically. It provides questions rather than offers easy answers. 
Throughout its 50 chapters Genesis has teased out the relationship between two 
and one. It is notable that the last mention of God in this book (Gen 50:20) reminds 
us that God uses human beings to work his purposes. It is not good for human 
beings—or even God—to be one and alone, yet being “two” is only life-giving if 
both partners are prepared to engage with each other in a way which risks mutual 
change. But are we ever likely to be brave enough to treat the Bible itself as such 
a dialogue partner, and is it a message which protagonists in the Middle Eastern 
maelstrom will ever be ready to hear?8
8 Clare Amos, “Genesis,” in Daniel Patte (ed.), Global Bible Commentary (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 2004), 15f. 
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Implications of Divine 
Communication in the Christian 
Tradition: The case of 1 Samuel 1–7
Kenneth Mtata
Gerhard Ebeling, a twentieth-century German Lutheran theologian, is said to 
have summarized the history of the church as essentially the history of biblical 
interpretation. One could say, on the basis of Ebeling’s compelling argument 
and in the spirit of interfaith hermeneutics, that the history of the Abrahamic 
religions is one of negotiating the interpretations of divine communication. In 
the Christian context, Ebeling’s conclusion can be understood in two ways: it 
may mean that “many of the significant turning points in ecclesiastical (church) 
history had to do with conflicting interpretations over the meaning of particular 
texts and over the methods of biblical interpretation,” or that “the history of the 
church is essentially the story of how the church interprets scripture ‘bodily,’ 
through the shape of its community life.”1 Such differing interpretations of 
meaning and the tentative interpretive consensuses reached from time to time 
play a key role in the internal vitality of religious communities and help form 
the way religious communities engage with contemporaneous forces—both 
for good or evil. In other words, the interpretation of sacred texts transforms 
readers who in turn transform their relationship with their environment—even 
though this transformation is not unidirectional.
This transformative dimension of the Word of God is presupposed in 
the self-understanding of diverse Christian communities, including my own 
Lutheran tradition. In this tradition, the Holy Scriptures constitute one of 
the main “divine media of salvation,” salvation in a broader sense being the 
1 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to 
Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 418.
158
Transformative Readings of Sacred Scriptures
ultimate form of transformation. The scriptures are also highly regarded 
for their theological epistemological function, that is, they are considered 
the primary “source and norm of human knowledge of God.”2 Even though 
this knowledge about God is not fixed, without a momentarily fixed body of 
knowledge or claims about the divine, communities of faith cannot be formed 
and communities of transformation cannot be established. According to this 
understanding, strong in the Lutheran tradition, the church or believing 
community is a creation “of the Word (ubi verbum, ibi ecclesia).”3
The underlying assumption in this Christian tradition is that God 
speaks and in a language human beings can understand. The consequence 
of this divine communication is transformation or change. For this reason, 
in the Hebrew Bible, which is also the Christian Old Testament, God spoke 
in the beginning and chaos was transformed into order (Genesis 1–2). When 
chaos returned in the form of injustice, immorality or idolatry, God would 
send out God’s messengers, the prophets, who would restore the covenant 
relationship through God’s word. This divine communication was not always 
benevolent as it was, for example, in the Garden of Eden when human 
beings were given the privilege to eat and enjoy one another’s company. In 
the narratives of the flood or of Sodom and Gomorrah, for example, divine 
communication had disastrous consequences.
God is understood in this Christian tradition to speak in two ways. God 
sometimes spoke in kindness and grace and promise but, at other times, in 
judgment and justice. In both ways, the people of God would rather have 
a God who spoke than one who was silent. So the Psalmist cried, “God, 
do not keep silence; do not hold your peace or be still, O God!” (Ps 83:1). 
Divine communication in this and other psalms is tantamount to the active 
intervention of the divine in the ordinary lives of creation.
I think that this is where the problem begins. If God human agency 
to actualize God’s communication, be it through a prophet or through 
interpretation of the written sacred texts, the vision of transformation had 
better be in ways with which we can identify. Transformation or change is 
required by a value judgment of the present situation. The Holy Scriptures 
provide faith communities with such value judgments. As has been pointed 
out by Ebeling, visions of transformation tend to diverge, sometimes 
violently. The problem is that in reading the Holy Scriptures, “hermeneutical 
2 Hans-Peter Grosshans, “Lutheran Hermeneutics: An Outline,” in Kenneth Mtata 
(ed.), “You have the Words of Eternal Life”: Transformative Readings of the Gospel 
of John from a Lutheran Perspective, LWF Documentation 57/2012 (Minneapolis: 
Lutheran University Press, 2012), 23–46, here 25.
3 Vítor Westhelle, Transfiguring Luther: The Planetary Promise of Luther’s Theology 
(Oregon: Cascade Books, 2016), 18.
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communities” may find divine communication that was violent and can use 
such readings to sanction their own destructive transformation agendas.
Transformative reading of the scriptures is therefore, for me, a 
deliberate predetermination of the boundaries of the positive changes in 
individual and communal life that are possible in response to the demands 
or promises of the Holy Scriptures. Such visions of positive transformation 
are not necessarily inventions of Christian communities but can be traced 
throughout the Bible.
For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and do not return there until 
they have watered the earth, making it bring forth and sprout … so shall my word be 
that goes out from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish 
that which I purpose, and succeed in the thing for which I sent it (Isa 55:10–11).
The transformative promise is that “the Lord God will wipe away the tears 
from all faces, and the disgrace of his people he will take away from all the 
earth, for the Lord has spoken” (Isa 25:8). This God will make God’s home 
among human beings and dwell with them; “they will be his peoples, and 
God himself will be with them; he will wipe every tear from their eyes. 
Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for 
the first things have passed away” (Rev 21:3–4).
Structure
In the following I shall pursue the following two objectives. First, by reading 
1 Samuel 1–7 I would like to demonstrate how divine communication and 
presence shaped the national transformation project from decline to total 
well-being. Second, I also shall explore the applicability of such a reading 
to efforts to influence the positive transformation by the way in which we 
interpret and appropriate sacred texts. Since I have chosen a long text for its 
particular narrative cycle, I will not give equal exegetical emphasis to all the 
verses or pericopes but, rather, to those that facilitate our illustration. Before 
doing this, let me locate myself as a reader as well as outlining what I think 
are challenges and opportunities of doing this from an interfaith perspective.
Locating the reader—challenges and prospects
I have already hinted at the fact that the process of interpretation is made 
possible because there are texts as well as readers. Readers are not usually 
aware of themselves while in the process of interpretation. This is not 
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deliberate but because readers bring past accumulated resources and models 
that make it possible for them to “anticipate” what the text is supposed 
to mean when they read it. In hermeneutics, we consider it a strength to 
make an effort critically to observe what we are doing when we read. For 
this reason, it matters that I clarify who I am as a reader of the text. 
As a Zimbabwean, a Christian shaped by my pietistic Swedish missionary 
background and then influenced by Enlightenment Western theological 
scholarship, I approach the texts with a hybrid identity. I bring both 
conscious and unconscious motivations to the reading process. One of my 
strongest interests is to ensure that my reading deliberately contributes 
to the positive transformation of institutions, practices and ideas so that 
they facilitate the fullness of life for all people. The idea that the “fullness 
of life” exists is not only shaped by my reading of the Gospel of John 10:10 
but is also reinforced by ideals that come from different movements and 
visions of the shared “good life.” Such visions are also present in other 
faiths and hence the need to reflect within but also across faiths.
In this self-description, I have already pointed to what I consider to be one 
of the main challenges for interfaith transformative hermeneutics, namely 
the heterogeneity of intra-faith interpretation. There are varied approaches 
among Christians as to the relevance and applicability of the different books 
and words of the Bible to the faith and life of Christians as well as the various 
methods of reading them. Even though they will not always be explicit about it, 
many Christian traditions work with some form of a canon within the canon; 
certain books of the Bible are preferred to others. For example, Luther had 
a fondness for Paul’s letters. Pentecostal Christians will find books like the 
Acts of the Apostles more appealing to them, just at Seventh Day Adventists 
will highly value the books of Daniel and Revelation.
Differences in faith traditions are shaped by a number of influences, 
the strongest among which includes education, culture and socioeconomic 
and political experiences. I, as a theologian from the global South, received 
my formal training in the reading of the Bible from Western educators or 
from Southern scholars trained in the West. Of course, many of us have 
now gone on to do other things with this knowledge, sometimes to the 
embarrassment of our academic progenitors. During our formation, one 
method of reading biblical texts that was considered orthodox was the 
historical approach, which worked with the assumption that the text as we 
have it in its final form has several histories. One can look at its own history 
or look “for the historical setting(s) that generated it,” or use “it to write 
history.”4 The assumption behind this approach is that biblical texts are 
4 Serge Frolov, The Turn of the Cycle: 1 Samuel 1-8 in Synchronic and Diachronic 
Perspectives (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 7.
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enclosed in theological wrappings, in some circles viewed as “corruptions” 
that are a result of the editors’ machinations. It was assumed that the 
editors came from the different religious communities. The responsibility 
of the biblical scholar was therefore to go back to the earliest phase of the 
text to uncover its original uncorrupted core because that was where its 
true meaning lay. (This is a kind of caricature of course.)
Such an approach assumed that the readers ought to cleanse themselves 
of all preconceived reading lenses or pre-understandings that would obscure 
the true meaning of the text. This was the case at least until Bultmann 
helped us to understand that all interpretations are shaped by interest, 
including historical approaches, which are also guided by “a certain putting 
of the questions to history.”5 The assumption was that serious biblical 
scholars, unlike church theologians, were supposed to rid themselves of 
such theological baggage so as to get to the heart of the biblical text in 
order to find the truth. When some of our teachers felt that the processes 
of peeling away these editing layers might be futile, they started to look 
at texts as pieces of literature that could be read in their final form while 
striving to “isolate the literary entities that underlie the received version 
and identify the literary processes that brought in into being.”6
Sometime in the twentieth century, scholars mainly from the South and 
others from the North, preferring to be explicit about their sociopolitical 
and economic interests and how these impinged on the process of reading, 
began to revise the reading practices they had learned and reshape them 
to consider their context as an integral component of the interpretive 
process. These so-called “contextual hermeneutical” approaches sought—to 
various degrees—to take the Bible as a text for faith communities, which 
must be read from this starting point. What this means is that when the 
words of the Bible are read, studied, explained and performed in the ritual 
of worship, the text is viewed as a vehicle through which God speaks to 
God’s people. Since God spoke only in context, the context of the people, 
especially those who were most vulnerable, provides the interpretive key. 
These “poor and marginalized” subjects of the reading experience were 
not to be viewed merely as victims who could identify their plight with 
similar victims in the biblical stories. In the process of reading, they 
were supposed to find the redemptive and transformative voice of God in 
the narratives, because God sided with those who were oppressed. The 
contextual methodological community experienced a serious challenge when 
reading texts that presented God as unjust or where the biblical people of 
5 Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity; History and Eschatology (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1957), 110—22.
6 Frolov, op. cit (note 4), 7. 
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God were behaving in ways considered repugnant to modern readers. Here, 
the ways between this community and the majority of Christian readers 
and ordinary Christian communities tended to part.
This brings me to another challenge I wish to highlight as we seek to 
develop a transformative hermeneutics across Christianity and Islam: the 
challenge of representation and scope of influence. Today, many ordinary 
church members read the Bible in ways that tend to be different from biblical 
scholars. It is common to see, at least where I come from, that as soon as 
students of theology go back to serve in their faith communities, they 
disregard the critical tools they acquired from their training. The question 
this raises for our project is: do we as biblical scholars and theologians 
represent our faith communities? Others are more cynical, observing 
that while scholars and Protestant churches opted for the poor and the 
marginalized, the poor and the marginalized opted for the Pentecostal 
churches. If academic reflection on the use of sacred texts has only limited 
impact on the reading habits of ordinary members of faith communities, 
how do we expect to influence their lives? In other words, if those religious 
actors who have the power to influence the beliefs, structures and practices 
of the majority of the faith adherents do not share in the transformative 
vision shared by the scholars, does it really matter what we do here?
For me, the dilemma described above also provides the way out. It is 
clear that behind the possibility of harnessing the transformative dimension 
of the sacred texts is the question of authority or legitimacy. For me, this 
fundamental question of the conflict over who possesses the authority to 
speak on behalf of God in both Christianity and Islam today could be defining 
regarding how we want to reflect on transformative hermeneutics across the 
two faiths. But what is the source of legitimacy? In his helpful paper, “The 
Legitimacy of Economics,”7 Kenneth Boulding discusses it as a phenomenon 
and identifies six sources of legitimacy of which I shall highlight three.
Boulding starts by pointing out that “legitimacy is something which 
we take for granted when we have it, almost without question, while when 
we do not have it, the system falls apart with such rapidity that there is no 
time to investigate [the causes].”8 He also makes an important distinction 
between legality and legitimacy where an “institution can be legitimate…
without being legal, and it can be legal without being legitimate ….”9 He 
goes on to identify six sources of legitimacy of which I shall focus on three. 
The fourth source of legitimacy on Boulding’s list, which I think informs 
7 Kenneth Boulding, “The Legitimacy of Economics,” in Economic Inquiry (1967), 
vol. 5, no. 4, 299-307.
8 Ibid., 299. 
9 Ibid. 
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the actions of many religious actors in my part of the world, is that of 
“mystery and charisma.”10 Here, legitimacy comes from the tendency of 
people to regard as legitimate that which they do not fully understand or 
“only dimly understand.”11 In contemporary Africa, the currently growing 
influence of so-called prophets who speak on behalf of God and perform 
miracles can be ascribed to their use of mysterious claims that they have 
special powers to access realms to which ordinary human beings have no 
access. What they say is taken to be indisputable truth since it is supposed 
to come from God.
Closely connected to the fourth is the fifth source of legitimacy, which 
is “communication through accepted symbols of legitimacy.” Here “rituals, 
clothing, incense, music, dance, art, architecture and so on are devoted in 
no small part to creating the symbols of legitimacy.”12 In many Christian 
communities, at least in Africa, just as in Europe in the past and still in 
some churches to this day, the ability of religious authorities to speak 
on behalf of God for good or bad was legitimated by several rituals and 
symbols. In contemporary Africa, the flamboyant lifestyle of such religious 
figures and the high regard with which they are viewed make it possible 
for them to issue directives to their followers, which the followers accept 
without question. Similar directives coming from a religious university 
professor speaking on the authority of his research knowledge will not 
command the same response as long as he cannot communicate through 
these accepted symbols of legitimacy.
The sixth source of legitimacy according to Boulding, “consists of 
alliances and associations with other legitimacies. Legitimacy, as it were, 
is something that rubs off, and if a less legitimate institution can ally itself 
with a more legitimate one, the legitimacy of both may even be increased.”13 
He gives the “frequent alliance of church and state” as an “example of this 
phenomenon.”14 We have seen an increase in the building of alliances of 
religious actors in different parts of the African continent giving legitimacy 
to one another as those who are speaking on behalf of God. In many cases, 
these actors have decimated the meager livelihoods of poor people in the 
name of God. Their gullible audiences are willing to part with their wealth 
in the hope that God is going to bless them and change their plight of 
poverty to prosperity. These actors are not interested in challenging the 
political and economic systems that impoverish these people.
10 Ibid., 301. 
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 302.
14 Ibid. 
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The hope of our conference is that we can build alliances and associations 
across our religious divides in order to develop ways of reading the sacred 
texts in a manner that will promote positive transformation in our faith 
communities. Maybe what some of us may lack in the form of mystery 
and charisma can be compensated for by clarity of divine communication. 
Maybe our transformative hermeneutics could seek to uphold alternative 
symbols of communication aligned to justice, peace and reconciliation.
Below, I attempt such transformative hermeneutics using 1 Samuel 1–7.
1 Samuel 1-7
The book of 1 Samuel provides insights into how the nation-building 
transition from theocratic to monarchical models was understood. In the 
Hebrew Bible, 1 Samuel comes after the book of Judges. The book of Judges 
provides a scenario in which Israel is in “cultic and moral chaos.”15 The 
situation is summarized by the closing words that anticipate a transition: 
“In those days there was no king in Israel; all the people did what was right 
in their own eyes” (Judg 21:25).
This transition from theocracy (in the form of judges) to monarchy 
(in the form of kings) seems contentious, as can be seen from 1 Samuel 8, 
where Samuel himself complains to God about the people’s request for a 
king. The text is ambiguous as to God’s view regarding kingship. God’s 
response to the people’s request for a king is begrudgingly to encourage 
Samuel to grant them their wish saying, “Listen to the voice of the people 
in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have 
rejected me from being king over them” (8:7). But Samuel must warn the 
people regarding the negative consequences of kingship:
These will be the ways of the king who will reign over you: he will take your sons 
and appoint them to his chariots and to be his horsemen, and to run before his 
chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and command-
ers of fifties, and some to plow his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his 
implements of war and the equipment of his chariots. He will take your daughters 
to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and 
vineyards and olive orchards and give them to his courtiers. He will take one-tenth 
of your grain and of your vineyards and give it to his officers and his courtiers. 
He will take your male and female slaves, and the best of your cattle and donkeys, 
and put them to his work. He will take one-tenth of your flocks, and you shall be 
15 Frolov, op. cit. (note 4), 2. 
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his slaves. And in that day you will cry out because of your king, whom you have 
chosen for yourselves; but the Lord will not answer you in that day (1 Sam 8:11-18).
In short, kingship is regarded as problematic because it will compromise 
the covenant relationships between God and God’s people and between 
people themselves since it will be characterized by injustice and oppression.
Theocracy under the judges is not perfect either according to the first 
seven chapters of 1 Samuel. Throughout chapters 1–7, there is a transition 
going on where the priestly house of Eli at Shiloh is being replaced by 
Samuel. Eli and his household are presented as having presided over 
the decline of Israel and hence the necessity to have them replaced—God 
has spoken. In order to understand such a national decline, one needs to 
understand the Old Testament logic of an ideal relationship between God 
and God’s people—a logic that is assumed throughout this entire narrative.
The relationship between people and their God in the Hebrew Bible is 
defined as a covenant relationship. According to Walter Brueggemann, a 
covenant relationship is “an enduring commitment by God and God’s people 
based on mutual vows of loyalty and mutual obligation through which both 
parties have their lives radically affected and empowered.”16 Both parties 
have obligations and benefits. Yahweh will provide security for Yahweh’s 
people so that they can prevail against their enemies; Yahweh will ensure 
that they have rain in season and that their land and their women are 
fruitful. On their part, the covenant people would treat each other with 
justice, take care of the widows and orphans and worship Yahweh alone. If 
this perfect balance is kept in place, people will be able to exist in peace.
“Shalom” is the word that appropriately expresses this holistic life 
of fulfillment and peace for the covenant people. A word which occurs 
more than 250 times in separate places in the Christian Old Testament 
or Hebrew Bible refers to a core belief that “comes from the root meaning 
‘to be whole’ and hence speaks of ‘wholeness’, ‘soundness’, ‘health’, and 
‘well-being’. Shalom is peace as opposed to war, concord as opposed to 
strife.”17 As such, it is
a condition of “all rightness” of things being as they should be, in various dimen-
sions…Shalom usually refers to material or physical conditions or circumstances…A 
second dimension of shalom has to do with social relationships. God intends for 
people to live in right relationship with one another and with God… A third ap-
16 Walter Brueggemann, The Bible Makes Sense (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 10.
17 Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1983), 178.
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plication or dimension of shalom … applies to the moral or ethical realm…Shalom 
involves a condition of honesty, moral integrity.18
As will be shown below, 1 Samuel 1–7 reflects the decline of a nation 
where shalom has become absent. At the same time, these seven chapters 
provide an account of the recovery process through which the nation is 
restored through the agency of God and God’s messengers. One can read 
it as narrative movement on two pivots, swinging from Ichabod (departure 
of God’s glory) to Ebenezer (the affirmation of God’s guidance thus far) and 
characterized by God’s speech or silence and God’s presence and absence 
as experienced by the imagined audience.
The path towards decline
The path towards decline is symbolically represented by the broken family 
of Elkanah (1 Sam 1–8) as well as by the broken worship presided over by 
Eli and his sons (1 Sam 9–28). Eli, the priest at the holy place at Shiloh, and 
his sons are no longer fit to preside over the people in matters of worship 
and of justice, so God prepares for their replacement. As in other Old 
Testament narratives of the birth of key agents, this one, Samuel, is born 
in strife and in extraordinary circumstances. His mother, Hannah, is one 
of the two wives of Elkanah, an Ephraimite who devotedly attends to his 
pilgrimage duties to the holy place at Shiloh every year.
Hannah is childless and is therefore grieved even though her husband 
gives her a double portion of the sacrifice “because he loved her” (1 Sam 5). 
Her grief comes not only from the social stigma attached to women without 
children, but because Peninnah, the other wife of Elkanah, constantly 
mocks her because of her childlessness. So many times “Hannah wept 
and would not eat” (1 Sam 7). It is in this mood of anguish that she goes 
to the place of worship to make her sacrifice and “deeply distressed,” she 
“prayed to the Lord, and wept bitterly” (1 Sam 10).
If one looks closely at Hannah’s petition, one observes that her bitterness 
seems to be triggered not only by her personal situation of childlessness 
but also the state of the nation and the cult:
O Lord of hosts, if only you will look on the misery of your servant,19 and remember 
me, and not forget your servant, but will give to your servant a male child, then 
18 Perry B. Yoder, Shalom: The Bible’s Word for Salvation, Justice, and Peace (Newton, 
KS: Faith and Life Press, 1995), 130–31.
19 A word that was also used to refer to the whole nation of Israel.
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I will set him before you as a nazirite until the day of his death. He shall drink 
neither wine nor intoxicants, and no razor shall touch his head.
She is already praying for the replacement of Eli and his sons. Her personal 
petition is at the same time a yearning for a national leadership renewal. The 
need for this prayer is confirmed by the disconnection between Eli and the 
needs of the people visiting the shrine. Eli has lost touch with the people’s 
deepest needs in such a way that when he sees a women entreating God in 
her anguish, he concludes “she was drunk” (1 Sam 1:13). This misdiagnosis 
of the status of the worshippers makes the ministry at Shiloh irrelevant 
in terms of contributing to the national shalom. Combined with the many 
injustices and sexual immorality of Eli’s sons (2 Sam 22–25), Eli will no 
longer play a central role in the nation-building process—so God will speak. 
One symptom of the unhealthy state of the covenant is the rejection of the 
ministry of Eli and his sons (2 Sam 22–36):
Therefore the Lord the God of Israel declares: “I promised that your family and 
the family of your ancestor should go in and out before me forever”; but now the 
Lord declares: “Far be it from me; for those who honor me I will honor, and those 
who despise me shall be treated with contempt (1 Sam 2:30). 
The priest in this covenantal arrangement is the bearer of religious legitimacy 
as he serves as the intermediary between people and God. Without him 
or his household, the routines at the shrine cannot be sustained. He must 
therefore be replaced soon.
Another sign of decline is the rarity of divine communication: “The 
word of the Lord was rare in those days; visions were not widespread” (1 
Sam 3:1). Some commentators have, I think correctly, suggested that the 
play on words in this opening verse referring to “Eli’s advanced blindness, 
the ‘lamp of God’ that has not yet gone out, and Samuel lying down in the 
temple of the Lord” reflect the paradox of juxtaposing the extent of decline 
with the hope of national recovery.20 So it is not only Eli whose sight is 
challenged, but the whole nation is groping about without clear direction 
of either the word of the prophet or divine intervention.
The third sign that this covenant relationship is unhealthy, as recounted 
elsewhere in the Old Testament, is that the nation loses its battles. In a 
situation of national blindness, the way the loss is diagnosed is misguided:
20 Uriel Steen-Noklberg, Reading Prophetic Narratives, transl. from the Hebrew by 
Lenn J. Schramm (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 62.
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When the troops came to the camp, the elders of Israel said, “Why has the Lord 
put us to rout today before the Philistines? Let us bring the ark of the covenant of 
the Lord here from Shiloh, so that he may come among us and save us from the 
power of our enemies” (1 Sam 4:3).
But this is a wrong move because since God is no longer speaking to them, 
or since they can no longer hear God, their solutions are based on shared 
ignorance. In this battle, Israel loses many of its soldiers including Eli’s 
sons. The worst outcome is that the Ark of the Covenant is captured by the 
Philistines (1 Sam 4:10–11).
Losing the first battle (1 Sam 4:1–2) was a challenge but not a big issue 
since they could regroup and restrategize. They are misguided in assuming 
that a single battle could mean that maybe future battles will be won. Their 
situation is grave since, in the second battle, the Ark of the Covenant is 
taken away when they lose the battle. The Ark of the Covenant, or Tabut in 
the Qur’an, was one of Israel’s most precious possessions. It was a
box-like object containing the Tablets of the Law and perhaps other items which 
were representative of the covenant relationship between Yahweh and Israel. On 
top of the Ark was a seat made of gold, which was said to represent the presence of 
Yahweh. In time, the Ark was considered to have magical properties and it played a 
significant role during the days of the judges and the early years of the monarchy.21
So the loss of the Ark of the Covenant was the lowest point of decline for 
Israel according to 1 Samuel. When Eli hears mention of the capture of the 
Ark, he “fell over backward from his seat by the side of the gate; and his neck 
was broken and he died” (1 Sam 4:18). His daughter-in-law, the wife of one of 
Eli’s sons who had perished in battle, begins her labor pains. She gives birth 
to a son and names him Ichabod before she, also, dies. The name Ichabod 
is indeed symbolic not only of the day, but of the era of decline. Ichabod 
means “‘The glory has departed from Israel,’ because the ark of God had been 
captured and because of her father-in-law and her husband” (1 Sam 4:21).
The path towards recovery
To understand this narrative in a linear sense of cause and effect misses its 
narrative complexity and its theological paradoxes. This is especially so if one 
reads it from the perspective of the Christian tradition. 1 Samuel 1–7 provides a 
21 Francis I. Fesperman, From Torah to Apocalypse: An Introduction to the Bible 
(London: Lanham, 1983), 53.
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more nuanced understanding of the covenantal relationship since it presents God 
as a harsh judge but also as forgiving and caring. This gracious side of Yahweh 
does not only manifest itself after Ichabod but even in the midst of the debacle.
From the beginning, we can observe that even in the midst of decline, 
the covenant people still travel from far away for fervent communal worship 
at Shiloh ( 1 Sam 3; 7:3ff). We can also observe that this worship is not mere 
routine but directed and strategic, entreating Yahweh to intervene at both 
personal and communal levels of need. As mentioned above, Hannah’s prayer 
is a good example (1 Sam 1:9ff; 1 Sam 2:1ff) that recalls all the covenant 
elements. She mentions how God will intervene on behalf of the weak in 
battle and break the “bows of the mighty” as well providing the harvest 
and food (1 Sam 2:4). It is not only the land that will be productive but also 
the women of the land: “The barren has borne seven… .” (1 Sam 2:5). She 
even envisions the coronation of the king before the appointed time: the 
Lord “will give strength to his king, and exalt the power of his anointed” 
(1 Sam 2:10). In other words, in Hannah’s prayer, lament is interlaced with 
hope and prayers of anticipation, even in the midst of much gloom.
The same is true of Eli. Even though he is criticized for not reining in 
his children, we cannot fail to see his extraordinary function as a mentor 
to the young Samuel, even if he is aware that God has chosen Samuel in his 
place. Eli does not only pronounce a blessing to Hannah, but also mentors 
and teaches her son to hear the Lord (1 Sam 1:17ff; 2:20, 27; 3:8ff). Even 
though Samuel has been chosen to replace Eli and his house, Samuel does 
not yet “know the Lord, and the word of the Lord had not yet been revealed 
to” (3:7). So when God speaks, Samuel confuses God with Eli. Under these 
conditions, God can be heard again; under the rejected Eli, Yahweh can 
only be heard because Eli facilitates the hearing. This is no longer for him 
and his family but for the people of God.
God’s words can be seen in 1 Samuel 1–7 as both a condition but also 
as a result of the new national direction. Once God has begun to speak and 
to be heard, the covenantal floodgates open. First, the priestly ministry 
recovers its legitimacy and effectiveness:
As Samuel grew up, the Lord was with him and let none of his words fall to the 
ground. And all Israel from Dan to Beer-sheba knew that Samuel was a trustworthy 
prophet of the Lord. The Lord continued to appear at Shiloh, for the Lord revealed 
himself to Samuel at Shiloh by the word of the Lord. And the word of Samuel came 
to all Israel (1 Sam3:19–4:1).
When Samuel as the religious agent speaks, God legitimates his speech by 
making sure God’s word comes to pass. This, in the Deuteronomic tradition, 
is the proof of being the messenger of Yahweh:
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You may say to yourself, “How can we recognize a word that the Lord has not spo-
ken?” If a prophet speaks in the name of the Lord but the thing does not take place 
or prove true, it is a word that the Lord has not spoken. The prophet has spoken it 
presumptuously; do not be frightened by it (Deuteronomy 18:21-22).
Further, in line with the covenant relationship, we can also see the restoration 
of justice and God’s glory. Samuel “would come back to Ramah, for his home 
was there; he administered justice there to Israel, and built there an altar 
to the Lord” (1 Sam 7:17). In this state of shalom, mishpat (justice) and 
tsedaka (righteousness) come close together as in the prophecy of Isaiah: 
“But the Lord of hosts is exalted by justice, and the Holy God shows himself 
holy by” (Isa 5:16). In this state of shalom, the covenant people do not need 
to prevail against their enemies because: “There was peace also between 
Israel and the Amorites” (1 Sam 7:14). There is no necessity to win wars 
because peace can prevail.
The Lord has now finally spoken according to the promise in the Psalm:
Lord, you were favorable to your land; 
you restored the fortunes of Jacob. 
You forgave the iniquity of your people; 
you pardoned all their sin. Selah 
You withdrew all your wrath; 
you turned from your hot anger.
Restore us again, O God of our salvation, 
and put away your indignation toward us. 
Will you be angry with us forever? 
Will you prolong your anger to all generations? 
Will you not revive us again, 
so that your people may rejoice in you? 
Show us your steadfast love, O Lord, 
and grant us your salvation.
Let me hear what God the Lord will speak, 
for he will speak peace to his people, 
to his faithful, to those who turn to him in their hearts. 
Surely his salvation is at hand for those who fear him, 
that his glory may dwell in our land.
Steadfast love and faithfulness will meet; 
righteousness and peace will kiss each other. 
Faithfulness will spring up from the ground, 
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and righteousness will look down from the sky. 
The Lord will give what is good, 
and our land will yield its increase. 
Righteousness will go before him, 
and will make a path for his steps (Ps 85:1–13).
Contemporary implications
What does this mean for our yearning for transformative interfaith 
hermeneutics? Let me propose three concluding insights that I think could 
define such a hermeneutic.
First, we need to acknowledge that the power of sacred texts, at least 
in my own Christian tradition, lies in their ability to offer a language for 
alternative reality. This alternative reality is always a promise with a 
condition—it is covenantal; “If you keep my commandments, you will abide 
in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in 
his love” (Jn 15:10). The promise to abide in God’s love is conditional on 
keeping God’s command. What is that command? In the New Testament 
they ask Jesus:
Teacher, which commandment in the law is the greatest? He said to him, “You 
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with 
all your mind.” This is the greatest and first commandment. 39 And a second is 
like it: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” On these two commandments 
hang all the law and the prophets” (Mt 22:36-40).
In other words, God’s communication is an invitation of love. How is this 
love discerned?
This brings us to the second insight that lies in the character of divine 
speech. How is it possible to evaluate whether it is God who has spoken, 
apart from the collective authentication or mutual affection? The litmus 
test is the convergence of righteousness and justice. True shalom, which 
is the climax of transformation, is characterized by mishpat (justice) and 
tsedaka (righteousness), not one after the other or one above the other, 
but both together. True hearing of the divine Word materializes in the 
realization of just relationships and true worship. How does the speaking 
of God materialize this alone?
The third observation is that the realization of justice and righteousness, 
though a result of divine speech, are mediated by human actors. In my 
Christian interpretive tradition, this agency does not come first and then 
divine intervention but follows the divine lead. The new alternate reality of 
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shalom is wholly owned and orchestrated by God. But in God’s grace, God 
has fully sanctioned human agency for the realization of shalom. As such, 
no human agent can claim divine authority—which is beyond questioning 
or evaluating by other human agents. No human agent can claim insight 
into the workings of the divine for the transformation of society that is not 
accessible to other human actors. Again we use the Deuteronomic test: “The 
secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the revealed things belong 
to us and to our children forever, to observe all the words of this law” (Dt 
29:29). From this perspective, transformation cannot be effected through 
swords but by words of persuasion. Any zealous human agency that seeks 
to materialize divine communication by force slowly slides into idolatry. 
In other words, to say that God is speaking should always be agreed upon 
by other members of the faith community.
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Dealing with Sacred Scripture: 
New Testament, Otherness 
and Intersectionality
Marianne Bjelland Kartzow
Introduction
When a text is considered sacred, it generates complex challenges of 
interpretation and meaning. It invites communication and dialogue. It needs 
community and relationships across time and place to make sense. It not 
only comes with a challenge but also with beauty, wisdom, paradox, humor, 
strangeness and hope. Encountering sacred scriptures is a rich intellectual 
enterprise, calling its readers to be creative and to act in the world.
In this article, I will look for interpretative models in the New Testament 
that have a destabilizing and transformative potential. I am interested in 
social history as a hermeneutical and epistemological tool, not to find out 
what actually happened in the past, but to rethink how bodies, relationships 
and social interaction are the raw material with which sacred scriptures 
construct their theology. After discussing different contexts for reading, 
some approaches will be presented and, towards the end, a model for biblical 
interaction and engagement will be suggested.
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Readings in context
Scriptural hermeneutics start with the encounter between everyday 
experience and texts. I will very briefly describe characteristics of the 
world we live in today and the current Norwegian context.
The current Norwegian context
We live at a time of an ever increasing gap between rich and poor and in a 
multicultural world challenged and enriched by religious diversity. We face 
environmental crises and a growing global refugee conflict. God’s creation 
is suffering. In northern Europe, we live in partly secular, once Protestant, 
societies. The majority, lacking narrative roots, will soon face biblical illiteracy. 
Religious diversity is welcomed here if it accepts Scandinavian paradoxes 
of freedom and equality. In Norway, sacred texts play an ambiguous role.
For instance, in the winter of 2015 we learned from one of our government 
ministers, Sylvi Listhaug, that in order to help as many as possible, Jesus 
had helped people in the neighborhoods where they lived.1 She encouraged 
us to follow the example of Jesus in our refugee politics. Accordingly, we 
should not allow more asylum seekers and refugees into our country, but 
rather help them where they are. We should support Syria’s neighbors and 
let them help people in need, not invite them to Norway.
Some years ago, we had a discussion on slavery in the Bible. A high-
profile evangelical theologian argued strongly that, according to the Bible, 
slavery is not a sin. Since it is not sin, it is not against the will of God. 
Therefore, since our ancient sacred scriptures do not consider it a sin, this 
reading of the text could easily encourage us silently to watch modern 
slavery spreading in our global world.
Over the past few years, we seem to have witnessed a general cultural 
trend, in which people who do not necessarily like Christianity still very 
much like the Bible. Almost every year a new play based on the Bible is 
produced, often breaking theatre audience records and at times involving 
sacred texts from different religions.2 The Bible remains a bestseller in 
this country. When a new Bible translation was published in 2011, many 
of our most prominent authors were involved in the process. The Bible is 
considered as belonging to our cultural canon.
1 For the video (in Norwegian), see https://www.nrk.no/video/PS*236374 (NRK 
03.11.2015).
2 In particular I will mention the great success “Abrahams barn” (Children of 
Abraham), where texts from the three traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) 
were included. See http://www.detnorsketeatret.no/framsyningar/abrahams-barn.
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Generally, the majority would support gender equality in religion. 
The majority is not very active in the faith community, but has a cultural-
personal interest in the Holy Scriptures. I sometimes think the Bible has 
primarily a symbolic value; it is a book to demonstrate who you are, not 
necessarily to be read. How can this particular ambiguous context contribute 
to making scripture sacred?
Interpretation
The history of interpretation also has a context. It has been argued that the 
Christian Reformation was a biblical movement: the Word of God was now 
free for all by the spirit of God. All believers were to read scripture and 
there to find guidance for everyday life. Printing presses and schools for 
lay people would contribute to reaching these goals. There was optimism 
that the principle of sola scriptura would make the text—no longer filtered 
through church authority or the power of the clergy—speak clearly and 
directly in people’s lives. Prior to the invention of the hermeneutical 
circle, this enthusiasm was perhaps a bit naive in relation to the complex 
act of reading or the role of the reader in constructing the meaning of a 
text. Perhaps we can say that the lack of tools to let the text speak clearly 
was the reason why the exegetical method of historical criticism was 
developed some hundred years later. Within a theological framework, the 
first generations of exegetes tried to reconstruct the original historical 
context and meaning of the texts.
In the past forty years or so, literary theories and impulses from 
the social sciences have contributed new perspectives, challenging the 
hermeneutical approach. New Testament scholars are no longer necessarily 
believers reading their Holy Scripture, searching for theological meaning. 
An interdisciplinary group of researchers has continued to study these 
texts as part of various historical, literary or ideological projects. The Bible 
is still sacred scripture for the churches, but also an academic, cultural, 
poetic and political text.
Texts of terror
It has been pointed out that the Bible contains numerous “texts of terror.”3 
This cultural and sacred bestseller has an ambiguous history. The Bible 
has helped colonizers and military campaigns by legitimizing their brutal 
or violent actions, mixing mission and politics to oppress other people, 
3 Phyllis Trible, Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives, 
Overtures to Biblical Theology, 13 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).
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supported the slave trade, gender discrimination, religious intolerance, 
racism, the Holocaust and apartheid. It has worked perfectly well to exclude 
and construct “others.” Difference is seen as problematic.4 Simultaneously, 
the same text has played the opposite role in many of these contexts. 
Colonialism, the slave trade, gender discrimination and racism have been 
fought with inspiration from the Bible, the same sacred text. Is the Bible 
a book to be recommended, for example, to boys and girls or new citizens 
coming from other parts of the world or other religious traditions? What 
criteria should be employed in order to prevent the Bible from being a 
text of terror?
Approaches to sacred scripture
Sacred texts as narratives
We will now turn to some New Testament texts. According to the Acts of 
the Apostles (Acts), the story of the early church starts where the Gospel 
of Luke ends: with the resurrection of Jesus. Their master has now left 
them and the disciples have received the Holy Spirit. They start speaking 
in all kinds of languages and all people can understand them. They behave 
strangely and Peter makes a speech in order to calm down the crowd and 
explain what is going on.
But Peter, standing with the eleven, raised his voice and addressed them, “Men of 
Judea and all who live in Jerusalem, let this be known to you, and listen to what I 
4 Othering: a way of discriminating or looking down on other individuals or groups. 
See Pui-lan Kwok, “Finding a Home for Ruth. Gender, Sexuality, and the Politics of 
Otherness,” in Robert M. Fowler, Edith L. Blumhofer, and Fernando F. Segovia (eds), 
New Paradigms for Bible Study: The Bible in the Third Millennium (New York: T & 
T Clark, 2004). See also Jerusha Tanner Lamptey, Never Wholly Other: A Muslima 
Theology of Religious Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17ff. See 
also Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, “Gossip and Gender: Othering of Speech in the 
Pastoral Epistles,” in BZNW, vol. 164 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). Definition: 
Othering can be described as discrimination of people or a population that is 
different from the collective social norm; since they are different they are also 
seen as deviant or in need of being cultured by the group that is othering them. 
An example of othering is when individuals that identify closely with their own 
ethnic or religious beliefs begin to gain the mentality that those who are different 
from them are problematic. This can lead to extreme separation, alienation and 
the exclusion of the person or of people seen as different or unusual in terms of 
the typical lens of one’s societal views.
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say. Indeed, these are not drunk, as you suppose, for it is only nine o’clock in the 
morning. No, this is what was spoken through the prophet Joel: “In the last days 
it will be, God declares, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons 
and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and 
your old men shall dream dreams. Even upon my slaves, both men and women, 
in those days I will pour out my Spirit; and they shall prophesy” (Acts 2:14–18).
This is indeed a fascinating little narrative. In the quotation from the 
Jewish prophet Joel, inclusive and inviting statements aim at involving 
all humankind: sons and daughters, young and old men, male and female 
slaves. Enough hopes, dreams and visions: that is the work of the Spirit 
in Acts. It connects to the overall metanarrative of the Bible in which all 
people are the children of God.5
People need narratives that can offer models for how to deal with life. 
Where a critical historical exegete would ask about what kind of a time 
system and clock they had or where in Jerusalem they were when Peter 
made his speech, a narrative approach asks for characters, relationships, 
scenes, plot, humor and point of view—and the reader’s role in the production 
of meaning.6 Narratives are “open texts”; they both invite and require 
the participation of their audience.7 The reading of narratives involves 
embodiment: we must read with all our senses. It involves seeing and 
listening to the texts and to the world. Communities need stories to build 
on, to remember who they are and where they come from. Narratives can 
lead to confusion and give no clear answers, where readers are confronted 
with their own good deeds or mistakes. Narratives cannot be read only to 
search for right or wrong; they ask more from their readers.
Peter’s speech in Acts can work this way. Readers may identify themselves 
with the sons, old men or slaves. The story gives hope, drama and visions 
to those encountering the text. It connects past, present and future and 
inscribes all of us into that metanarrative. It does not matter whether we 
are rich or poor, high or low, successful or not: “There is no longer Jew or 
Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; 
for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:28). No one is the other here. 
The people of God are unified. No wonder that the passage from Acts 2 has 
5 More on the concept of “metanarrative,” see Timo Eskola, A Narrative Theology of 
the New Testament: Exploring the Metanarrative of Exile and Restoration (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2015).
6 Mark Allan Powell, What Is Narrative Criticism? A New Approach to the Bible 
(London: Spck, 1993).
7 See chapter 4 on narrative criticism in Joel B. Green (ed.), Methods for Luke (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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globally been the strongest canon within the canon for neo-charismatic 
movements over the past decades.
There is only one small snake in paradise: when this text passage 
includes young and old men and children and slaves of both genders, why 
are young and old women not mentioned? And why are only the men of 
Judea addressed?
An intersectional approach
In other New Testament texts, the term “old women” works as a name tag 
for what is wrong. In the Pastoral Epistles, part of the so-called disputed 
Pauline, “old wives tales” is a category used to label false teaching (1 Tim 
4:7).8 Old women are requested not to teach young women to slander or 
drink too much (1 Tim 3:11; Tit 2:3–5) and young widows are blamed for 
running around, gossiping and saying things they should not say (1 Tim 
5:3–15).9 Women shall be saved through childbirth (1 Tim 2:15). Such 
requirements hide stereotyping and “othering” and gender rhetoric is used 
to blame. In the same letters, slaves are told to be obedient and not to talk 
back to their masters (1 Tim 6:1–2; Tit 2:9).10 The problem is not only that 
the text is “othering” women; several groups seem to be excluded. Women, 
children and slaves are also regulated in the so-called household codes, for 
example, in the Pseudo-Pauline “Letter to the Colossians”:
Wives, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord. Husbands, love your 
wives and never treat them harshly. Children, obey your parents in everything, for 
this is your acceptable duty in the Lord. Fathers, do not provoke your children, or they 
may lose heart. Slaves, obey your earthly masters in everything, not only while being 
watched and in order to please them, but wholeheartedly, fearing the Lord (Col 3:18–22).
The three relationship pairs—wives/husbands, children/parents and 
slaves/masters—may work rhetorically as isolated parameters, but not 
8 Joanna Dewey, “Women on the Way: A Reconstruction of Late First-Century Women’s 
Storytelling,” in Holly E. Hearon and Philip Ruge-Jones (eds), The Bible in Ancient 
and Modern Media: Story and Performance (Eugene, Or.: Cascade Books, 2009), 
36–48. Jouette M. Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Abingdon New Testament 
Commentaries (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996).
9 These texts as discussed in Kartzow, op. cit. (note 4), 164.
10 More on slavery, see Bernadette J. Brooten and Jacqueline L. Hazelton (eds), Beyond 
Slavery: Overcoming Its Religious and Sexual Legacies (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2010); 
Jennifer A. Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
179
in the real life of the ancient world.11 Instead of hierarchical organized 
pairs, a complex web of intersecting relationships in which authority and 
power were negotiated and distributed corresponds better to the everyday 
experience of the first Jesus followers.
I will use “intersectionality” to rethink this cultural complexity. 
Intersectionality as a theoretical concept has only very recently been applied 
to biblical scholarship,12 although the basic ideas and concerns have been 
articulated by African and African-American scholarship and womanist 
biblical interpreters in particular for some years now.13 The basic idea is 
the following: instead of examining gender, race, class, age and sexuality 
as separate categories, intersectionality explores how these categories 
overlap and mutually modify and reinforce each other.14 Intersectionality 
enables interpreters to “ask the ‘other’ question” and thereby make visible 
categories that otherwise are overlooked or downplayed.15
11 Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, “ ‘Asking the Other Question’: An Intersectional 
Approach to Galatians 3:28 and the Colossian Household Codes,” in Biblical 
Interpretation 18, no. 4–5 (2010), 364–89.
12 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Introduction: Exploring the Intersections of Race, 
Gender, Status, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies,” in Laura Nasrallah and 
Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (eds), Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, 
Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 1–23. 
Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, “Intersectional Studies,” in Julia M. O’Brien (ed.), The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
13 Sarojini Nadar, “The Bible in and for Mission: A Case Study of the Council of World 
Mission,” in Missionalia 37, no. 2 (2009), 226. See also Brian K. Blount et al. (eds), True to 
Our Native Land: An African American New Testament Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2007) and numerous works by Schüssler Fiorenza and for example Kwok (note 4).
14 See for example Kathy Davis, “Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science 
Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful,” in Feminist Theory 9 
(2008), 67–83; Gudrun-Axeli Knapp, “Race, Class, Gender: Reclaiming Baggage in 
Fast Travelling Theories,” in European Journal of Women’s Studies 12, no. 3 (2005), 
249–65; Leslie McCall, “The Complexity of Intersectionality,” in Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 30, no. 3 (2005), 1771–800; Ann Phoenix and Pamela 
Pattynama (eds), European Journal of Women’s Studies (Issue on Intersectionality), vol. 
13 (2006); Sumi Cho, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, “Toward a Field 
of Intersectional Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,” in Signs (Theme Issue: 
Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory 38), no. 4 (2013), 785–810.
15 Mari Matsuda argues: “The way I try to understand the interconnection of all 
forms of subordination is through a method I call ‘ask the other question.’ When 
I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where is the patriarchy in this?’ When I 
see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the heterosexism in this?’ When 
I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the class interests in 
this?’,” Mari J. Matsuda, “Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out 
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In the social world of the New Testament, ethnicity, class, gender and age/
generation worked together and mutually constructed each other. A man could 
be either free or a slave—although slave men were not considered real men.16 
Different rules worked for women depending on their status: slave women 
had no chance to follow the gender codes where honor and invisibility were 
the norm, as was expected of freeborn women.17 Small children, slave and 
free, may have played together and had some kind of schooling together, but 
the life waiting for them had clear borders and separated them into different 
social worlds according to gender and social class.18
So who were the insiders in the communities that produced the Christian 
sacred scripture? Who were those considered to be in control of themselves, 
their choices, their bodies? And who was the other? It is tempting to say 
that for Paul, free adult Jewish men like himself were the ultimate insiders. 
He admitted that “in Christ Jesus,” all other parameters were of less value 
(Gal 3:28), but the metanarrative he wrote into what that privilege was 
belonged to a specific position in society. The other could be welcomed into 
the spiritual reality as long as they followed the code of obedience and 
submission according to gender, class, age and race. How do we deal with 
this message without letting the New Testament work like a text of terror?
We have to read against the grain and with a hermeneutics of suspicion.19 
Paul and the Pauline traditions belonged to a specific cultural and social 
context, as the historical critical method has taught us. Theology is formulated 
accordingly, with the help of bodies, relationships and social interaction, 
as intersectionality may help us realize. Nevertheless, the Pauline letters, 
disputed or not, belong to the sacred scripture of Christianity. They are 
considered part of the Word of God. As a storyteller, Paul brings good news 
to the table, such as the credo of Galatians 3:28, but in his name, we also find 
stereotypes and othering. For good reasons, he has a firm status within the 
church, academy and Lutheran communities. I will nevertheless suggest that 
we read him in light of other, less famous texts from the Christian scripture.
of Coalition,” in Stanford Law Review 43 (1990), 1187. See also Jennifer C. Nash, 
“Re-Thinking Intersectionality,” in Feminist Review 89 (2008), 12.
16 Halvor Moxnes, “Conventional Values in the Hellenistic World: Masculinity,” in Per 
Bilde, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Lise Hannestad and Jan Zahle (eds), Conventional 
Values of the Hellenistic Greeks, Studies in Hellenistic Civilization, 8 (Aarhus: 
Aarhus University Press, 1997), 263–84.
17 Anna Rebecca Solevag, Birthing Salvation: Gender and Class in Early Christian 
Childbearing Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
18 Carolyn Osiek, Margaret Y. MacDonald, and Janet H. Tulloch, A Woman’s Place: 
House Churches in Earliest Christianity (Minneapolis, MN.: Fortress Press, 2006).
19 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological 
Reconstruction of Christian Origins (London: SCM Press, 1983).
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A model for biblical interaction and engagement
Criteria for finding (new) texts
Not all texts do good things for all people. The world needs voices which, 
based on the sacred scriptures and faced with the current situation, speak 
out loud in the face of crises and discrimination. We need to find narratives 
that can cure the growing scriptural illiteracy. What kind of criteria can 
be used for finding text passages that are not othering but rather bring a 
message of hope?
I think that a variety of genres is one answer: household codes or legal 
material must be put into dialogue with narrative passages or metanarratives. 
Doctrinal conclusions need to be scrutinized for stereotyping and othering. 
Texts from the New Testament itself can work as interpretative models 
for other texts in an internal biblical dialogue. In addition, familiar texts 
that have a special status within the canon must be read side by side with 
texts in the margins; they all belong to scripture. Although the Reformers 
and others before and after them had ideas about which texts were most 
central, Christians consider the whole Bible sacred. Instead of bringing 
texts to the table with clear answers, we must risk the possibility that a 
reading might lead to challenge and change. To be taken by surprise by a 
text is better than knowing beforehand what it will tell us.
Can internal biblical genre—dialogue, marginality, risk and surprise—
be criteria for how to encounter the New Testament as sacred scripture 
without othering?
The slave girl with the spirit of divination
One short story, once again from Acts, can take us by surprise and destabilize 
the truth. It presents a different narrative about Paul and about the roots 
of Christianity. Paul and Silas are in Philippi and they have just met the 
dealer in purple cloth, Lydia, and baptized her and her household. Now 
they are moving on and the following little incident is quickly passed over:
One day, as we were going to the place of prayer, we met a slave-girl who had a 
spirit of divination and brought her owners a great deal of money by fortune-telling. 
While she followed Paul and us, she would cry out, “These men are slaves of the 
Most High God, who proclaim to you a way of salvation. She kept doing this for 
many days. But Paul, very much annoyed, turned and said to the spirit, “I order 
you in the name of Jesus Christ to come out of her.” And it came out that very 
hour (Acts 16:16–18).
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This story has not received prominent focus; in fact, it has hardly been 
noticed at all. The slave girl is constructed as the other at several levels: 
narratively, theologically and in the history of interpretation due to 
intersections of gender, class and ethnic/cultural background. Volumes 
entitled “Women in the Bible” mostly focus on the prominent Lydia, 
described some verses before, and pay little attention to this girl. As a 
slave, her talent in fortune-telling is owned by others; the grammatical 
form is plural, so she might be shared property between several owners 
or households. She could be inherited property between brothers. Later 
in the chapter, her owners become very angry with Paul and his men and 
send them to prison because Paul has healed her and thereby taken away 
their income. Such a girl, lacking her fortune-telling talent, would need 
another job; to sell a female slave’s body into prostitution could be an option. 
Ethnically and culturally, in common with several other slaves, she has 
lost the ties of origin, nationality and family. Slaves are cut off from what 
normally gives people identity and position.20 The spirit she is said to be 
possessed by—a spirit of divination—makes her appear as a strange and 
foreign character on whom Paul’s spiritual power is demonstrated. He talks 
to the spirit and not to her.
In problematic ways, the text builds on rhetorical techniques where 
gender and class are used in intersecting ways. At one level, the text tells a 
bad story about the readers who sympathize with Paul. As discussed above, 
narratives invite readers or listeners to be involved and engaged and they 
can offer models for how to deal with life. Such narratives cannot be read 
only to search for right or wrong; they require more from us. It requires 
ethical and self-critical reflection.21
The story recounts how Paul operates in the field, how the spirit of God 
wins the battle over other spirits and how minor characters’ bodies and lives 
become artifacts and are used as rhetorical devices. How do we deal with 
the fact that early Christian missionaries were annoyed and mistreated, 
marginal characters and left them behind with no means of survival, simply 
because the hero wanted to show that our God is the strongest?
The spirit-possessed slave girl is the other, the religious other. The young 
female refugee, fleeing due to war or the environmental crisis, shivering 
in an open boat on her way to Europe. The Roma woman begging at the 
20 Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); John Byron, Recent Research on Paul and Slavery (Sheffield: Phoenix 
Press, 2008).
21 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: Decentering 
Biblical Scholarship,” in Journal of Biblical Literature 107, no. 1 (1988), 3–17.
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Metro station. We have all seen her. She is annoying; she does not give up, 
she keeps on crying, day after day.
Truth in unexpected places
While this narrative has a destabilizing potential, further investigation 
may reveal that there is more to it than simply stating that “she should 
be numbered among the disadvantaged of the sort who are the particular 
objects of Jesus’ salvation.”22 Interpreters have paid attention to what the 
slave girl is reported to have said: her words correspond to what is seen as 
the truth in Acts.23 She cries out that Paul and his men are slaves of God, 
a common description of early Christian individuals and groups; she also 
declares that they proclaim a way of salvation.24 Some would even say she 
sounds like a prophet, like one of the female slaves in the Joel quotation 
in Peter’s speech, on whom the Lord will pour out the spirit and allow to 
prophesy (Acts 2:18). A character at the margins carries the truth, however 
annoying or unpopular.
The story can encourage people from all traditions, contexts and 
backgrounds to look for the truth in unexpected places. It opens up for self-
reflection. It invites us to follow the model of the marginalized other. The 
story about the slave girl presents a model for how to behave, regardless 
of whether we are in the center or on the periphery, whether rich or poor, 
whether strong or weak: speak out loud. Be annoying. Tell the truth.
Stories like this demonstrate that genre-variety, marginality, risk 
and surprise help us to find new models. Although the text and Paul is 
involved in othering, readers of sacred scripture can find creative models 
for hermeneutical engagements. It may look like a text of terror at the first 
glance, but it has some transformative potential. It can work as a narrative 
to inspire action in the world, to inspire those suffering from scriptural 
illiteracy. Speak out loud. Be annoying. Tell the truth.
22 Robert F. O’Toole, “Slave Girl at Philippi,” in David Noel Freedman (ed.), The 
Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York, London: Doubleday, 1992), 58; discussed in 
Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, Destabilizing the Margins: An Intersectional Approach 
to Early Christian Memory (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2012), 131.
23 Turid Karlsen Seim, The Double Message: Patterns of Gender in Luke-Acts, Studies 
of the New Testament and Its World (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994).
24 John Byron, Slavery Metaphors in Early Judaism and Pauline Christianity: A 
Traditio-Historical and Exegetical Examination, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen 
Zum Neuen Testament, Reihe 2, vol. 162 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003).
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“Choose Life so that you and your 
Descendants may Live”: Climate 
Change as a Case Study for a 
Contextual Hermeneutics
Martin Kopp
Introduction
For a few hours in early 2016, the Northern hemisphere appears to have 
breached the 2°C limit under which the average global temperature is 
supposed to be kept by the end of this century.1 Although in part political,2 
this 2°C limit is recognized by all parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the threshold leading us to reach 
the tipping points, the irreversible climatic trends and possibly runaway 
climate change and, in any case, catastrophic consequences for human 
societies. That this limit was briefly reached only two months after the 
diplomatic success of COP21 in Paris, France, and its unexpected ambition 
to pursue efforts to keep the mean warming below 1.5°C3 resounds as a 
1 Eric Holthaus, “Our Hemisphere’s Temperature Just Reached A Terrifying Milestone,” 
in Slate, 1 March 2016, at http://slate.me/1WTPMNi
2 See a brief historical account of the definition of this temperature limit. Stefan 
C. Aykut and Amy Dahan, “Le choc de Copenhague. La régression du climat,” in 
Stefan C. Aykut and Amy Dahan (eds), Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations 
internationales (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2015), 325–98.
3 Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.
186
Transformative Readings of Sacred Scriptures
stark warning: the peaking and then slashing of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions is of utmost urgency and must not suffer further delay.
Since the UN climate conference COP19 in Warsaw, Poland, in 2013, 
thousands of people have fasted for the climate all around the globe on the 
first day of the month to express their solidarity with vulnerable people and 
to call for action.4 The people who fast come from all walks of life. Many of 
them are Christians from all denominations, especially Lutherans. From the 
beginning, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has been very committed 
to this initiative. This should not come as a surprise. For decades now, 
especially at the Protestant–Orthodox international ecumenical level of the 
World Council of Churches,5 Christians have been theologically engaged 
with the issue of climate change and, more broadly, the environmental 
crisis. Catholic theologians and popes have also discussed the matter, but 
it is only recently that it has entered the social teaching of the Roman 
Catholic Church through the encyclical Laudato Si.
Nevertheless, at the local level, for churches and individual believers—
whatever the Christian confession—the commitment to climate change 
is often not a “natural” move. The link between climate change and the 
Christian faith is not obvious and churches need to use both a solid contextual 
theology and good ecclesial pedagogy to put it on the agenda and integrate 
it into the various aspects of the life of the Christian community.
Climate change thus provides an interesting case study on the subject of 
“transformative readings of sacred scriptures” and biblical hermeneutics—
the latter being understood here as “a systematic and disciplined form of 
second-order reflection on the praxis of interpretation,”6 i.e., a distanced 
reflection on the act of interpretation of the biblical scriptures. What is 
the interpretative landscape of climate change? What are the peculiarities 
of this contemporary subject? How does Christian theology interpret 
the scriptures in light of this new question? What are the opportunities 
but also the risks of such an endeavor? What can we learn from it at the 
hermeneutical level? These will be our guiding questions as we first explore 
the interpretative landscape of climate change and then its meeting with 
the biblical scriptures.
4 https://www.lutheranworld.org/fastfortheclimate 
5 Guillermo Kerber, “International Advocacy for Climate Justice,” in Robin G. Veldman, 
Andrew Szasz, and Randolph Haluza-Delay (eds), How the World’s Religions Are 
Responding to Climate Change (Oxford: Routledge, 2014), 278–94.
6 Ernst Conradie, “What on Earth is an Ecological Hermeneutics,” in David G. 
Horrel et al. (eds), Ecological Hermeneutics. Biblical, Historical and Theological 
Perspectives (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 298.
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The interpretative landscape of climate change
To depict the specific interpretative landscape of climate change, we will rely 
on the general conceptual map proposed by Ernst M. Conradie (see below).7 
This map acknowledges that the “text” has a “historical context of origin” 
and depicts the relationship between the “source” and the “receiver” as a 
“spiral of ongoing interpretation” and appropriation. The “message” from 
the “source” reaches the “receiver” within a “contemporary context” and 
a specific “rhetorical context,” by which Conradie means the “rhetorical 
thrust of the act of interpretation and appropriation.”8 In between, so to 
speak, the text and its context on the one hand and the spiral of ongoing 
interpretation and appropriation on the other stand the “traditions of 
interpretation,” which are diverse in their forms (confessions, liturgies, 
creeds, etc.). Finally, as a background to all elements, one finds the “world 
of hidden interpretative interests” and subconscious ideological distortions.
The origin of the interpretative inquiry triggered by climate change is 
found in the contemporary context. This challenge is new and belongs to 
the wider modern issue of the ecological crisis. Science with, notably, the 
growing role of social sciences, provides knowledge about it. The Christian 
interpreter9 usually relies on the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) as well as on other climate focused papers. These 
studies establish (1) the unequivocal mean global warming since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution and its related climate changes; (2) 
7 Ibid., 299.
8 Ibid. 
9 We prefer to speak of an “interpreter” rather than a “receiver” so as to stress the 
active and constructive role interpretation requires—which Conradie recognizes.
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estimate that there is an over ninety-five percent probability that human 
activities have been the dominant cause of this warming since the mid-
twentieth century; and (3) warn against the diverse harmful consequences 
on ecosystems, other species, humans and their livelihoods.10
Based on these findings, different agents engage in an exegetical, 
interpretative and theological inquiry. The praxis of interpretation of 
an individual Christian and a collective of Christians—be it a church, a 
fellowship of churches or a communion of churches—is a bit different. In 
the case of a collective effort, the interpretative work seeks to articulate a 
shared understanding of the scriptures, building on nuanced or differentiated 
interpretations, which is a process that would demand a study of its own. In 
any case, although climate change is global and affects everyone, it impacts 
people differently according to where they live. Climate science is universal; 
climate experience is local. It takes little imagination to understand how 
differently the climate issue and the scriptures would be approached by a 
wealthy Norwegian single businesswoman or a sub-Saharan small farmer 
with a family, an Indian solar company CEO or an East European coal miner, 
an Australian conservative politician or a Latin-American indigenous 
mother. It is reasonable to posit that the level of climate dependency and 
vulnerability of the interpreters’ livelihood and context—and closely linked 
to it, their relationship to “nature”—are key.
One should add the other usual “baggage” that any interpreter carries: 
personal history; education; worldview; set of values; theology; spirituality; 
political stance; etc. This underscores the role of one’s identity and context 
as one meets the biblical text: the question(s) carried by the interpreter 
as well as the way the text may speak to and move them—actually, the 
way the scriptures can become the Word of God through the work of 
the Holy Spirit—can differ based on these elements. This also applies to 
professional theologians. The fact is not to be criticized, nor does it entail 
any determinism allowing anyone to prejudge the way one will read the 
scriptures, but it is to be taken into account in order to recognize the 
legitimacy, under certain conditions, of the diversity of interpretations. 
Such an understanding is especially important in the case of a collective 
international interpretative effort.
Speaking of baggage, if not a sense of guilt, surely an apologetic 
agenda constitutes an item either explicitly carried or present as a hidden 
interpretative interest in the approach of many Christians. It derives from 
the famous thesis according to which Judeo-Christianity as it evolved in 
10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014. Synthesis 
Report. Summary for Policymakers (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2014).
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Western Europe in the Middle Ages bears a great responsibility for the 
development of the current ecological crisis: simply put, it is accused of 
having diffused a worldview based on a reading of Genesis according to 
which humans are at the center and top of creation and have been given 
the divine mandate to dominate and exploit the rest of creation, which has 
value only through its utility for humans. The medieval historian Lynn 
White Jr. made this case in his famous 1967 article in Science.11 Others 
supported a similar thesis12 and it has been a regular critique of Christians 
in environmental circles. Acknowledging this background, an interpretative 
pitfall can be outlined: someone convinced of the importance of the climate 
crisis and the urgency to act risks approaching the biblical text with the 
objective of defending their faith and opposing a tradition of interpretation 
based on the axiom that the theology of creation depicted by White and 
others is not—or cannot be—sound. We are presented with a clear danger 
of eisegesis, i.e., the bringing of meaning to the text by the reader who is 
not receptive of what the text may say but tweaks the interpretation in a 
certain pre-determined direction.
We have now stepped into the spiral of interpretation and reappropriation. 
Such a spiral exhibits an ongoing coming-and-going between the text 
and the interpreter in context, and rightly so in our view. Yet, in the case 
of climate change, one can argue that there is a primary “structuring” 
movement, which goes from the contemporary world to the text. The 
dynamics are opposite to how the text can be read in a traditional daily 
reading of the Bible or on the occasion of the Sunday sermon; in that case, 
the text comes first as a source being considered as meaningful and meets 
the contemporary world down the interpretative road. We therefore hold 
that there are at least two kinds of spirals. The main difference between 
both is that climate change leads us to approach the text with a specific 
question. The fact that a question is posed and, more decisively, the way 
in which it is formulated, which can vary significantly, play a role in 
the interpretation. We could metaphorically depict the question and its 
language as colored glasses that interpreters put on their noses as they 
approach the biblical text.
Being aware of wearing glasses puts interpreters on their guard: it may 
be that some elements of meaning of the text are seen in a certain fashion 
or not seen at all because of them. To give one example: a person who would 
11 Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” in Science 155 
(1967), 1203-07.
12 For a summary of the discussion, Paul H. Santmyre, The Travail of Nature. The 
Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985), 1–7.
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approach the biblical text using the concept of “environment” would be 
party to modern Western dualism, which separates human beings from 
what surrounds them. This person might thus not be sensitive enough to 
the strength of the biblical view, which puts the greatest divide between the 
creator and creation, consequently underlining the ontological proximity 
of humans, animals, plants, rocks, etc., which all fall under the same 
theological category of creature. Therefore one should always be open to 
the possibility that the text might put into question the glasses themselves.
The meeting with the biblical scriptures
Among all the possible questions arising from the climate change challenge, 
we choose to consider the broadest and primary question in its simplest 
expression: is climate change an ethical issue for Christians and does it 
commit them to action in the name of their faith? For the Lutheran World 
Federation and, more broadly, the World Council of Churches, but also for 
other Christian bodies like the Roman Catholic Church or even the World 
Evangelical Alliance, the answer to this question is positive. Two main 
theological arguments have been put forward: climate change does concern 
Christians and commits them to act in a differentiated way because it is 
(1) a matter of care for God’s creation; and (2) a matter of justice and peace. 
We will focus on the first pillar: the theology of creation.
Climate change did not exist at the time of the writing of the different 
books of the Bible. In that sense, it is an issue alien to the scriptures. 
But the climate is a fundamental subsystem of the earth system and the 
experienced and projected changes impact all ecosystems and life in 
its variety13 and quality. It arguably falls under the general theme of the 
relationship human beings establish with what exists around them and 
with themselves. In theological terms, it relates to the relationship humans 
entertain with creation in the face of God the creator.
We cannot explore the rich discoveries of the Christian theology of 
creation as it unfolded over the past decades. But it is of special interest to 
get back to the interpretation debate triggered by Lynn White Jr.’s argument, 
which lies at the heart of our problem.14 The text put into question by White 
13 Climate change is for now playing a secondary role in the extinction of species, 
but it could become a major contributor to the much-feared sixth great extinction 
of species. See, Robert Barbault, “Loss of Biodiversity. Overview,” in Encyclopedia 
of Biodiversity (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013), 656–66.
14 We rely on John W. Rogerson, “The Creation Stories: Their Ecological Potential 
and Problems,” in David G. Horrel et al. (eds), Ecological Hermeneutics. Biblical, 
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is the biblical narrative of creation. Following the work of the Old Testament 
scholar Norbert Lohfink,15 the debate focused on verse 28 of the first chapter 
of the book of Genesis, which seemed to give credit to White’s case: “God 
blessed them, and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the 
earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over 
the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth’.”
Lohfink argued that important elements of this passage had been 
overlooked or were wrong. In particular, he defended the verse considering 
that the Hebrew verbs behind the translation “to subdue” and “to have 
dominion,” respectively kabash and radah, had been misunderstood. 
The former actually meant “to put the foot on something, in the sense of 
claiming ownership,”16 as in the case of the taking of the land of Canaan 
by the Israelites (Josh 18:1) and that the latter actually had a semantic 
field implying that it should be understood as “tender, sympathetic rule.”17 
This lexicographical argument has since been critiqued and thought to be 
unfounded, for example by Old Testament scholar Alfred Marx: “The verbs 
used [in Gen 1:28] are very harsh, they shall not be sweetened.”18 And it is 
true that a thorough review of the fourteen uses of kabash and twenty-four 
uses of radah in the Old Testament make such a softening difficult to defend.19 
One might wonder whether it is Lohfink’s defensive agenda that made him 
push an argument that does not hold up—a danger we had spotted above.
But Lohfink also made a remark that led scholars to reconsider the 
whole narrative from chapter 1 of Genesis to chapter 9, i.e., including 
the narrative of the flood. Lohfink indeed pointed to the following verse, 
which seemed to have been forgotten and whose implications had not been 
considered up to then: “God said, ‘See, I have given you every plant yielding 
seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its 
fruit; you shall have them for food” (Gen 1:29). In other words, according 
to the first narrative of creation, at the beginning, human beings were 
commanded to be vegetarians. It is only after the flood, considering that 
the human heart is inclined to evil, that God gave permission to humans 
to eat meat, lifeless meat, that is to say, without its blood (Gen 8:21–9:17). 
Historical and Theological Perspectives (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 21–31.
15 Norbert Lohfink, Unsere großen Wörter. Das Alte Testament zu Themen dieser 
Jahre (Freiburg: Herder, 1977).
16 Rogerson, op. cit. (note 14), 22.
17 Ibid.
18 Alfred Marx, “Assujettir ou veiller sur la création ?,” in Revue Projet 347 (2015), 37.
19 See Rogerson, op. cit (note 14), 25; and for a detailed discussion, Ute Neumann-
Gorsolke, Herrschen in den Grenzen der Schöpfung. Ein Beitrag zur alttestamentlichen 
Anthropologie am Beispiel vom Psalm 8, Genesis 1 und verwandten Texten (Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2004), 204–29 and 274–300.
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Lohfink dismissed as absurd the idea that all human beings should be 
vegetarians, but underlined that the first creation narrative was prophetic 
in its vision of a world without violence between humans and animals.
Later studies built on Lohfink’s remarkable insight and went a step 
further by noting that in verse 30, animals themselves were supposed 
to be vegetarians: “ ‘And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of 
the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has 
the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food.’ And it was so.” 
Furthermore, they also noted that the narrative of the flood explicitly 
states that the relationship between humans and animals changed with 
the change of diet:
The fear and dread of you shall rest on every animal of the earth, and on every 
bird of the air, on everything that creeps on the ground, and on all the fish of the 
sea; into your hand they are delivered. Every moving thing that lives shall be food 
for you; and just as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything (Gen 9:2–3).
Paul Beauchamp’s study20 shows that through diet, it is the relationship 
between all living beings that is at stake: according to the ideal of the 
origins, no one was to eat another living being. No one must hunt another. 
No one must fear another. The relationship between humans and animals 
is peaceful. It is quite relevant that this ideal of the origins also appears 
in texts about the ideal of the end of times. Scholars typically quote Isaiah:
The wolf shall live with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf 
and the lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. The cow 
and the bear shall graze, their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall 
eat straw like the ox. The nursing child shall play over the hole of the asp, and the 
weaned child shall put its hand on the adder’s den. They will not hurt or destroy 
on all my holy mountain; for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord 
as the waters cover the sea (Isa 11:6–9).
From these considerations, Beauchamp, Rogerson, Marx and others conclude, 
first, that it is only in this context that what the two verbs kabash and radah 
entail in the relationship with other creatures can be understood correctly: 
they are mastery in a non-violent world. Second, they acknowledge that 
this is not our world. We live in the world after the flood. But the worlds 
described in protological and eschatological texts share an ideal vision and 
put forward values, which Marx identifies as being solidarity between living 
20 Paul Beauchamp, “Création et foundation de la loi en Gn 1,1-2,4,” in Fabien 
Blanquart et al. (eds), La création dans l’orient ancient (Paris: Cerf, 1985), 139-82.
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beings, non-violence and respect for life. These provide an orientation or 
moral compass towards a renewed creation, which will be fully realized 
in eschatological times.
This interpretative effort, together with taking into consideration 
the whole biblical testimony, including several key excerpts of the New 
Testament, allows theologians creatively to construct a legitimate position 
in the face of climate change. Christians have to take the climate issue 
seriously and act upon it: to anticipate the coming world and the kingdom 
of God; to fulfill the well-understood mission of domination of the earth 
and submission of all living creatures; to till and guard the earth; truly 
to embody the image of God as followers of the serving Christ; to obey the 
command of loving the neighbor and follow the example of Jesus in the care 
for the most vulnerable; and to be seeds of justice and workers of peace.
Climate change is an example of transformative reading of the scrip-
tures in three directions: a renewed interpretation of the scriptures in 
the face of the ecological crisis led to a transformation of our theology 
with a renewed theology of creation. But, a renewed theology of creation 
also led to a transformation in the understanding of what it means to be 
a Christian in the contemporary world. These transformations or renew-
als can be described as a metanoia, a conversion, which leads to a third 
transformation: the transformation of individual and ecclesial behavior 
towards low-carbon, climate-resilient, sustainable livelihoods. “Choose life 
so that you and your descendants may live” (Dt 30:19), God advised after 
the giving of the Law. Although the issue of climate change was clearly 
not in the mind of the historical author, one cannot escape the resonance 
of this verse in the face of climate change. It is indeed a matter of life and 
death and God invites us to choose life, today as in the past.
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